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CVE-2022-40760: mTower/tee_api_operations.c at efd36709306a9afcca5b4782499d01be0c7a02a5 · Samsung/mTower

A Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value vulnerablity in the TEE_MACUpdate function in Samsung mTower through 0.3.0 allows a trusted application to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by invoking the function TEE_MACUpdate with an excessive size value of chunkSize.

CVE
#mac#dos#redis#samsung#auth

// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause /* * Copyright © 2014, STMicroelectronics International N.V. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS “AS IS” * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <string_ext.h> #include <tee_api.h> #include <tee_api_defines_extensions.h> #include <tee_internal_api_extensions.h> #include <utee_syscalls.h> #include <utee_defines.h> #include <util.h> #include “tee_api_private.h” #include “utee_types.h” TEE_Result utee_cipher_update(unsigned long state, const void *src, size_t src_len, void *dst, uint64_t *dst_len); struct __TEE_OperationHandle { TEE_OperationInfo info; TEE_ObjectHandle key1; TEE_ObjectHandle key2; uint32_t operationState;/* Operation state : INITIAL or ACTIVE */ uint8_t *buffer; /* buffer to collect complete blocks */ bool buffer_two_blocks; /* True if two blocks need to be buffered */ size_t block_size; /* Block size of cipher */ size_t buffer_offs; /* Offset in buffer */ uint32_t state; /* Handle to state in TEE Core */ uint32_t ae_tag_len; /* * tag_len in bytes for AE operation else unused */ }; /* Cryptographic Operations API - Generic Operation Functions */ TEE_Result TEE_AllocateOperation(TEE_OperationHandle *operation, uint32_t algorithm, uint32_t mode, uint32_t maxKeySize) { TEE_Result res; TEE_OperationHandle op = TEE_HANDLE_NULL; uint32_t handle_state = 0; size_t block_size = 1; uint32_t req_key_usage; bool with_private_key = false; bool buffer_two_blocks = false; if (!operation) TEE_Panic(0); if (algorithm == TEE_ALG_AES_XTS) handle_state = TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_EXPECT_TWO_KEYS; /* Check algorithm max key size */ switch (algorithm) { case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA1: if (maxKeySize < 512) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; if (maxKeySize > 1024) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; if (maxKeySize % 64 != 0) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA224: if (maxKeySize != 2048) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA256: if (maxKeySize != 2048 && maxKeySize != 3072) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P192: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192: if (maxKeySize != 192) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224: if (maxKeySize != 224) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256: if (maxKeySize != 256) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P384: if (maxKeySize != 384) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P521: if (maxKeySize != 521) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; default: break; } /* Check algorithm mode */ switch (algorithm) { case TEE_ALG_AES_CTS: case TEE_ALG_AES_XTS: buffer_two_blocks = true; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case TEE_ALG_AES_ECB_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_AES_CBC_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_AES_CCM: case TEE_ALG_DES_ECB_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_DES_CBC_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_DES3_ECB_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_DES3_CBC_NOPAD: if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(algorithm) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_AES) block_size = TEE_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; else block_size = TEE_DES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case TEE_ALG_AES_CTR: case TEE_ALG_AES_GCM: if (mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_ENCRYPT; else if (mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_DECRYPT; else return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break; case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_MD5: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA1: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA224: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA256: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA384: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA512: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA1: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA224: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA256: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA384: case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA512: case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA1: case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA224: case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA256: case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P192: case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224: case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256: case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384: case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521: if (mode == TEE_MODE_SIGN) { with_private_key = true; req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_SIGN; } else if (mode == TEE_MODE_VERIFY) { req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_VERIFY; } else { return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } break; case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5: case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA1: case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA224: case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA256: case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA384: case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA512: if (mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) { req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_ENCRYPT; } else if (mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) { with_private_key = true; req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_DECRYPT; } else { return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } break; case TEE_ALG_RSA_NOPAD: if (mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) { req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_ENCRYPT | TEE_USAGE_VERIFY; } else if (mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) { with_private_key = true; req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_DECRYPT | TEE_USAGE_SIGN; } else { return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } break; case TEE_ALG_DH_DERIVE_SHARED_SECRET: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P384: case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P521: case TEE_ALG_HKDF_MD5_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA1_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA224_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA256_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA384_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_HKDF_SHA512_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_CONCAT_KDF_SHA1_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_CONCAT_KDF_SHA224_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_CONCAT_KDF_SHA256_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_CONCAT_KDF_SHA384_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_CONCAT_KDF_SHA512_DERIVE_KEY: case TEE_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1_DERIVE_KEY: if (mode != TEE_MODE_DERIVE) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; with_private_key = true; req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_DERIVE; break; case TEE_ALG_MD5: case TEE_ALG_SHA1: case TEE_ALG_SHA224: case TEE_ALG_SHA256: case TEE_ALG_SHA384: case TEE_ALG_SHA512: if (mode != TEE_MODE_DIGEST) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; /* v1.1: flags always set for digest operations */ handle_state |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET; req_key_usage = 0; break; case TEE_ALG_DES_CBC_MAC_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_AES_CBC_MAC_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_AES_CBC_MAC_PKCS5: case TEE_ALG_AES_CMAC: case TEE_ALG_DES_CBC_MAC_PKCS5: case TEE_ALG_DES3_CBC_MAC_NOPAD: case TEE_ALG_DES3_CBC_MAC_PKCS5: case TEE_ALG_HMAC_MD5: case TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA1: case TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA224: case TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA256: case TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA384: case TEE_ALG_HMAC_SHA512: if (mode != TEE_MODE_MAC) return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; req_key_usage = TEE_USAGE_MAC; break; default: return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } op = TEE_Malloc(sizeof(*op), TEE_MALLOC_FILL_ZERO); if (!op) return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; op->info.algorithm = algorithm; op->info.operationClass = TEE_ALG_GET_CLASS(algorithm); op->info.mode = mode; op->info.maxKeySize = maxKeySize; op->info.requiredKeyUsage = req_key_usage; op->info.handleState = handle_state; if (block_size > 1) { size_t buffer_size = block_size; if (buffer_two_blocks) buffer_size *= 2; op->buffer = TEE_Malloc(buffer_size, TEE_USER_MEM_HINT_NO_FILL_ZERO); if (op->buffer == NULL) { res = TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; goto out; } } op->block_size = block_size; op->buffer_two_blocks = buffer_two_blocks; if (TEE_ALG_GET_CLASS(algorithm) != TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST) { uint32_t mks = maxKeySize; TEE_ObjectType key_type = TEE_ALG_GET_KEY_TYPE(algorithm, with_private_key); /* * If two keys are expected the max key size is the sum of * the size of both keys. */ if (op->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_EXPECT_TWO_KEYS) mks /= 2; res = TEE_AllocateTransientObject(key_type, mks, &op->key1); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; if (op->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_EXPECT_TWO_KEYS) { res = TEE_AllocateTransientObject(key_type, mks, &op->key2); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; } } res = utee_cryp_state_alloc(algorithm, mode, (unsigned long)op->key1, (unsigned long)op->key2, &op->state); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; /* * Initialize digest operations * Other multi-stage operations initialized w/ TEE_xxxInit functions * Non-applicable on asymmetric operations */ if (TEE_ALG_GET_CLASS(algorithm) == TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST) { res = utee_hash_init(op->state, NULL, 0); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; /* v1.1: flags always set for digest operations */ op->info.handleState |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; } op->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; *operation = op; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) { if (res != TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY && res != TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) TEE_Panic(res); if (op) { if (op->state) { TEE_FreeOperation(op); } else { TEE_Free(op->buffer); TEE_FreeTransientObject(op->key1); TEE_FreeTransientObject(op->key2); TEE_Free(op); } } } return res; } void TEE_FreeOperation(TEE_OperationHandle operation) { TEE_Result res; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_Panic(0); /* * Note that keys should not be freed here, since they are * claimed by the operation they will be freed by * utee_cryp_state_free(). */ res = utee_cryp_state_free(operation->state); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); TEE_Free(operation->buffer); TEE_Free(operation); } void TEE_GetOperationInfo(TEE_OperationHandle operation, TEE_OperationInfo *operationInfo) { if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_Panic(0); if (!operationInfo) TEE_Panic(0); *operationInfo = operation->info; } TEE_Result TEE_GetOperationInfoMultiple(TEE_OperationHandle operation, TEE_OperationInfoMultiple *operationInfoMultiple, uint32_t *operationSize) { TEE_Result res = TEE_SUCCESS; TEE_ObjectInfo key_info1; TEE_ObjectInfo key_info2; uint32_t num_of_keys; size_t n; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (!operationInfoMultiple) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (!operationSize) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } num_of_keys = (*operationSize-sizeof(TEE_OperationInfoMultiple))/ sizeof(TEE_OperationInfoKey); if (num_of_keys > 2) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* Two keys flag (TEE_ALG_AES_XTS only) */ if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_EXPECT_TWO_KEYS) != 0 && (num_of_keys != 2)) { res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER; goto out; } /* Clear */ for (n = 0; n < num_of_keys; n++) { operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[n].keySize = 0; operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[n].requiredKeyUsage = 0; } if (num_of_keys == 2) { res = TEE_GetObjectInfo1(operation->key2, &key_info2); /* Key2 is not a valid handle */ if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[1].keySize = key_info2.keySize; operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[1].requiredKeyUsage = operation->info.requiredKeyUsage; } if (num_of_keys >= 1) { res = TEE_GetObjectInfo1(operation->key1, &key_info1); /* Key1 is not a valid handle */ if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) { if (num_of_keys == 2) { operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[1]. keySize = 0; operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[1]. requiredKeyUsage = 0; } goto out; } operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[0].keySize = key_info1.keySize; operationInfoMultiple->keyInformation[0].requiredKeyUsage = operation->info.requiredKeyUsage; } /* No key */ operationInfoMultiple->algorithm = operation->info.algorithm; operationInfoMultiple->operationClass = operation->info.operationClass; operationInfoMultiple->mode = operation->info.mode; operationInfoMultiple->digestLength = operation->info.digestLength; operationInfoMultiple->maxKeySize = operation->info.maxKeySize; operationInfoMultiple->handleState = operation->info.handleState; operationInfoMultiple->operationState = operation->operationState; operationInfoMultiple->numberOfKeys = num_of_keys; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } void TEE_ResetOperation(TEE_OperationHandle operation) { TEE_Result res; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_Panic(0); if (!(operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET)) TEE_Panic(0); operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; if (operation->info.operationClass == TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST) { res = utee_hash_init(operation->state, NULL, 0); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); operation->info.handleState |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; } else { operation->info.handleState &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; } } TEE_Result TEE_SetOperationKey(TEE_OperationHandle operation, TEE_ObjectHandle key) { TEE_Result res; uint32_t key_size = 0; TEE_ObjectInfo key_info; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (key == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) { /* Operation key cleared */ TEE_ResetTransientObject(operation->key1); res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* No key for digest operation */ if (operation->info.operationClass == TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* Two keys flag not expected (TEE_ALG_AES_XTS excluded) */ if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_EXPECT_TWO_KEYS) != 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } res = TEE_GetObjectInfo1(key, &key_info); /* Key is not a valid handle */ if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; /* Supplied key has to meet required usage */ if ((key_info.objectUsage & operation->info.requiredKeyUsage) != operation->info.requiredKeyUsage) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.maxKeySize < key_info.keySize) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } key_size = key_info.keySize; TEE_ResetTransientObject(operation->key1); operation->info.handleState &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET; res = TEE_CopyObjectAttributes1(operation->key1, key); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; operation->info.handleState |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET; operation->info.keySize = key_size; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_CORRUPT_OBJECT && res != TEE_ERROR_STORAGE_NOT_AVAILABLE) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_SetOperationKey2(TEE_OperationHandle operation, TEE_ObjectHandle key1, TEE_ObjectHandle key2) { TEE_Result res; uint32_t key_size = 0; TEE_ObjectInfo key_info1; TEE_ObjectInfo key_info2; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* * Key1/Key2 and/or are not initialized and * Either both keys are NULL or both are not NULL */ if (key1 == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || key2 == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) { /* Clear operation key1 (if needed) */ if (key1 == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_ResetTransientObject(operation->key1); /* Clear operation key2 (if needed) */ if (key2 == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_ResetTransientObject(operation->key2); res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* No key for digest operation */ if (operation->info.operationClass == TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* Two keys flag expected (TEE_ALG_AES_XTS only) */ if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_EXPECT_TWO_KEYS) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } res = TEE_GetObjectInfo1(key1, &key_info1); /* Key1 is not a valid handle */ if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; /* Supplied key has to meet required usage */ if ((key_info1.objectUsage & operation->info. requiredKeyUsage) != operation->info.requiredKeyUsage) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } res = TEE_GetObjectInfo1(key2, &key_info2); /* Key2 is not a valid handle */ if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) { if (res == TEE_ERROR_CORRUPT_OBJECT) res = TEE_ERROR_CORRUPT_OBJECT_2; goto out; } /* Supplied key has to meet required usage */ if ((key_info2.objectUsage & operation->info. requiredKeyUsage) != operation->info.requiredKeyUsage) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* * AES-XTS (the only multi key algorithm supported, requires the * keys to be of equal size. */ if (operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_AES_XTS && key_info1.keySize != key_info2.keySize) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.maxKeySize < key_info1.keySize) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* * Odd that only the size of one key should be reported while * size of two key are used when allocating the operation. */ key_size = key_info1.keySize; TEE_ResetTransientObject(operation->key1); TEE_ResetTransientObject(operation->key2); operation->info.handleState &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET; res = TEE_CopyObjectAttributes1(operation->key1, key1); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; res = TEE_CopyObjectAttributes1(operation->key2, key2); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) { if (res == TEE_ERROR_CORRUPT_OBJECT) res = TEE_ERROR_CORRUPT_OBJECT_2; goto out; } operation->info.handleState |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET; operation->info.keySize = key_size; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_CORRUPT_OBJECT && res != TEE_ERROR_CORRUPT_OBJECT_2 && res != TEE_ERROR_STORAGE_NOT_AVAILABLE && res != TEE_ERROR_STORAGE_NOT_AVAILABLE_2) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } void TEE_CopyOperation(TEE_OperationHandle dst_op, TEE_OperationHandle src_op) { TEE_Result res; if (dst_op == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || src_op == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_Panic(0); if (dst_op->info.algorithm != src_op->info.algorithm) TEE_Panic(0); if (src_op->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST) { TEE_ObjectHandle key1 = TEE_HANDLE_NULL; TEE_ObjectHandle key2 = TEE_HANDLE_NULL; if (src_op->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET) { key1 = src_op->key1; key2 = src_op->key2; } if ((src_op->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_EXPECT_TWO_KEYS) == 0) { TEE_SetOperationKey(dst_op, key1); } else { TEE_SetOperationKey2(dst_op, key1, key2); } } dst_op->info.handleState = src_op->info.handleState; dst_op->info.keySize = src_op->info.keySize; dst_op->operationState = src_op->operationState; if (dst_op->buffer_two_blocks != src_op->buffer_two_blocks || dst_op->block_size != src_op->block_size) TEE_Panic(0); if (dst_op->buffer != NULL) { if (src_op->buffer == NULL) TEE_Panic(0); memcpy(dst_op->buffer, src_op->buffer, src_op->buffer_offs); dst_op->buffer_offs = src_op->buffer_offs; } else if (src_op->buffer != NULL) { TEE_Panic(0); } res = utee_cryp_state_copy(dst_op->state, src_op->state); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); } /* Cryptographic Operations API - Message Digest Functions */ static void init_hash_operation(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *IV, uint32_t IVLen) { TEE_Result res; /* * Note : IV and IVLen are never used in current implementation * This is why coherent values of IV and IVLen are not checked */ res = utee_hash_init(operation->state, IV, IVLen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); operation->buffer_offs = 0; operation->info.handleState |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; } void TEE_DigestUpdate(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *chunk, uint32_t chunkSize) { TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST) TEE_Panic(0); operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE; res = utee_hash_update(operation->state, chunk, chunkSize); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); } TEE_Result