Headline

CVE-2021-29474: Relative Path Traversal Attack on note creation

HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker can read arbitrary .md files from the server’s filesystem due to an improper input validation, which results in the ability to perform a relative path traversal. To verify if you are affected, you can try to open the following URL: http://localhost:3000/..%2F..%2FREADME# (replace http://localhost:3000 with your instance’s base-URL e.g. https://demo.hedgedoc.org/..%2F..%2FREADME#). If you see a README page being rendered, you run an affected version. The attack works due the fact that the internal router passes the url-encoded alias to the noteController.showNote-function. This function passes the input directly to findNote() utility function, that will pass it on the the parseNoteId()-function, that tries to make sense out of the noteId/alias and check if a note already exists and if so, if a corresponding file on disk was updated. If no note exists the note creation-function is called, which pass this unvalidated alias, with a .md appended, into a path.join()-function which is read from the filesystem in the follow up routine and provides the pre-filled content of the new note. This allows an attacker to not only read arbitrary .md files from the filesystem, but also observes changes to them. The usefulness of this attack can be considered limited, since mainly markdown files are use the file-ending .md and all markdown files contained in the hedgedoc project, like the README, are public anyway. If other protections such as a chroot or container or proper file permissions are in place, this attack’s usefulness is rather limited. On a reverse-proxy level one can force a URL-decode, which will prevent this attack because the router will not accept such a path.

3 years ago

CVE

Open in Source

#js #git

Impact

An attacker can read arbitrary .md files from the server’s filesystem due to an improper input validation, which results in the ability to perform a relative path traversal.

CVSSv3 string: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

PoC / Quicktest

To verify if you are affected, you can try to open the following URL: http://localhost:3000/…%2F…%2FREADME# (replace http://localhost:3000 with your instance’s base-URL e.g. https://demo.hedgedoc.org/…%2F…%2FREADME#).

If you see a README page being rendered, you run an affected version.

Analysis

The attack works due the fact that the internal router passes the url-encoded alias to the noteController.showNote-function. This function passes the input directly to findNote() utility function, that will pass it on the the parseNoteId()-function, that tries to make sense out of the noteId/alias and check if a note already exists and if so, if a corresponding file on disk was updated.

If no note exists the note creation-function is called, which pass this unvalidated alias, with a .md appended, into a path.join()-function which is read from the filesystem in the follow up routine and provides the pre-filled content of the new note.

This allows an attacker to not only read arbitrary .md files from the filesystem, but also observes changes to them.

The usefulness of this attack can be considered limited, since mainly markdown files are use the file-ending .md and all markdown files contained in the hedgedoc project, like the README, are public anyway. If other protections such as a chroot or container or proper file permissions are in place, this attack’s usefulness is rather limited.

Patches

diff --git a/lib/models/note.js b/lib/models/note.js index 9fe02359…49b7ce84 100644 — a/lib/models/note.js +++ b/lib/models/note.js @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ module.exports = function (sequelize, DataTypes) { if (!note.alias) { filePath = config.defaultNotePath } else { - filePath = path.join(config.docsPath, note.alias + ‘.md’)

         filePath = path.join(config.docsPath, path.basename(note.alias) + '.md')
       }
       if (Note.checkFileExist(filePath)) {
         var fsCreatedTime = moment(fs.statSync(filePath).ctime)

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ module.exports = function (sequelize, DataTypes) { } }).then(function (note) { if (note) { - let filePath = path.join(config.docsPath, noteId + ‘.md’)

       let filePath = path.join(config.docsPath, path.basename(noteId) + '.md')
       if (Note.checkFileExist(filePath)) {
         // if doc in filesystem have newer modified time than last change time
         // then will update the doc in db

@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ module.exports = function (sequelize, DataTypes) { return callback(null, note.id) } } else { - var filePath = path.join(config.docsPath, noteId + ‘.md’)

       var filePath = path.join(config.docsPath, path.basename(noteId) + '.md')
       if (Note.checkFileExist(filePath)) {
         Note.create({
           alias: noteId,

Workarounds

On a reverse-proxy level one can force a URL-decode, which will prevent this attack because the router will not accept such a path.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: