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CVE-2007-6283: /etc/rndc.key has 644 permissions by default

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and Fedora install the Bind /etc/rndc.key file with world-readable permissions, which allows local users to perform unauthorized named commands, such as causing a denial of service by stopping named.

CVE
#linux#red_hat#dos

Description Florian La Roche 2007-12-11 09:40:22 UTC

Description of problem:

/etc/rndc.key is readable for all, so any user can issue named commands like “rndc stop” to shut named down or other things.

/usr/sbin/rndc is not readable for all users, but we usually then don’t restrict the binary in this way, but keep the binary openly available. (Does not really count to the above mentioned item, but might be something to look at for testing purposes.)

regards,

Florian La Roche

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):

How reproducible:

Steps to Reproduce:

Actual results:

Expected results:

Additional info:

Comment 1 Mark J. Cox 2007-12-11 10:56:43 UTC

Confirmed, on a test RHEL5 system without bind-chroot, /etc/rndc.conf is mode 644

Comment 2 Adam Tkac 2007-12-11 12:08:09 UTC

Thanks for report. This is pretty bad issue. Anyone could control server with self-compiled rndc (to bypass 750 rndc perms). I think this should be clone to z-stream

Comment 3 Tomas Hoger 2007-12-11 12:20:36 UTC

This problem only affects bind packages as shipped in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and Fedora. If only affects system without recommended bind-chroot package installed, which reconfigures bind to run chrooted in /var/named/chroot directory. /var/named/chroot has correct permissions by default (root:named, 750).

Version of bind as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1, 3, and 4 create rndc.conf file with sane permissions by default (root:named, 640).

Possible impact - any user with access to system running bind can perform following actions using rndc:

  • stop named
  • change logging level of daemon by setting too low (malicious activity will not appear in the log) or too high (high disk usage due to lots of debug messages being logged) log level value
  • request configuration or zone file reload (contents of file is not controlled by unprivileged user)
  • disable updates of dynamic zone

rndc installed without read and execute permission for other users does not provide sufficient protection, as described by reporter.

Comment 4 Tomas Hoger 2007-12-11 13:38:02 UTC

Possible workarounds for affected systems:

  • Manually fix permissions of rndc.key file:

    chmod 640 /etc/rndc.key chown root:named /etc/rndc.key

OR

  • Install bind-chroot package and run bind chrooted in /var/named/chroot

Comment 5 Florian La Roche 2007-12-11 13:42:14 UTC

Since the key could be stolen maybe a new key should get generated for existing rndc.key files?

regards,

Florian La Roche

Comment 6 Tomas Hoger 2007-12-11 14:03:42 UTC

(In reply to comment #5) > Since the key could be stolen maybe a new key should get generated for

existing rndc.key files?

If it’s possible that rndc key was compromised in the meantime, new one can be generated using /usr/sbin/dns-keygen . New key printed on standard output should be used in rndc.key file as new value for secret keyword and named has to be restarted / reload for the change to take effect.

Example:

/usr/sbin/dns-keygen

we2sIj37XBlBC0FslnmOhjVNCx3M4KbAOUpRxYndd7gdRra7ZZ5qdqwmCDVL

Line with “secret” keyword in rndc.conf should be changed to:

secret "we2sIj37XBlBC0FslnmOhjVNCx3M4KbAOUpRxYndd7gdRra7ZZ5qdqwmCDVL";

Florian, thanks for reminding that.

Comment 8 ivo 2007-12-18 09:57:46 UTC

(In reply to comment #3) > This problem only affects bind packages as shipped in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5

and Fedora.

Please report the affected distribution versions of Fedora. Thank you.

Comment 9 Tomas Hoger 2007-12-18 10:10:50 UTC

(In reply to comment #8) > (In reply to comment #3)

This problem only affects bind packages as shipped in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and Fedora.

Please report the affected distribution versions of Fedora. Thank you.

Sorry, no specific versions were listed as bind packages in all currently supported Fedora versions (7, 8 and rawhide) were affected by this issue.

Please follow instructions in comment #4 and comment #6 if your configuration is affected and this issue may cause problems in your environment.

Comment 11 Adam Tkac 2007-12-19 15:57:36 UTC

(In reply to comment #10) > Created an attachment (id=290037) [edit]

patch

From F8 branch, other distributions will have appropriate version in trigger.

Comment 13 Fedora Update System 2007-12-20 19:49:20 UTC

bind-9.5.0-20.b1.fc8 has been pushed to the Fedora 8 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.

Comment 16 Vladislav Bogdanov 2008-02-01 15:26:51 UTC

Just my 2 cents. After fixing permissions on /etc/rndc.conf, /usr/sbin/rndc could be freely installed as root:root 0755 (or as root:named 0750), so any administrator (or some kind of automated script or daemon, f.e. ldap2dnsd, that is running as the user in the ‘named’ group) who has been added to the ‘named’ group will be able reload nameserver.

Regards, Vladislav Bogdanov.

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