TEE_DigestDoFinal(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *chunk, uint32_t chunkLen, void *hash, uint32_t *hashLen) { TEE_Result res; uint64_t hl; if ((operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) || (!chunk && chunkLen) || !hash || !hashLen || (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST)) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } hl = *hashLen; res = utee_hash_final(operation->state, chunk, chunkLen, hash, &hl); *hashLen = hl; if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; /* Reset operation state */ init_hash_operation(operation, NULL, 0); operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } /* Cryptographic Operations API - Symmetric Cipher Functions */ void TEE_CipherInit(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *IV, uint32_t IVLen) { TEE_Result res; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_CIPHER) TEE_Panic(0); if (!(operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET) || !(operation->key1)) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL) TEE_ResetOperation(operation); operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE; res = utee_cipher_init(operation->state, IV, IVLen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); operation->buffer_offs = 0; operation->info.handleState |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; } static TEE_Result tee_buffer_update( TEE_OperationHandle op, TEE_Result(*update_func)(unsigned long state, const void *src, size_t slen, void *dst, uint64_t *dlen), const void *src_data, size_t src_len, void *dest_data, uint64_t *dest_len) { TEE_Result res; const uint8_t *src = src_data; size_t slen = src_len; uint8_t *dst = dest_data; size_t dlen = *dest_len; size_t acc_dlen = 0; uint64_t tmp_dlen; size_t l; size_t buffer_size; size_t buffer_left; if (!src) { if (slen) TEE_Panic(0); goto out; } if (op->buffer_two_blocks) { buffer_size = op->block_size * 2; buffer_left = 1; } else { buffer_size = op->block_size; buffer_left = 0; } if (op->buffer_offs > 0) { /* Fill up complete block */ if (op->buffer_offs < op->block_size) l = MIN(slen, op->block_size - op->buffer_offs); else l = MIN(slen, buffer_size - op->buffer_offs); memcpy(op->buffer + op->buffer_offs, src, l); op->buffer_offs += l; src += l; slen -= l; if ((op->buffer_offs % op->block_size) != 0) goto out; /* Nothing left to do */ } /* If we can feed from buffer */ if ((op->buffer_offs > 0) && ((op->buffer_offs + slen) >= (buffer_size + buffer_left))) { l = ROUNDUP(op->buffer_offs + slen - buffer_size, op->block_size); l = MIN(op->buffer_offs, l); tmp_dlen = dlen; res = update_func(op->state, op->buffer, l, dst, &tmp_dlen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); dst += tmp_dlen; dlen -= tmp_dlen; acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; op->buffer_offs -= l; if (op->buffer_offs > 0) { /* * Slen is small enough to be contained in rest buffer. */ memcpy(op->buffer, op->buffer + l, buffer_size - l); memcpy(op->buffer + op->buffer_offs, src, slen); op->buffer_offs += slen; goto out; /* Nothing left to do */ } } if (slen >= (buffer_size + buffer_left)) { /* Buffer is empty, feed as much as possible from src */ if (op->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_AES_CTS) l = ROUNDUP(slen - buffer_size, op->block_size); else l = ROUNDUP(slen - buffer_size + 1, op->block_size); tmp_dlen = dlen; res = update_func(op->state, src, l, dst, &tmp_dlen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); src += l; slen -= l; dst += tmp_dlen; dlen -= tmp_dlen; acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; } /* Slen is small enough to be contained in buffer. */ memcpy(op->buffer + op->buffer_offs, src, slen); op->buffer_offs += slen; out: *dest_len = acc_dlen; return TEE_SUCCESS; } TEE_Result TEE_CipherUpdate(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *srcData, uint32_t srcLen, void *destData, uint32_t *destLen) { TEE_Result res; size_t req_dlen; uint64_t dl; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (srcData == NULL && srcLen != 0) || destLen == NULL || (destData == NULL && *destLen != 0)) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_CIPHER) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (!srcData && !srcLen) { *destLen = 0; res = TEE_SUCCESS; goto out; } /* Calculate required dlen */ if (operation->block_size > 1) { req_dlen = ((operation->buffer_offs + srcLen) / operation->block_size) * operation->block_size; } else { req_dlen = srcLen; } if (operation->buffer_two_blocks) { if (req_dlen > operation->block_size * 2) req_dlen -= operation->block_size * 2; else req_dlen = 0; } /* * Check that required destLen is big enough before starting to feed * data to the algorithm. Errors during feeding of data are fatal as we * can’t restore sync with this API. */ if (*destLen < req_dlen) { *destLen = req_dlen; res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER; goto out; } dl = *destLen; if (operation->block_size > 1) { res = tee_buffer_update(operation, utee_cipher_update, srcData, srcLen, destData, &dl); } else { if (srcLen > 0) { res = utee_cipher_update(operation->state, srcData, srcLen, destData, &dl); } else { res = TEE_SUCCESS; dl = 0; } } *destLen = dl; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_CipherDoFinal(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *srcData, uint32_t srcLen, void *destData, uint32_t *destLen) { TEE_Result res; uint8_t *dst = destData; size_t acc_dlen = 0; uint64_t tmp_dlen; size_t req_dlen; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (srcData == NULL && srcLen != 0) || destLen == NULL || (destData == NULL && *destLen != 0)) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_CIPHER) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* * Check that the final block doesn’t require padding for those * algorithms that requires client to supply padding. */ if (operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_AES_ECB_NOPAD || operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_AES_CBC_NOPAD || operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_DES_ECB_NOPAD || operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_DES_CBC_NOPAD || operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_DES3_ECB_NOPAD || operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_DES3_CBC_NOPAD) { if (((operation->buffer_offs + srcLen) % operation->block_size) != 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } } /* * Check that required destLen is big enough before starting to feed * data to the algorithm. Errors during feeding of data are fatal as we * can’t restore sync with this API. */ if (operation->block_size > 1) { req_dlen = operation->buffer_offs + srcLen; } else { req_dlen = srcLen; } if (*destLen < req_dlen) { *destLen = req_dlen; res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER; goto out; } tmp_dlen = *destLen - acc_dlen; if (operation->block_size > 1) { res = tee_buffer_update(operation, utee_cipher_update, srcData, srcLen, dst, &tmp_dlen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; dst += tmp_dlen; acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; tmp_dlen = *destLen - acc_dlen; res = utee_cipher_final(operation->state, operation->buffer, operation->buffer_offs, dst, &tmp_dlen); } else { res = utee_cipher_final(operation->state, srcData, srcLen, dst, &tmp_dlen); } if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; *destLen = acc_dlen; operation->info.handleState &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } /* Cryptographic Operations API - MAC Functions */ void TEE_MACInit(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *IV, uint32_t IVLen) { if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_MAC) TEE_Panic(0); if (!(operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET) || !(operation->key1)) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL) TEE_ResetOperation(operation); operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE; init_hash_operation(operation, IV, IVLen); } void TEE_MACUpdate(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *chunk, uint32_t chunkSize) { TEE_Result res; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (chunk == NULL && chunkSize != 0)) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_MAC) TEE_Panic(0); if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE) TEE_Panic(0); res = utee_hash_update(operation->state, chunk, chunkSize); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); } TEE_Result TEE_MACComputeFinal(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *message, uint32_t messageLen, void *mac, uint32_t *macLen) { TEE_Result res; uint64_t ml; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (message == NULL && messageLen != 0) || mac == NULL || macLen == NULL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_MAC) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } ml = *macLen; res = utee_hash_final(operation->state, message, messageLen, mac, &ml); *macLen = ml; if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; operation->info.handleState &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_MACCompareFinal(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *message, uint32_t messageLen, const void *mac, uint32_t macLen) { TEE_Result res; uint8_t computed_mac[TEE_MAX_HASH_SIZE]; uint32_t computed_mac_size = TEE_MAX_HASH_SIZE; if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_MAC) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } res = TEE_MACComputeFinal(operation, message, messageLen, computed_mac, &computed_mac_size); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; if (computed_mac_size != macLen) { res = TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID; goto out; } if (buf_compare_ct(mac, computed_mac, computed_mac_size) != 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID; goto out; } operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } /* Cryptographic Operations API - Authenticated Encryption Functions */ TEE_Result TEE_AEInit(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *nonce, uint32_t nonceLen, uint32_t tagLen, uint32_t AADLen, uint32_t payloadLen) { TEE_Result res; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || nonce == NULL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_AE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* * AES-CCM tag len is specified by AES-CCM spec and handled in TEE Core * in the implementation. But AES-GCM spec doesn’t specify the tag len * according to the same principle so we have to check here instead to * be GP compliant. */ if (operation->info.algorithm == TEE_ALG_AES_GCM) { /* * From GP spec: For AES-GCM, can be 128, 120, 112, 104, or 96 */ if (tagLen < 96 || tagLen > 128 || (tagLen % 8 != 0)) { res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto out; } } res = utee_authenc_init(operation->state, nonce, nonceLen, tagLen / 8, AADLen, payloadLen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) goto out; operation->ae_tag_len = tagLen / 8; operation->info.handleState |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } void TEE_AEUpdateAAD(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *AADdata, uint32_t AADdataLen) { TEE_Result res; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (AADdata == NULL && AADdataLen != 0)) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_AE) TEE_Panic(0); if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) TEE_Panic(0); res = utee_authenc_update_aad(operation->state, AADdata, AADdataLen); operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE; if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); } TEE_Result TEE_AEUpdate(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *srcData, uint32_t srcLen, void *destData, uint32_t *destLen) { TEE_Result res = TEE_SUCCESS; size_t req_dlen; uint64_t dl; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (srcData == NULL && srcLen != 0) || destLen == NULL || (destData == NULL && *destLen != 0)) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_AE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (!srcData && !srcLen) { *destLen = 0; res = TEE_SUCCESS; goto out; } /* * Check that required destLen is big enough before starting to feed * data to the algorithm. Errors during feeding of data are fatal as we * can’t restore sync with this API. */ if (operation->block_size > 1) { req_dlen = ROUNDDOWN(operation->buffer_offs + srcLen, operation->block_size); } else { req_dlen = srcLen; } if (*destLen < req_dlen) { *destLen = req_dlen; res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER; goto out; } dl = *destLen; // if (operation->block_size > 1) { // res = tee_buffer_update(operation, utee_authenc_update_payload, // srcData, srcLen, destData, &dl); // } else { // if (srcLen > 0) { // res = utee_authenc_update_payload(operation->state, // srcData, srcLen, // destData, &dl); // } else { // dl = 0; // res = TEE_SUCCESS; // } // } // if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) // goto out; *destLen = dl; operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_AEEncryptFinal(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *srcData, uint32_t srcLen, void *destData, uint32_t *destLen, void *tag, uint32_t *tagLen) { TEE_Result res = TEE_SUCCESS; // uint8_t *dst = destData; size_t acc_dlen = 0; uint64_t tmp_dlen; size_t req_dlen; // uint64_t tl; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (srcData == NULL && srcLen != 0) || destLen == NULL || (destData == NULL && *destLen != 0) || tag == NULL || tagLen == NULL) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_AE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* * Check that required destLen is big enough before starting to feed * data to the algorithm. Errors during feeding of data are fatal as we * can’t restore sync with this API. */ req_dlen = operation->buffer_offs + srcLen; if (*destLen < req_dlen) { *destLen = req_dlen; res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER; goto out; } /* * Need to check this before update_payload since sync would be lost if * we return short buffer after that. */ if (*tagLen < operation->ae_tag_len) { *tagLen = operation->ae_tag_len; res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER; goto out; } // tl = *tagLen; tmp_dlen = *destLen - acc_dlen; // if (operation->block_size > 1) { // res = tee_buffer_update(operation, utee_authenc_update_payload, // srcData, srcLen, dst, &tmp_dlen); // if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) // goto out; // // dst += tmp_dlen; // acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; // // tmp_dlen = *destLen - acc_dlen; // res = utee_authenc_enc_final(operation->state, // operation->buffer, // operation->buffer_offs, dst, // &tmp_dlen, tag, &tl); // } else { // res = utee_authenc_enc_final(operation->state, srcData, // srcLen, dst, &tmp_dlen, // tag, &tl); // } // *tagLen = tl; // if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) // goto out; acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; *destLen = acc_dlen; operation->info.handleState &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_AEDecryptFinal(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const void *srcData, uint32_t srcLen, void *destData, uint32_t *destLen, void *tag, uint32_t tagLen) { TEE_Result res; //uint8_t *dst = destData; size_t acc_dlen = 0; uint64_t tmp_dlen; size_t req_dlen; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (srcData == NULL && srcLen != 0) || destLen == NULL || (destData == NULL && *destLen != 0) || (tag == NULL && tagLen != 0)) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_AE) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) { res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS; goto out; } /* * Check that required destLen is big enough before starting to feed * data to the algorithm. Errors during feeding of data are fatal as we * can’t restore sync with this API. */ req_dlen = operation->buffer_offs + srcLen; if (*destLen < req_dlen) { *destLen = req_dlen; res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER; goto out; } tmp_dlen = *destLen - acc_dlen; // if (operation->block_size > 1) { // res = tee_buffer_update(operation, utee_authenc_update_payload, // srcData, srcLen, dst, &tmp_dlen); // if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) // goto out; // // dst += tmp_dlen; // acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; // // tmp_dlen = *destLen - acc_dlen; // res = utee_authenc_dec_final(operation->state, // operation->buffer, // operation->buffer_offs, dst, // &tmp_dlen, tag, tagLen); // } else { // res = utee_authenc_dec_final(operation->state, srcData, // srcLen, dst, &tmp_dlen, // tag, tagLen); // } // if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) // goto out; /* Supplied tagLen should match what we initiated