Headline
CVE-2021-21807: TALOS-2021-1275 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group
An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the DICOM parse_dicom_meta_info functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 19.9. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to a stack-based buffer overflow. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
Summary
An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the DICOM parse_dicom_meta_info functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 19.9. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to a stack-based buffer overflow. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
Tested Versions
Accusoft ImageGear 19.9
Product URLs
https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/
CVSSv3 Score
9.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Details
The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.
There is a vulnerability in the parse_dicom_meta_info function which occurs with a specially crafted DICOM file, leading to a stack-based buffer overflow which can result in remote code execution.
Trying to load a malformed DICOM file, we end up in the following situation:
(b7c0.b52c): Security check failure or stack buffer overrun - code c0000409 (!!! second chance !!!)
Subcode: 0x2 FAST_FAIL_STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE
eax=00000001 ebx=0c3ebfb8 ecx=00000002 edx=000001e9 esi=0019fa4c edi=0f0d8fa0
eip=79fb5b82 esp=0019f55c ebp=0019f880 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
igMED19d!CPb_MED_init+0x22ae2:
79fb5b82 cd29 int 29h
Stack inspection show us the stack buffer overflow as follow:
0:000> kb
# ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
00 0019f880 79fa85d7 0019fa64 00000000 00000000 igMED19d!CPb_MED_init+0x22ae2
01 0019f9d8 32373334 31383533 31323533 34303030 igMED19d!CPb_MED_init+0x15537
02 0019f9dc 31383533 31323533 34303030 00080031 0x32373334
03 0019f9e0 31323533 34303030 00080031 49550016 0x31383533
04 0019f9e4 34303030 00080031 49550016 2e31001c 0x31323533
05 0019f9e8 00080031 49550016 2e31001c 34382e32 0x34303030
06 0019f9ec 49550016 2e31001c 34382e32 30312e30 0x80031
07 0019f9f0 2e31001c 34382e32 30312e30 2e383030 0x49550016
08 0019f9f4 34382e32 30312e30 2e383030 2e312e35 0x2e31001c
09 0019f9f8 30312e30 2e383030 2e312e35 2e312e34 0x34382e32
0a 0019f9fc 2e383030 2e312e35 2e312e34 2e332e31 0x30312e30
In our case the stack overwrite is happening in a do-while loop (LINE204 to LINE213) in function perform_some_read_operations. This is the pseudo-code of said function:
LINE1 BOOL perform_some_read_operations
LINE2 (mys_table_function *table_function,int tag_dicom_id,uint size,uint index_vr_table,
LINE3 void *ptr_buffer_allocated,uint *size_divided_by_4,int *param_7)
LINE4 {
[...]
LINE25 _ptr_buffer_allocated = ptr_buffer_allocated;
LINE26 read_size = 0;
LINE27 *param_7 = 0;
LINE28 *size_divided_by_4 = 0;
LINE29 if (0x1a < (index_vr_table & 0xffff)) {
LINE30 if (tag_dicom_id != -0x12000) {
LINE31 if ((size != 0xffffffff) &&
LINE32 (read_size = IO_read(table_function,(byte *)ptr_buffer_allocated,size), read_size != size))
LINE33 {
LINE34 return 0;
LINE35 }
LINE36 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + read_size;
LINE37 }
LINE38 *puVar7 = 1;
