Headline
CVE-2021-21955: TALOS-2021-1382 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group
An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the get_aes_key_info_by_packetid() function of the home_security binary of Anker Eufy Homebase 2 2.1.6.9h. Generic network sniffing can lead to password recovery. An attacker can sniff network traffic to trigger this vulnerability.
Summary
An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the get_aes_key_info_by_packetid() function of the home_security binary of Anker Eufy Homebase 2 2.1.6.9h. Generic network sniffing can lead to password recovery. An attacker can sniff network traffic to trigger this vulnerability.
Tested Versions
Anker Eufy Homebase 2 2.1.6.9h
Product URLs
https://us.eufylife.com/products/t88411d1
CVSSv3 Score
7.7 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
CWE
CWE-334 - Small Space of Random Values
Details
The Eufy Homebase 2 is the video storage and networking gateway that enables the functionality of the Eufy Smarthome ecosystem. All Eufy devices connect back to this device, and this device connects out to the cloud, while also providing assorted services to enhance other Eufy Smarthome devices.
The Eufy Homebase 2’s home_security binary is a central cog in the device, spawning an inordinate amount of pthreads immediately after executing, each with their own little task. For the purposes of this advisory, we care solely about the pthread in charge of a particular cloud connectivity occurring with IP address 18.224.66.194 on UDP port 8006. An example of such traffic is shown below:
// device -> cloud
0000 58 5a fe b9 0b 00 00 00 59 5e 42 61 01 00 00 00 XZ......Y^Ba....
0010 00 00 01 00 54 38 30 31 30 4e 31 32 33 34 35 36 ....T8010N123456
0020 37 48 39 3A 00 789A.
This particular packet is the CMD_DEVICE_HEARTBEAT_CHECK, and the server’s response is seen below:
// cloud -> device response
0000 58 5a 32 b2 0b 00 1d 00 59 5e 42 61 01 00 01 00 XZ2.....Y^Ba....
0010 00 00 01 00 54 38 30 31 30 4e 31 32 33 34 35 36 ....T8010N123456
0020 38 48 39 3a 00 7b 22 64 65 76 69 63 65 5f 69 70 789a.{"device_ip
0030 22 3a 22 37 31 2e 31 36 32 2e 32 33 37 2e 33 34 ":"71.162.237.34
0040 22 7d "}
While there is some interesting information already visible, reversing the protocol and viewing with a decoder is much more informative:
[>_>] ---Pushpkt---
Magic : 0x5a58
CRC : 0x1234
Opcode : 0x000b (CMD_DEVICE_HEARTBEAT_CHECK)
Bodylen : 0x0000
Time (unix) : 1632154786
msg_ver : 0x0001
is_resp : 0x00
idk_lol : 0x00
idk_lol2 : 0x0000
non_zero : 0x0001
Hub SN : T8010N123456789a\x00
[<_<] response pkt:
[>_>] ---Pushpkt---
Magic : 0x5a58
CRC : 0x5678
Opcode : 0x000b (CMD_DEVICE_HEARTBEAT_CHECK)
Bodylen : 0x001d
Time (unix) : 1632154746
msg_ver : 0x0001
is_resp : 0x01
idk_lol : 0x00
idk_lol2 : 0x0000
non_zero : 0x0001
Hub SN : T8010N123456789a\x00
Msgbody : {"device_ip":"71.162.237.34"}
While this specific command doesn’t particularly do much, there does exist a decent amount of other opcodes to interact with:
opcode_dict = {
0xb : "CMD_DEVICE_HEARTBEAT_CHECK",
0xc : "CMD_DEVICE_GET_SERVER_LIST_REQUEST",
0xd : "CMD_DEVICE_GET_RSA_KEY_REQUEST", // [1]
0x22 : "CMD_SERVER_GET_AES_KEY_INFO",
0x3ea : "zx_app_unbind_hub_by_server",
0x3eb : "zx_start_stream",
0x3ec : "zx_stream_delete",
0x3f1 : "zx_set_dev_storagetype_by_SN",
0x40a : "APP_CMD_HUB_REBOOT",
0x410 : "zx_unbind_dev_by_sn",
0x464 : "APP_CMD_GET_EXCEPTION_LOG",
0x46d : "CMD_GET_HUB_UPGRADE",
0xbb8 : "turn_on_facial_recognition?",
0xfa0 : "wifi_country_code_update",
0xfa1 : "wifi_channel_update",
0x1388 : "CMD_SET_DEFINE_COMMAND_VALUE",
0x1770 : "CMD_SET_DEFINE_COMMAND_STRING"
}
This advisory deals with the fact that some of these opcodes require authentication, whilst others don’t. Any opcodes greater that 0x10 (i.e. below [1]) require authentication. These authenticated commands are rather powerful and some of them can be exploited for further escalation, but this is a digression, for we now discuss exactly how this authentication occurs. To start, we first visit the zx_push_receiver_msg_process function, called on boot to initialize the device’s cloud communication server:
005a10a0 int32_t zx_push_receiver_msg_process()
005a1114 dzlog(0x79c99c, 0x17, 0x79dcc4, 0x1c, 0x1d7, 0x28, 0x79cf78, getpid(), 0x83bdb0) {"src/zx_push_interface.c"} {"enter PID=%d"} {"zx_push_receiver_msg_process"}
005a1120 init_udp_server_domain()
005a112c update_udp_push_config_file()
005a113c s_aes_key = 0
005a1178 rand_str(&s_aes_key, rand_len: 0x10) // [2]
The only thing worth noting is that the s_aes_key static variable is initialized to a random secret on boot by the rand_str function:
004ec5a4 void* rand_str(void* arg1, int32_t rand_len)
004ec5c4 int32_t var_20 = 0
004ec5e4 void var_18
004ec5e4 void var_10
004ec5e4 gettimeofday(&var_18, &var_10) // [3]
004ec5f8 int32_t var_14
004ec5f8 int32_t var_1c = var_14
004ec608 // seeded with usec
004ec614 srand(var_1c) // [4]
004ec698 for (int32_t ctr = 0; ctr s< rand_len; ctr = ctr + 1) // [5]
004ec674 *(arg1 + ctr) = *((rand_r(&var_1c) & 0x3f) + 0x7895a4) {"0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV…"} // [6]
004ec6b0 *(arg1 + rand_len) = 0
004ec6c4 return arg1
We can see the tv.tv_usec field of gettimeofday [3] being used to seed srand at [4], which is totally fine. At [5] we start looping and putting random characters into the output at [6]. The full keyspace looks as such:
>>> len("0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz~_")
64
Up until this point, the secret generation seems relatively normal, but let us now examine how this secret is utilized in the process_msg function, which handles validation and authentication:
005a28a0 int32_t aes_key_len = strlen(s_aes_key, pkttime)
005a28b4 if (aes_key_len != 0x10)
005a2d60 $v0_9 = dzlog(0x79c99c, 0x17, 0x79dc6c, 0xb, 0x33b, 0x28, 0x79d3f0) {"src/zx_push_interface.c"} {"process_msg COMM_RANDOM_AES_ENCR…"} {"process_msg"}
005a28c0 else
005a28c0 int32_t inp_key_str = 0
005a2924 if (get_aes_key_info_by_packetid(str: s_aes_key, packetid: devpkt_arg1->time, output: &inp_key_str) != 0) // [7]
005a2d0c $v0_9 = dzlog(0x79c99c, 0x17, 0x79dc6c, 0xb, 0x337, 0x28, 0x79d39c) {"src/zx_push_interface.c"} {"process_msg COMM_RANDOM_AES_ENCR…"} {"process_msg"}
005a2948 else
005a2948 struct aes_key_st* preexpanded
005a2948 int_aes_decryptkey(inputkey: &inp_key_str, aeskey: &preexpanded) // [8]
005a2978 void some_output_s0x448_l0x401
005a2978 memset(&some_output_s0x448_l0x401, 0, 0x401)
005a2984 int32_t var_bb8_1 = 0
005a29b4 int32_t declen = aes_decrypt(key: &preexpanded, inp_enc: &devpkt_arg1->hub_sn, inplen: 0x10, decbytes: &some_output_s0x448_l0x401) // [9]
005a29cc int32_t sn_enc_strncmp
005a29cc if (declen == 0x10)
005a29f0 sn_enc_strncmp = strncmp(g_hub_sn, &some_output_s0x448_l0x401, 0x10) // [10]
005a29cc if (sn_enc_strncmp != 0)
005a2a58 dzlog(0x79c99c, 0x17, 0x79dc6c, 0xb, 0x310, 0x28, 0x79d2f0, &some_output_s0x448_l0x401, 0x881c30) {"src/zx_push_interface.c"} {"process_msg COMM_RANDOM_AES_ENCR…"} {"process_msg"}
005a2a68 $v0_9 = send_device_packet_by_command_id(opcode: 0xd)
After getting through some basic validation of the packet length, packet time, etc, we get to the authentication. This process starts at [7], where the previously generated s_aes_key is taken, modified and then thrown into the inp_key_str stack variable at [7]. We’ll skip the actual implementation of get_aes_key_info_by_packetid for a second and continue looking at this function. This new key is utilized as the secret for AES_set_decrypt_key inside int_aes_decryptkey[8], and then the decryption of our input packet’s hub_sn field occurs at [9]. This decrypted string is then compared against the device’s serial number at [10]. If it’s a match, we’ve successfully authenticated. At first glance this might appear secure, but there are two very important facets of this code that we must examine further.
