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CVE-2015-10004: Merge pull request #13 from polezaivsani/fix_timming_sidechannel · robbert229/jwt@ca1404e
Token validation methods are susceptible to a timing side-channel during HMAC comparison. With a large enough number of requests over a low latency connection, an attacker may use this to determine the expected HMAC.
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Merge pull request #13 from polezaivsani/fix_timming_sidechannel
Spoil timming side-channel attack when comparing macs
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2 parents 2eb16e9 + eddce24 commit ca1404ee6e83fcbafb66b09ed0d543850a15b654
Showing 1 changed file with 1 addition and 1 deletion.
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ func (a *Algorithm) validateSignature(encoded string) error {
b64SignedAttempt := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(signedAttempt))
if strings.Compare(b64Signature, b64SignedAttempt) != 0 {
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(b64Signature), []byte(b64SignedAttempt)) {
return errors.New(“invalid signature”)
}
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Token validation methods are susceptible to a timing side-channel during HMAC comparison. With a large enough number of requests over a low latency connection, an attacker may use this to determine the expected HMAC.