LINE39 switchD_1001a8c4_caseD_12:
LINE40 return 1;
LINE41 }
LINE42 uVar10 = (undefined2)index_vr_table;
LINE43 switch(index_vr_table & 0xffff) {
LINE44 default:
LINE45 read_size = IO_read(table_function,(byte *)ptr_buffer_allocated,size);
LINE46 if (read_size != size) {
LINE47 return 0;
LINE48 }
LINE49 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + read_size;
LINE50 uVar5 = FUN_10024a80((int)ptr_buffer_allocated,size,uVar10,&index_vr_table);
LINE51 *puVar7 = uVar5;
LINE52 return 1;
LINE53 case 2:
LINE54 local_c = size >> 2;
LINE55 *size_divided_by_4 = local_c;
LINE56 uVar5 = 0;
LINE57 iVar8 = 0;
LINE58 local_8 = 0;
LINE59 if (local_c != 0) {
LINE60 do {
LINE61 dVar3 = read_short(table_function,¶m_7);
LINE62 dVar4 = read_short(table_function,&size_divided_by_4);
LINE63 iVar8 = dVar3 + dVar4;
LINE64 if (iVar8 != 4) {
LINE65 return 0;
LINE66 }
LINE67 local_8 = local_8 + 4;
LINE68 *(uint *)((int)ptr_buffer_allocated + uVar5 * 4) =
LINE69 (uint)size_divided_by_4 & 0xffff | (int)param_7 << 0x10;
LINE70 uVar5 = uVar5 + 1;
LINE71 } while (uVar5 < local_c);
LINE72 }
LINE73 if ((size & 3) != 0) {
LINE74 IO_seek(table_function,size - local_8,1);
LINE75 }
LINE76 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + iVar8;
LINE77 return 1;
LINE78 case 7:
LINE79 puVar7 = (uint *)(size >> 2);
LINE80 *size_divided_by_4 = (uint)puVar7;
LINE81 _index = NULL;
LINE82 pvVar9 = NULL;
LINE83 param_7 = NULL;
LINE84 size_divided_by_4 = puVar7;
LINE85 if (puVar7 != NULL) {
LINE86 do {
LINE87 pvVar9 = (void *)read_long(table_function,_ptr_buffer_allocated);
LINE88 if (pvVar9 != (void *)0x4) {
LINE89 return 0;
LINE90 }
LINE91 param_7 = param_7 + 1;
LINE92 _index = (uint *)((int)_index + 1);
LINE93 _ptr_buffer_allocated = (void *)((int)_ptr_buffer_allocated + 4);
LINE94 ptr_buffer_allocated = pvVar9;
LINE95 } while (_index < size_divided_by_4);
LINE96 }
LINE97 break;
LINE98 case 8:
LINE99 puVar7 = (uint *)(size >> 3);
LINE100 *size_divided_by_4 = (uint)puVar7;
LINE101 _index = NULL;
LINE102 pvVar9 = NULL;
LINE103 param_7 = NULL;
LINE104 buffer = (byte *)ptr_buffer_allocated;
LINE105 size_divided_by_4 = puVar7;
LINE106 if (puVar7 != NULL) {
LINE107 do {
LINE108 pvVar9 = (void *)IO_read(table_function,buffer,8);
LINE109 if (pvVar9 != (void *)0x8) {
LINE110 return 0;
LINE111 }
LINE112 param_7 = (int *)((int)param_7 * 2);
LINE113 _index = (uint *)((int)_index + 1);
LINE114 buffer = buffer + 8;
LINE115 ptr_buffer_allocated = pvVar9;
LINE116 } while (_index < size_divided_by_4);
LINE117 }
LINE118 if ((size & 7) != 0) {
LINE119 IO_seek(table_function,size - (int)param_7,1);
LINE120 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + (int)pvVar9;
LINE121 return 1;
LINE122 }
LINE123 goto LAB_1001a9f0;
LINE124 case 0xc:
LINE125 case 0xd:
LINE126 case 0x19:
LINE127 case 0x1a:
LINE128 if ((size != 0xffffffff) &&
LINE129 (read_size = IO_read(table_function,(byte *)ptr_buffer_allocated,size), read_size != size)) {
LINE130 return 0;
LINE131 }
LINE132 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + read_size;
LINE133 uVar5 = FUN_10024a80((int)ptr_buffer_allocated,size,uVar10,&index_vr_table);
LINE134 *puVar7 = uVar5;
LINE135 return 1;
LINE136 case 0xe:
LINE137 case 0x13:
LINE138 case 0x18:
LINE139 uVar5 = size >> 1;
LINE140 *size_divided_by_4 = uVar5;