While the hub_sn eventually is encrypted for authenticated packets, as long as we can sniff the wire, this string flows periodically to the cloud servers unencrypted. Take for example the previously posted example push packet:
[>_>] ---Pushpkt---
Magic : 0x5a58
CRC : 0x1234
Opcode : 0x000b (CMD_DEVICE_HEARTBEAT_CHECK)
Bodylen : 0x0000
Time (unix) : 1632154786
msg_ver : 0x0001
is_resp : 0x00
idk_lol : 0x00
idk_lol2 : 0x0000
non_zero : 0x0001
Hub SN : T8010N123456789a\x00 // [11]
We can clearly see this hub_sn value [11] over the wire all the time, so this is a known value. Keeping this in mind, the second facet exists within the glossed-over get_aes_key_info_by_packetid function:
00551658 int32_t get_aes_key_info_by_packetid(char *inpstr, int32_t packetid, char* output)
00551680 void pktid_str
00551680 int32_t pktidlen
00551680 if (str != 0 && output != 0)
005516cc strncpy(output, str, strlen(str)) // [12]
005516fc sprintf(&pktid_str, 0x79071c, packetid) // "%d" // [13]
0055171c pktidlen = strlen(&pktid_str)
To start and reiterate, the input secret is our randomly generated 0x10 length s_aes_key, and the packetid field is the devpkt->time field that we provide in our packet. At [12] the input secret is appropriately strncpy‘ed to the output, and then at [13] we take the decimal format of the devpkt->time. For a quick example of what this would look like:
>>> str(time.time()).split(".")[0]
'1632411932'
It’s important to note that the input devpkt->time field must be within 60 seconds of the unix time of the Eufy Homebase device, or else it is considered invalid and we never get to the authentication. Thus, since enough time has passed since epoch, the length of this string will always be 10 bytes. Also, to see the Eufy device’s time, it suffices to sniff network traffic and pull it from one of the outbound packets. Continuing on within get_aes_key_info_by_packetid:
00551680 if (str != 0 && output != 0)
005516cc strncpy(output, str, strlen(str))
005516fc sprintf(&pktid_str, 0x79071c, packetid) // "%d" // [14]
0055171c pktidlen = strlen(&pktid_str)
00551680 int32_t ret
00551680 if (str == 0 || (str != 0 && output == 0) || (str != 0 && output != 0 && pktidlen s>= 0x10))
0055178c ret = 0xffffffff
00551680 if (str != 0 && output != 0 && pktidlen s< 0x10)
00551774 memcpy(&output[0x10 - pktidlen], &pktid_str, pktidlen) // [15]
00551780 ret = 0
00551798 return ret
After the pktid_str is generated at [14], it is then memcpy‘ed on top of our s_aes_key copy at [15]. Since this occurs in an overlapping fashion and not in an appending fashion, the output secret will look something like aC01_? + 1632411932, i.e. the first bytes of our randomly generated s_aes_key and then the unix time as a string. While the output secret is the same length as we had before, 0x10, this function reduces entropy of our AES encryption from 0x10 bytes to 0x6 bytes, and our keyspace goes from 64^16 (79228162514264337593543950336 combinations) to 64^6 (68719476736 combinations).
To summarize all this into a final vulnerability: Since we know what the decrypted authentication string is supposed to be (our device’s g_hub_sn, T8010N123456789a), and we also know the last 10 bytes of the encryption key that’s used for a given packet (the unix time), then it easily becomes possible to offline bruteforce the first six bytes of the AES secret that’s actually used to encrypt the g_hub_sn. Once we know these first 6 bytes, it does not matter what the current unix time is, we can simply append the first six bytes of the bruteforced s_aes_key to the current unix time and gain privileges, resulting in an authentication bypass.
Timeline
2021-09-30 - Vendor Disclosure
2021-11-22 - Vendor Patched
2021-11-29 - Public Release
Discovered by Lilith >_> of Cisco Talos.