Headline
CVE-2022-44034: [PATCH v5] char: pcmcia: scr24x_cs: Fix use-after-free in scr24x_fops
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 6.0.6. drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c has a race condition and resultant use-after-free if a physically proximate attacker removes a PCMCIA device while calling open(), aka a race condition between scr24x_open() and scr24x_remove().
From: Hyunwoo Kim [email protected] To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Subject: [PATCH v5] char: pcmcia: scr24x_cs: Fix use-after-free in scr24x_fops Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2022 03:18:25 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: 20220919101825.GA313940@ubuntu (raw)
A race condition may occur if the user physically removes the pcmcia device while calling open() for this char device node.
This is a race condition between the scr24x_open() function and the scr24x_remove() function, which may eventually result in UAF.
So, add a mutex to the scr24x_open() and scr24x_remove() functions to avoid race contidion of krefs.
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim [email protected] Reported-by: kernel test robot [email protected]
v2: fixed issue using dev’s member mutex which can be freed after kref_put() v3: fixed using “removed” member of dev that could be freed after kref_put() v4: fix issue referencing uninitialized dev in scr24x_open() function v5: Fix patch reporting email format
drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++±--------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c b/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c index 1bdce08fae3d…039d44ee0ebe 100644 — a/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c +++ b/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
struct scr24x_dev { struct device *dev;
- struct pcmcia_device *p_dev; struct cdev c_dev; unsigned char buf[CCID_MAX_LEN]; int devno; @@ -42,15 +43,31 @@ struct scr24x_dev { };
#define SCR24X_DEVS 8 -static DECLARE_BITMAP(scr24x_minors, SCR24X_DEVS); +static struct pcmcia_device *dev_table[SCR24X_DEVS]; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(remove_mutex);
static struct class *scr24x_class; static dev_t scr24x_devt;
static void scr24x_delete(struct kref *kref) { - struct scr24x_dev *dev = container_of(kref, struct scr24x_dev,
refcnt);
struct scr24x_dev *dev = container_of(kref, struct scr24x_dev, refcnt);
struct pcmcia_device *link = dev->p_dev;
int devno;
for (devno = 0; devno < SCR24X_DEVS; devno++) {
if (dev\_table\[devno\] == link)
break;
}
if (devno == SCR24X_DEVS)
return;
device_destroy(scr24x_class, MKDEV(MAJOR(scr24x_devt), dev->devno));
mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
pcmcia_disable_device(link);
cdev_del(&dev->c_dev);
dev->dev = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
kfree(dev); } @@ -73,11 +90,24 @@ static int scr24x_wait_ready(struct scr24x_dev *dev)
static int scr24x_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - struct scr24x_dev *dev = container_of(inode->i_cdev,
struct scr24x\_dev, c\_dev);
struct scr24x_dev *dev;
struct pcmcia_device *link;
int minor = iminor(inode);
if (minor >= SCR24X_DEVS)
return -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&remove_mutex);
link = dev_table[minor];
if (link == NULL) {
mutex\_unlock(&remove\_mutex);
return -ENODEV;
}
dev = link->priv; kref_get(&dev->refcnt); filp->private_data = dev;
mutex_unlock(&remove_mutex);
return stream_open(inode, filp); } @@ -232,24 +262,31 @@ static int scr24x_config_check(struct pcmcia_device *link, void *priv_data) static int scr24x_probe(struct pcmcia_device *link) { struct scr24x_dev *dev; - int ret;
int i, ret;
for (i = 0; i < SCR24X_DEVS; i++) {
if (dev\_table\[i\] == NULL)
break;
}
if (i == SCR24X_DEVS)
return -ENODEV;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev) return -ENOMEM;
- dev->devno = find_first_zero_bit(scr24x_minors, SCR24X_DEVS);
- if (dev->devno >= SCR24X_DEVS) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto err;
- }
dev->devno = i;
mutex_init(&dev->lock); kref_init(&dev->refcnt);
link->priv = dev;
dev->p_dev = link; link->config_flags |= CONF_ENABLE_IRQ | CONF_AUTO_SET_IO;
dev_table[i] = link;
ret = pcmcia_loop_config(link, scr24x_config_check, NULL); if (ret < 0) goto err; @@ -282,8 +319,8 @@ static int scr24x_probe(struct pcmcia_device *link) return 0;
err: - if (dev->devno < SCR24X_DEVS)
clear\_bit(dev->devno, scr24x\_minors);
- dev_table[i] = NULL;
- kfree (dev); return ret; } @@ -292,15 +329,9 @@ static void scr24x_remove(struct pcmcia_device *link) { struct scr24x_dev *dev = (struct scr24x_dev *)link->priv;
- device_destroy(scr24x_class, MKDEV(MAJOR(scr24x_devt), dev->devno));
- mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
- pcmcia_disable_device(link);
- cdev_del(&dev->c_dev);
- clear_bit(dev->devno, scr24x_minors);
- dev->dev = NULL;
- mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
- mutex_lock(&remove_mutex); kref_put(&dev->refcnt, scr24x_delete);
- mutex_unlock(&remove_mutex); }
static const struct pcmcia_device_id scr24x_ids[] = {
base-commit: 521a547ced6477c54b4b0cc206000406c221b4d6
2.25.1
reply other threads:\[~2022-09-19 10:26 UTC|newest\]
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