LINE141 ptr_buffer_allocated =
LINE142 (void *)IO_read(table_function,(byte *)ptr_buffer_allocated,size & 0xfffffffe);
LINE143 (*_DAT_10051634)(table_function,&local_10);
LINE144 pvVar9 = ptr_buffer_allocated;
LINE145 if ((local_10 == 1) && (uVar6 = 0, uVar5 != 0)) {
LINE146 do {
LINE147 uVar1 = *(ushort *)((int)_ptr_buffer_allocated + uVar6 * 2);
LINE148 *(ushort *)((int)_ptr_buffer_allocated + uVar6 * 2) = uVar1 << 8 | uVar1 >> 8;
LINE149 uVar6 = uVar6 + 1;
LINE150 } while (uVar6 < uVar5);
LINE151 }
LINE152 if ((size & 1) != 0) {
LINE153 IO_seek(table_function,size - (int)ptr_buffer_allocated,1);
LINE154 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + (int)pvVar9;
LINE155 return 1;
LINE156 }
LINE157 goto LAB_1001a9f0;
LINE158 case 0xf:
LINE159 read_size = IO_read(table_function,(byte *)ptr_buffer_allocated,size);
LINE160 goto joined_r0x1001aaf9;
LINE161 case 0x10:
LINE162 case 0x14:
LINE163 case 0x15:
LINE164 case 0x16:
LINE165 read_size = IO_read(table_function,(byte *)ptr_buffer_allocated,size);
LINE166 joined_r0x1001aaf9:
LINE167 if (read_size != size) {
LINE168 return 0;
LINE169 }
LINE170 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + read_size;
LINE171 uVar5 = FUN_10024a80((int)ptr_buffer_allocated,size,uVar10,&index_vr_table);
LINE172 *puVar7 = uVar5;
LINE173 return 1;
LINE174 case 0x11:
LINE175 puVar7 = (uint *)(size >> 2);
LINE176 *size_divided_by_4 = (uint)puVar7;
LINE177 _index = NULL;
LINE178 pvVar9 = NULL;
LINE179 param_7 = NULL;
LINE180 size_divided_by_4 = puVar7;
LINE181 if (puVar7 != NULL) {
LINE182 do {
LINE183 pvVar9 = (void *)read_long(table_function,_ptr_buffer_allocated);
LINE184 if (pvVar9 != (void *)0x4) {
LINE185 return 0;
LINE186 }
LINE187 param_7 = param_7 + 1;
LINE188 _index = (uint *)((int)_index + 1);
LINE189 _ptr_buffer_allocated = (void *)((int)_ptr_buffer_allocated + 4);
LINE190 ptr_buffer_allocated = pvVar9;
LINE191 } while (_index < size_divided_by_4);
LINE192 }
LINE193 break;
LINE194 case 0x12:
LINE195 goto switchD_1001a8c4_caseD_12;
LINE196 case 0x17:
LINE197 puVar7 = (uint *)(size >> 2);
LINE198 *size_divided_by_4 = (uint)puVar7;
LINE199 _index = NULL;
LINE200 pvVar9 = NULL;
LINE201 param_7 = NULL;
LINE202 size_divided_by_4 = puVar7;
LINE203 if (puVar7 != NULL) {
LINE204 do {
LINE205 pvVar9 = (void *)read_long(table_function,_ptr_buffer_allocated);
LINE206 if (pvVar9 != (void *)0x4) {
LINE207 return 0;
LINE208 }
LINE209 param_7 = param_7 + 1;
LINE210 _index = (uint *)((int)_index + 1);
LINE211 _ptr_buffer_allocated = (void *)((int)_ptr_buffer_allocated + 4);
LINE212 ptr_buffer_allocated = pvVar9;
LINE213 } while (_index < size_divided_by_4);
LINE214 }
LINE215 }
LINE216 if ((size & 3) != 0) {
LINE217 IO_seek(table_function,size - (int)param_7,1);
LINE218 }
LINE219 LAB_1001a9f0:
LINE220 *piVar2 = *piVar2 + (int)pvVar9;
LINE221 return 1;
LINE222 }
The variable corresponding to our stack buffer is represented by the variable named _ptr_buffer_allocated, and it is written into through the call to read_long function in LINE205. The do-while loop is controlled by the size_divided_by_4. The _ptr_buffer_allocated is corresponding to the argument ptr_buffer_allocated passed to this function (see LINE25) and size_divided_by_4 is the value of size divided by 4 (see LINE197 and LINE202).
