#git

### Summary Any project that uses Protobuf pure-Python backend to parse untrusted Protocol Buffers data containing an arbitrary number of **recursive groups**, **recursive messages** or **a series of [`SGROUP`](https://protobuf.dev/programming-guides/encoding/#groups) tags** can be corrupted by exceeding the Python recursion limit. Reporter: Alexis Challande, Trail of Bits Ecosystem Security Team [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) Affected versions: This issue only affects the [pure-Python implementation](https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/tree/main/python#implementation-backends) of protobuf-python backend. This is the implementation when `PROTOCOL_BUFFERS_PYTHON_IMPLEMENTATION=python` environment variable is set or the default when protobuf is used from Bazel or pure-Python PyPi wheels. CPython PyPi wheels do not use pure-Python by default. This is a Python variant of a [previous issue affecting protobuf-java](https://github.com/protocolbuffers/...

### Impact When a user who hasn't logged in to the system before (i.e. doesn't exist in the authd user database) logs in via SSH, the user is considered a member of the root group in the context of the SSH session. That leads to a local privilege escalation if the user should not have root privileges. ### Patches Fixed by https://github.com/ubuntu/authd/commit/619ce8e55953b970f1765ddaad565081538151ab ### Workarounds Configure the SSH server to not allow authenticating via authd, for example by setting `UsePAM no` or `KbdInteractiveAuthentication no` in the `sshd_config` (see https://documentation.ubuntu.com/authd/stable/howto/login-ssh/#ssh-configuration).

Path traversal vulnerability with the downloading and installation of Xuggler in Liferay Portal 7.0.0 through 7.4.3.4, and Liferay DXP 7.4 GA, 7.3 GA through update 34, and older unsupported versions allows remote attackers to (1) add files to arbitrary locations on the server and (2) download and execute arbitrary files from the download server via the `_com_liferay_server_admin_web_portlet_ServerAdminPortlet_jarName` parameter.

### Impact The audit log notifications included the full IP address of the acting user. This could be obtained by third-party servers such as SMTP relays, or spam filters. ### Patches This issue has been addressed in Weblate 5.12 via https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/15102. ### References Thanks to [micael1](https://hackerone.com/micael1) for reporting this [issue at HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/reports/3179850).

### Impact The verification of the second factor was not subject to rate limiting. The absence of rate limiting on the second factor endpoint allows an attacker with valid credentials to automate OTP guessing. ### Patches This issue has been addressed in Weblate 5.12 via https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/14918. ### References Thanks to [obscuredeer](https://hackerone.com/obscuredeer) for reporting this [issue at HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/reports/3150564).

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Army intelligence analysts are monitoring civilian-made ICE tracking tools, treating them as potential threats, as immigration protests spread nationwide.

### Impact The title of every single page whose reference is known can be accessed through the REST API as long as an XClass with a page property is accessible, this is the default for an XWiki installation. This allows an attacker to get titles of pages whose reference is known, one title per request. This doesn't affect fully [private wikis](https://www.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Documentation/AdminGuide/Access%20Rights/#HPrivateWiki) as the REST endpoint checks access rights on the XClass definition. The impact on confidentiality depends on the strategy for page names. By default, page names match the title, so the impact should be low but if page names are intentionally obfuscated because the titles are sensitive, the impact could be high. ### Patches This has been fixed in XWiki 16.4.7, 16.10.3 and 17.0.0 by adding access control checks before getting the title of any page. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workarounds.

### Impact Any user with edit right on a page (could be the user's profile) can execute code (Groovy, Python, Velocity) with programming right by defining a wiki macro. This allows full access to the whole XWiki installation and thus impacts its confidentiality, integrity and availability. The main problem is that if a wiki macro parameter allows wiki syntax, its default value is executed with the rights of the author of the document where it is used. This can be exploited by overriding a macro like the `children` macro that is used in a page that has programming right like the page `XWiki.ChildrenMacro` and thus allows arbitrary script macros. The full reproduction steps can be found in the [original issue](https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22760). ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 16.4.7, 16.10.3 and 17.0.0 by executing wiki parameters with the rights of the wiki macro's author when the parameter's value is the default value. ### Workarounds We're not aware...

### Impact When editing content that contains "dangerous" macros like malicious script macros that were authored by a user with fewer rights, XWiki warns about the execution of these macros since XWiki 15.9RC1. These required rights analyzers that trigger these warnings are incomplete, allowing an attacker to hide malicious content. For most macros, the existing analyzers don't consider non-lowercase parameters. Further, most macro parameters that can contain XWiki syntax like titles of information boxes weren't analyzed at all. Similarly, the "source" parameters of the content and context macro weren't anylzed even though they could contain arbitrary XWiki syntax. In the worst case, this could allow a malicious to add malicious script macros including Groovy or Python macros to a page that are then executed after another user with programming righs edits the page, thus allowing remote code execution. ### Patches The required rights analyzers have been made more robust and extended to...