with */ if (tagLen != operation->ae_tag_len) res = TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID; acc_dlen += tmp_dlen; *destLen = acc_dlen; operation->info.handleState &= ~TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL; out: if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER && res != TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } /* Cryptographic Operations API - Asymmetric Functions */ TEE_Result TEE_AsymmetricEncrypt(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const TEE_Attribute *params, uint32_t paramCount, const void *srcData, uint32_t srcLen, void *destData, uint32_t *destLen) { TEE_Result res; struct utee_attribute ua[paramCount]; uint64_t dl; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (srcData == NULL && srcLen != 0) || destLen == NULL || (destData == NULL && *destLen != 0)) TEE_Panic(0); if (params == NULL && paramCount != 0) TEE_Panic(0); if (!operation->key1) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_ASYMMETRIC_CIPHER) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.mode != TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) TEE_Panic(0); __utee_from_attr(ua, params, paramCount); dl = *destLen; res = utee_asymm_operate(operation->state, ua, paramCount, srcData, srcLen, destData, &dl); *destLen = dl; if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER && res != TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_AsymmetricDecrypt(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const TEE_Attribute *params, uint32_t paramCount, const void *srcData, uint32_t srcLen, void *destData, uint32_t *destLen) { TEE_Result res; struct utee_attribute ua[paramCount]; uint64_t dl; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (srcData == NULL && srcLen != 0) || destLen == NULL || (destData == NULL && *destLen != 0)) TEE_Panic(0); if (params == NULL && paramCount != 0) TEE_Panic(0); if (!operation->key1) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_ASYMMETRIC_CIPHER) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.mode != TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) TEE_Panic(0); __utee_from_attr(ua, params, paramCount); dl = *destLen; res = utee_asymm_operate(operation->state, ua, paramCount, srcData, srcLen, destData, &dl); *destLen = dl; if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER && res != TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_AsymmetricSignDigest(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const TEE_Attribute *params, uint32_t paramCount, const void *digest, uint32_t digestLen, void *signature, uint32_t *signatureLen) { TEE_Result res; struct utee_attribute ua[paramCount]; uint64_t sl; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (digest == NULL && digestLen != 0) || signature == NULL || signatureLen == NULL) TEE_Panic(0); if (params == NULL && paramCount != 0) TEE_Panic(0); if (!operation->key1) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.mode != TEE_MODE_SIGN) TEE_Panic(0); __utee_from_attr(ua, params, paramCount); sl = *signatureLen; res = utee_asymm_operate(operation->state, ua, paramCount, digest, digestLen, signature, &sl); *signatureLen = sl; if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } TEE_Result TEE_AsymmetricVerifyDigest(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const TEE_Attribute *params, uint32_t paramCount, const void *digest, uint32_t digestLen, const void *signature, uint32_t signatureLen) { TEE_Result res; struct utee_attribute ua[paramCount]; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || (digest == NULL && digestLen != 0) || (signature == NULL && signatureLen != 0)) TEE_Panic(0); if (params == NULL && paramCount != 0) TEE_Panic(0); if (!operation->key1) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.mode != TEE_MODE_VERIFY) TEE_Panic(0); __utee_from_attr(ua, params, paramCount); res = utee_asymm_verify(operation->state, ua, paramCount, digest, digestLen, signature, signatureLen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS && res != TEE_ERROR_SIGNATURE_INVALID) TEE_Panic(res); return res; } /* Cryptographic Operations API - Key Derivation Functions */ void TEE_DeriveKey(TEE_OperationHandle operation, const TEE_Attribute *params, uint32_t paramCount, TEE_ObjectHandle derivedKey) { TEE_Result res; TEE_ObjectInfo key_info; struct utee_attribute ua[paramCount]; if (operation == TEE_HANDLE_NULL || derivedKey == 0) TEE_Panic(0); if (params == NULL && paramCount != 0) TEE_Panic(0); if (TEE_ALG_GET_CLASS(operation->info.algorithm) != TEE_OPERATION_KEY_DERIVATION) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_KEY_DERIVATION) TEE_Panic(0); if (!operation->key1) TEE_Panic(0); if (operation->info.mode != TEE_MODE_DERIVE) TEE_Panic(0); if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_KEY_SET) == 0) TEE_Panic(0); res = utee_cryp_obj_get_info((unsigned long)derivedKey, &key_info); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); if (key_info.objectType != TEE_TYPE_GENERIC_SECRET) TEE_Panic(0); if ((key_info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) != 0) TEE_Panic(0); __utee_from_attr(ua, params, paramCount); res = utee_cryp_derive_key(operation->state, ua, paramCount, (unsigned long)derivedKey); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); } /* Cryptographic Operations API - Random Number Generation Functions */ void TEE_GenerateRandom(void *randomBuffer, uint32_t randomBufferLen) { TEE_Result res; res = utee_cryp_random_number_generate(randomBuffer, randomBufferLen); if (res != TEE_SUCCESS) TEE_Panic(res); }

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