We can see during the loop the address of the buffer is incremented by 4 in LINE211.
Now the function perform_some_read_operations above is called by the function parse_dicom_meta_info in LINE363. The two interesting parameters are represented by the _size LINE362 and the variable copy_stack_buffer corresponding respectively to our previously seen variables size and ptr_buffer_allocated argument of perform_some_read_operations.
LINE223 dword parse_dicom_meta_info
LINE224 (mys_table_function *table_function,dicom_data_set *dicom_data_set,
LINE225 undefined8 *param_3)
LINE226 {
[...]
LINE256 int stack_buffer [64];
LINE257 uint local_8;
LINE258 uint _size_copy;
LINE259 uint _tag_dicom_id;
LINE260
LINE261 local_8 = DAT_10050fe0 ^ (uint)&stack0xfffffffc;
LINE262 /* size_t _Size for memset */
LINE263 bVar1 = false;
LINE264 iVar6 = 0;
LINE265 /* int _Val for memset */
LINE266 /* void * _Dst for memset */
LINE267 local_12c = 0;
LINE268 copy_stack_buffer = NULL;
LINE269 local_140 = 0;
LINE270 local_120 = 0;
LINE271 local_138 = 0;
LINE272 local_11c = 0;
LINE273 local_114 = 0;
LINE274 local_10c = 0;
LINE275 memset(stack_buffer,0,256);
LINE276 set_endian(table_function,0);
LINE277 IO_seek(table_function,0,0);
LINE278 IO_read(table_function,(byte *)stack_buffer,128);
LINE279 copy_preambule_buffer_into_dicom_data(dicom_data_set,stack_buffer,128);
LINE280 IO_seek(table_function,4,1);
LINE281 local_130 = 0;
LINE282 _current_offset = get_current_offset(table_function);
LINE283 constant_1 = FUN_1000ab00(table_function,1,3,&tag_dicom_id,0);
LINE284 IO_seek(table_function,_current_offset,0);
LINE285 local_148 = 0;
LINE286 do {
LINE287 pmVar7 = table_function;
LINE288 iVar9 = constant_1;
LINE289 iVar2 = get_dicom_tag_info(table_function,constant_1,&tag_dicom_id,&index_into_vr_code_records,
LINE290 &_size,&local_128);
LINE291 _current_offset = local_128;
LINE292 _tag_dicom_id = tag_dicom_id;
LINE293 if (iVar2 == 0) {
LINE294 AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Components\\MED\\Dicom\\dcmread.c",0x122a,0x5622,0,
LINE295 _size,local_128,NULL);
LINE296 bVar1 = true;
LINE297 LAB_100183b6:
LINE298 if (copy_stack_buffer == NULL) {
LINE299 AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Components\\MED\\Dicom\\dcmread.c",0x1272,0x5623,
LINE300 0,0,0,NULL);
LINE301 bVar1 = true;
LINE302 }
LINE303 else {
LINE304 if (!bVar1) goto LAB_100183ee;
LINE305 }
LINE306 }
LINE307 else {
LINE308 if (local_12c != 0) {
LINE309 local_120 = local_120 + local_128;
LINE310 }
LINE311 puVar3 = &DAT_10044008;
LINE312 do {
LINE313 if (*puVar3 == tag_dicom_id) {
LINE314 local_138 = local_138 + 1;
LINE315 break;
LINE316 }
LINE317 puVar3 = puVar3 + 1;
LINE318 } while ((int)puVar3 < 0x10044020);
LINE319 if ((short)(tag_dicom_id >> 0x10) != 2) {
LINE320 if ((local_12c != 0) && (local_138 != 6)) {
LINE321 AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Components\\MED\\Dicom\\dcmread.c",0x1245,
