Headline
GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc: Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.
Impact
In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures.
There is no known compromise the default public good instance (rekor.sigstore.dev) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected.
Patches
This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399
Workarounds
n/a
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model
Package
gomod github.com/sigstore/gitsign (Go)
Affected versions
>= 0.6.0, < 0.8.0
Patched versions
0.8.0
Description
Impact
In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures.
There is no known compromise the default public good instance (rekor.sigstore.dev) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected.
Patches
This was fixed in v0.8.0 via sigstore/gitsign#399
Workarounds
n/a
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model
References
- GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47122
- sigstore/gitsign#399
- sigstore/gitsign@cd66ccb
- https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model
wlynch published to sigstore/gitsign
Nov 10, 2023
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Nov 10, 2023
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Nov 14, 2023
Reviewed
Nov 14, 2023
Last updated
Nov 14, 2023
Related news
Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available.