Headline
GHSA-4mmh-5vw7-rgvj: Venice vulnerable to Partial Path Traversal issue within the functions `load-file` and `load-resource`
Impact
A partial path traversal issue exists within the functions load-file
and load-resource
. These functions can be limited to load files from a list of load paths.
Assuming Venice has been configured with the load paths: [ "/Users/foo/resources" ]
When passing relative paths to these two vulnerable functions everything is fine:
(load-resource "test.png")
=> loads the file “/Users/foo/resources/test.png”
(load-resource "../resources-alt/test.png")
=> rejected, outside the load path
When passing absolute paths to these two vulnerable functions Venice may return files outside the configured load paths:
(load-resource "/Users/foo/resources/test.png")
=> loads the file “/Users/foo/resources/test.png”
(load-resource "/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png")
=> loads the file “/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png” !!!
The latter call suffers from the Partial Path Traversal vulnerability.
This issue’s scope is limited to absolute paths whose name prefix matches a load path. E.g. for a load-path "/Users/foo/resources"
, the actor can cause loading a resource also from "/Users/foo/resources-alt"
, but not from "/Users/foo/images"
.
Versions of Venice before and including v1.10.16 are affected by this issue.
Patches
Upgrade to Venice >= 1.10.17, if you are on a version < 1.10.17
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade the library, you can control the functions that can be used in Venice with a sandbox. If it is appropriate, the functions load-file
and load-resource
can be blacklisted in the sandbox.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in GitHub Venice
- Email us at juerg.ch
Credits
I want to publicly recognize the contribution of Jonathan Leitschuh for reporting this issue.
Impact
A partial path traversal issue exists within the functions load-file and load-resource. These functions can be limited to load files from a list of load paths.
Assuming Venice has been configured with the load paths: [ “/Users/foo/resources” ]
When passing relative paths to these two vulnerable functions everything is fine:
(load-resource “test.png”) => loads the file “/Users/foo/resources/test.png”
(load-resource “…/resources-alt/test.png”) => rejected, outside the load path
When passing absolute paths to these two vulnerable functions Venice may return files outside the configured load paths:
(load-resource “/Users/foo/resources/test.png”) => loads the file “/Users/foo/resources/test.png”
(load-resource “/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png”) => loads the file “/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png” !!!
The latter call suffers from the Partial Path Traversal vulnerability.
This issue’s scope is limited to absolute paths whose name prefix matches a load path. E.g. for a load-path "/Users/foo/resources", the actor can cause loading a resource also from "/Users/foo/resources-alt", but not from "/Users/foo/images".
Versions of Venice before and including v1.10.16 are affected by this issue.
Patches
Upgrade to Venice >= 1.10.17, if you are on a version < 1.10.17
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade the library, you can control the functions that can be used in Venice with a sandbox. If it is appropriate, the functions load-file and load-resource can be blacklisted in the sandbox.
References
- PR
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in GitHub Venice
- Email us at juerg.ch
Credits
I want to publicly recognize the contribution of Jonathan Leitschuh for reporting this issue.
References
- GHSA-4mmh-5vw7-rgvj
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36007
- jlangch/venice@215ae91
- jlangch/venice@c942c73
- https://github.com/jlangch/venice/releases/tag/v1.10.17
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Venice is a Clojure inspired sandboxed Lisp dialect with excellent Java interoperability. A partial path traversal issue exists within the functions `load-file` and `load-resource`. These functions can be limited to load files from a list of load paths. Assuming Venice has been configured with the load paths: `[ "/Users/foo/resources" ]` When passing **relative** paths to these two vulnerable functions everything is fine: `(load-resource "test.png")` => loads the file "/Users/foo/resources/test.png" `(load-resource "../resources-alt/test.png")` => rejected, outside the load path When passing **absolute** paths to these two vulnerable functions Venice may return files outside the configured load paths: `(load-resource "/Users/foo/resources/test.png")` => loads the file "/Users/foo/resources/test.png" `(load-resource "/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png")` => loads the file "/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png" !!! The latter call suffers from the _Partial Path Traversal_ vulnerability. This...