LINE322 0x55f6,0,tag_dicom_id >> 0x10,tag_dicom_id & 0xffff,NULL);
LINE323 }
LINE324 IO_seek(table_function,-_current_offset,1);
LINE325 LAB_100183ab:
LINE326 bVar1 = true;
LINE327 iVar6 = local_120;
LINE328 goto LAB_100183b6;
LINE329 }
LINE330 if ((ushort)tag_dicom_id < (ushort)local_130) {
LINE331 _tag_dicom = tag_dicom_id & 0xffff;
LINE332 uVar4 = local_130 & 0xffff;
LINE333 _current_offset = 0;
LINE334 iVar9 = 0x5625;
LINE335 pmVar7 = (mys_table_function *)0x1251;
LINE336 error:
LINE337 AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Components\\MED\\Dicom\\dcmread.c",pmVar7,iVar9,
LINE338 _current_offset,uVar4,_tag_dicom,NULL);
LINE339 goto LAB_100183ab;
LINE340 }
LINE341 uVar4 = _size + 2;
LINE342 if (0x100 < uVar4) {
LINE343 iVar6 = perform_checking(tag_dicom_id,(short)index_into_vr_code_records,_size);
LINE344 if (iVar6 == 0) {
LINE345 _tag_dicom = 0;
LINE346 _current_offset = 0;
LINE347 iVar9 = 0x5614;
LINE348 pmVar7 = (mys_table_function *)0x1269;
LINE349 }
LINE350 else {
LINE351 _current_offset = 0x10018375;
LINE352 dVar5 = allocate_mem_zero_buffer(dicom_data_set,uVar4,©_stack_buffer);
LINE353 iVar6 = local_120;
LINE354 if (dVar5 == 0) goto LAB_100183b6;
LINE355 _tag_dicom = 0x5623;
LINE356 uVar4 = 0x1262;
LINE357 }
LINE358 goto error;
LINE359 }
LINE360 copy_stack_buffer = stack_buffer;
LINE361 LAB_100183ee:
LINE362 _size_copy = _size;
LINE363 uVar4 = perform_some_read_operations
LINE364 (table_function,_tag_dicom_id,_size,index_into_vr_code_records,
LINE365 copy_stack_buffer,&local_130,&local_128);
LINE366 if (uVar4 == 0) {
LINE367 iVar6 = 0x5624;
LINE368 uVar8 = 0x127b;
LINE369 _tag_dicom = uVar4;
LINE370 LAB_1001842d:
LINE371 AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Components\\MED\\Dicom\\dcmread.c",uVar8,iVar6,
LINE372 uVar4,_tag_dicom,_size_copy,(char *)uVar4);
LINE373 bVar1 = true;
LINE374 iVar6 = local_120;
LINE375 }
LINE376 else {
LINE377 *(undefined *)(_size_copy + (int)copy_stack_buffer) = 0;
LINE378 if (local_12c != 0) {
LINE379 local_120 = local_120 + local_128;
LINE380 }
LINE381 if (_tag_dicom_id == 0x20000) {
LINE382 local_140 = *copy_stack_buffer;
LINE383 local_120 = 0;
LINE384 local_12c = 1;
LINE385 iVar6 = 0;
LINE386 }
LINE387 else {
LINE388 piVar10 = copy_stack_buffer;
LINE389 iVar6 = FUN_100131c0(_tag_dicom_id);
LINE390 iVar6 = FUN_1000e5a0(dicom_data_set,iVar6,piVar10,_size_copy);
LINE391 if (iVar6 != 0) {
LINE392 uVar4 = 0;
LINE393 _size_copy = 0;
LINE394 iVar6 = 0x5615;
LINE395 uVar8 = 0x1297;
LINE396 _tag_dicom = _tag_dicom_id;
LINE397 goto LAB_1001842d;
LINE398 }
LINE399 iVar6 = local_120;
LINE400 if (_tag_dicom_id == 0x20010) {
LINE401 FUN_100248a0((char *)copy_stack_buffer,&local_14c,0,NULL);
LINE402 FUN_10024a00(local_14c,NULL,NULL,(undefined4 *)&local_11c);
LINE403 iVar6 = local_120;
LINE404 }
LINE405 }
LINE406 }
LINE407 }
LINE408 local_130 = _tag_dicom_id;
LINE409 if ((copy_stack_buffer != stack_buffer) && (copy_stack_buffer != NULL)) {
