Headline
GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2: On a compromised node, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs
Impact
If a malicious user has taken over a Kubernetes node where virt-handler (the KubeVirt node-daemon) is running, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs.
This can be misused to lure-in system-level-privileged components (which can for instance read all secrets on the cluster, or can exec into pods on other nodes). This way a compromised node can be used to elevate privileges beyond the node until potentially having full privileged access to the whole cluster.
The simplest way to exploit this, once a user could compromise a specific node, is to set with the virt-handler service account all other nodes to unschedulable and simply wait until system-critical components with high privileges appear on its node.
Since this requires a node to be compromised first, the severity of this finding is considered Medium.
Patches
Not yet available.
Workarounds
Gatekeeper users can add a webhook which will block the virt-handler service account to modify the spec of a node.
An example policy, preventing virt-handler from changing the node spec may look like this:
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
name: virthandlerrestrictions
spec:
[...]
targets:
- libs:
- |
[...]
is_virt_handler(username) {
username == "system:serviceaccount:kubevirt:virt-handler"
}
mutates_node_in_unintended_way {
# TODO
# only allow kubevirt.io/ prefixed metadata node changes
}
rego: |
[...]
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
is_virt_handler(username)
mutates_node_in_unintended_way(input.review.object, input.review.oldObject)
msg := sprintf("virt-handler tries to modify node <%v> in an unintended way.", [input.review.object.name])
}
and applying this template to node modifications.
Credits
Special thanks to the discoverers of this issue:
Nanzi Yang ([email protected]) Xin Guo ([email protected]) Jietao Xiao ([email protected]) Wenbo Shen ([email protected]) Jinku Li ([email protected])
References
https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/issues/9109
- GitHub Advisory Database
- GitHub Reviewed
- CVE-2023-26484
On a compromised node, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs
Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Mar 15, 2023 in kubevirt/kubevirt
Package
gomod kubevirt.io/kubevirt (Go)
Affected versions
<= 0.59.0
Impact
If a malicious user has taken over a Kubernetes node where virt-handler (the KubeVirt node-daemon) is running, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs.
This can be misused to lure-in system-level-privileged components (which can for instance read all secrets on the cluster, or can exec into pods on other nodes). This way a compromised node can be used to elevate privileges beyond the node until potentially having full privileged access to the whole cluster.
The simplest way to exploit this, once a user could compromise a specific node, is to set with the virt-handler service account all other nodes to unschedulable and simply wait until system-critical components with high privileges appear on its node.
Since this requires a node to be compromised first, the severity of this finding is considered Medium.
Patches
Not yet available.
Workarounds
Gatekeeper users can add a webhook which will block the virt-handler service account to modify the spec of a node.
An example policy, preventing virt-handler from changing the node spec may look like this:
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
name: virthandlerrestrictions
spec:
[…]
targets:
- libs:
- |
[…]
is_virt_handler(username) {
username == “system:serviceaccount:kubevirt:virt-handler”
}
mutates_node_in_unintended_way {
# TODO
# only allow kubevirt.io/ prefixed metadata node changes
}
rego: |
[…]
violation\[{"msg": msg}\] {
is\_virt\_handler(username)
mutates\_node\_in\_unintended\_way(input.review.object, input.review.oldObject)
msg := sprintf("virt-handler tries to modify node <%v> in an unintended way.", \[input.review.object.name\])
}
and applying this template to node modifications.
Credits
Special thanks to the discoverers of this issue:
Nanzi Yang ([email protected])
Xin Guo ([email protected])
Jietao Xiao ([email protected])
Wenbo Shen ([email protected])
Jinku Li ([email protected])
References
kubevirt/kubevirt#9109
References
- GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26484
- kubevirt/kubevirt#9109
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Mar 15, 2023
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Mar 16, 2023
Related news
KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In versions 0.59.0 and prior, if a malicious user has taken over a Kubernetes node where virt-handler (the KubeVirt node-daemon) is running, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs. This can be misused to lure-in system-level-privileged components which can, for instance, read all secrets on the cluster, or can exec into pods on other nodes. This way, a compromised node can be used to elevate privileges beyond the node until potentially having full privileged access to the whole cluster. The simplest way to exploit this, once a user could compromise a specific node, is to set with the virt-handler service account all other nodes to unschedulable and simply wait until system-critical components with high privileges appear on its node. No patches are available as of time of publication. As a workaround, gatekeeper users can add a webhook which will block the `virt-handler` service account to mod...