LINE410 FUN_1000e980((int *)dicom_data_set,copy_stack_buffer);
LINE411 copy_stack_buffer = NULL;
LINE412 }
LINE413 if ((((iVar6 == local_140) && (local_12c != 0)) || (bVar1)) ||
LINE414 (local_148 = local_148 + 1, 9 < (ushort)local_148)) {
LINE415 local_114 = CONCAT44(0x270d,(int)local_114);
LINE416 local_10c = 1;
LINE417 if ((int)local_114 == 0) {
LINE418 AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Components\\MED\\Dicom\\dcmread.c",0x12c6,0x55f6,
LINE419 0,2,0x10,NULL);
LINE420 }
LINE421 if (param_3 != NULL) {
LINE422 *param_3 = local_11c;
LINE423 param_3[1] = local_114;
LINE424 *(undefined4 *)(param_3 + 2) = local_10c;
LINE425 }
LINE426 AF_error_check();
LINE427 dVar5 = raise_security_failure(local_8 ^ (uint)&stack0xfffffffc,extraout_DL,(char)param_3);
LINE428 return dVar5;
LINE429 }
LINE430 } while( true );
LINE431 }
The _size value is directly read from the file through the call to the function get_dicom_tag_info in LINE289 and an integer overflow is happening in LINE341 if size is set to the value 0xFFFFFFFF. The check at line LINE342 tests if the size of stack_buffer is bigger or equal than _size + 2, and if it is, a new larger buffer is allocated. Because of the integer overflow, the check at LINE342 succeeds and no buffer is allocated. This in turn leads to a stack buffer overflow which could lead to code execution.
Crash Information
0:000> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Exception Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
Value: 2281
Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisProvider.CPP
Value: Create: 8007007e on DESKTOP-4DAOCFH
Key : Analysis.DebugData
Value: CreateObject
Key : Analysis.DebugModel
Value: CreateObject
Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 6706
Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
Value: 184
Key : Analysis.System
Value: CreateObject
Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
Value: 72299
Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
Value: 87
Key : WER.OS.Branch
Value: vb_release
Key : WER.OS.Timestamp
Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z
Key : WER.OS.Version
Value: 10.0.19041.1
Key : WER.Process.Version
Value: 1.0.1.1
ADDITIONAL_XML: 1
OS_BUILD_LAYERS: 1
NTGLOBALFLAG: 2100000
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 79fb5b82 (igMED19d!CPb_MED_init+0x00022ae2)
ExceptionCode: c0000409 (Security check failure or stack buffer overrun)
ExceptionFlags: 00000001
NumberParameters: 1
Parameter[0]: 00000002
Subcode: 0x2 FAST_FAIL_STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE
FAULTING_THREAD: 0000b52c
PROCESS_NAME: Fuzzme.exe
WATSON_BKT_EVENT: BEX
ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000409 - The system detected an overrun of a stack-based buffer in this application. This overrun could potentially allow a malicious user to gain control of this application.
EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: c0000409
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 00000002
STACK_TEXT:
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0019f880 79fa85d7 0019fa64 00000000 00000000 igMED19d!CPb_MED_init+0x22ae2
0019f9d8 32373334 31383533 31323533 34303030 igMED19d!CPb_MED_init+0x15537
0019f9dc 31383533 31323533 34303030 00080031 0x32373334
0019f9e0 31323533 34303030 00080031 49550016 0x31383533
0019f9e4 34303030 00080031 49550016 2e31001c 0x31323533
0019f9e8 00080031 49550016 2e31001c 34382e32 0x34303030
0019f9ec 49550016 2e31001c 34382e32 30312e30 0x80031
0019f9f0 2e31001c 34382e32 30312e30 2e383030 0x49550016
0019f9f4 34382e32 30312e30 2e383030 2e312e35 0x2e31001c
0019f9f8 30312e30 2e383030 2e312e35 2e312e34 0x34382e32
0019f9fc 2e383030 2e312e35 2e312e34 2e332e31 0x30312e30
0019fa00 2e312e35 2e312e34 2e332e31 00080031 0x2e383030
0019fa04 2e312e34 2e332e31 00080031 49550018 0x2e312e35
0019fa08 2e332e31 00080031 49550018 2e31002a 0x2e312e34
0019fa0c 00080031 49550018 2e31002a 34382e32 0x2e332e31
0019fa10 49550018 2e31002a 34382e32 31312e30 0x80031
0019fa14 2e31002a 34382e32 31312e30 37353833 0x49550018
0019fa18 34382e32 31312e30 37353833 3236312e 0x2e31002a
0019fa1c 31312e30 37353833 3236312e 36312e36 0x34382e32
0019fa20 37353833 3236312e 36312e36 35333630 0x31312e30
0019fa24 3236312e 36312e36 35333630 3237312e 0x37353833
0019fa28 36312e36 35333630 3237312e 35312e37 0x3236312e
0019fa2c 35333630 3237312e 35312e37 35313831 0x36312e36
0019fa30 3237312e 35312e37 35313831 342e312e 0x35333630
0019fa34 35312e37 35313831 342e312e 00200008 0x3237312e
0019fa38 35313831 342e312e 00200008 00084144 0x35312e37
0019fa3c 342e312e 00200008 00084144 30303032 0x35313831
0019fa40 00200008 00084144 30303032 33323230 0x342e312e
0019fa44 00084144 30303032 33323230 00230008 0x200008
0019fa48 30303032 33323230 00230008 00084144 0x84144
0019fa4c 33323230 00230008 00084144 30303032 0x30303032
0019fa50 00230008 00084144 30303032 33323230 0x33323230
0019fa54 00084144 30303032 33323230 00000000 0x230008
0019fa58 30303032 33323230 00000000 00000000 0x84144
0019fa5c 33323230 00000000 00000000 00000000 0x30303032
0019fa60 00000000 00000000 00000000 0000270d 0x33323230
STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb
SYMBOL_NAME: igMED19d!CPb_MED_init+22ae2
MODULE_NAME: igMED19d
IMAGE_NAME: igMED19d.dll
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: FAIL_FAST_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN_STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE_MISSING_GSFRAME_AVRF_c0000409_igMED19d.dll!CPb_MED_init
OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1
BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x86
OSNAME: Windows 10
IMAGE_VERSION: 19.9.0.0
FAILURE_ID_HASH: {dc561a0a-1f81-d3b1-565f-3f9fcd5b0c15}
Followup: MachineOwner
---------
Timeline
2021-03-22 - Vendor Disclosure
2021-06-01 - Public Release
Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.