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CVE-2022-35936: ethermint/statedb.go at c9d42d667b753147977a725e98ed116c933c76cb · evmos/ethermint

Ethermint is an Ethereum library. In Ethermint running versions before v0.17.2, the contract selfdestruct invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the DeleteAccountfunction, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct OPCODE. This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint version v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint, so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required. A workaround is available. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e. with identical bytecode, so that the original contract’s code is recovered. The new contract deployment restores the bytecode hash -> bytecode entry in the internal state.

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#vulnerability#mac#git#auth

package keeper import ( “bytes” “fmt” “math/big” “github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/store/prefix” sdk “github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types” sdkerrors “github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/types/errors” “github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common” ethermint “github.com/evmos/ethermint/types” “github.com/evmos/ethermint/x/evm/statedb” “github.com/evmos/ethermint/x/evm/types” ) var _ statedb.Keeper = &Keeper{} // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- // StateDB Keeper implementation // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- // GetAccount returns nil if account is not exist, returns error if it’s not `EthAccountI` func (k *Keeper) GetAccount(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address) *statedb.Account { acct := k.GetAccountWithoutBalance(ctx, addr) if acct == nil { return nil } acct.Balance = k.GetBalance(ctx, addr) return acct } // GetState loads contract state from database, implements `statedb.Keeper` interface. func (k *Keeper) GetState(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address, key common.Hash) common.Hash { store := prefix.NewStore(ctx.KVStore(k.storeKey), types.AddressStoragePrefix(addr)) value := store.Get(key.Bytes()) if len(value) == 0 { return common.Hash{} } return common.BytesToHash(value) } // GetCode loads contract code from database, implements `statedb.Keeper` interface. func (k *Keeper) GetCode(ctx sdk.Context, codeHash common.Hash) []byte { store := prefix.NewStore(ctx.KVStore(k.storeKey), types.KeyPrefixCode) return store.Get(codeHash.Bytes()) } // ForEachStorage iterate contract storage, callback return false to break early func (k *Keeper) ForEachStorage(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address, cb func(key, value common.Hash) bool) { store := ctx.KVStore(k.storeKey) prefix := types.AddressStoragePrefix(addr) iterator := sdk.KVStorePrefixIterator(store, prefix) defer iterator.Close() for ; iterator.Valid(); iterator.Next() { key := common.BytesToHash(iterator.Key()) value := common.BytesToHash(iterator.Value()) // check if iteration stops if !cb(key, value) { return } } } // SetBalance update account’s balance, compare with current balance first, then decide to mint or burn. func (k *Keeper) SetBalance(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address, amount *big.Int) error { cosmosAddr := sdk.AccAddress(addr.Bytes()) params := k.GetParams(ctx) coin := k.bankKeeper.GetBalance(ctx, cosmosAddr, params.EvmDenom) balance := coin.Amount.BigInt() delta := new(big.Int).Sub(amount, balance) switch delta.Sign() { case 1: // mint coins := sdk.NewCoins(sdk.NewCoin(params.EvmDenom, sdk.NewIntFromBigInt(delta))) if err := k.bankKeeper.MintCoins(ctx, types.ModuleName, coins); err != nil { return err } if err := k.bankKeeper.SendCoinsFromModuleToAccount(ctx, types.ModuleName, cosmosAddr, coins); err != nil { return err } case -1: // burn coins := sdk.NewCoins(sdk.NewCoin(params.EvmDenom, sdk.NewIntFromBigInt(new(big.Int).Neg(delta)))) if err := k.bankKeeper.SendCoinsFromAccountToModule(ctx, cosmosAddr, types.ModuleName, coins); err != nil { return err } if err := k.bankKeeper.BurnCoins(ctx, types.ModuleName, coins); err != nil { return err } default: // not changed } return nil } // SetAccount updates nonce/balance/codeHash together. func (k *Keeper) SetAccount(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address, account statedb.Account) error { // update account cosmosAddr := sdk.AccAddress(addr.Bytes()) acct := k.accountKeeper.GetAccount(ctx, cosmosAddr) if acct == nil { acct = k.accountKeeper.NewAccountWithAddress(ctx, cosmosAddr) } if err := acct.SetSequence(account.Nonce); err != nil { return err } codeHash := common.BytesToHash(account.CodeHash) if ethAcct, ok := acct.(ethermint.EthAccountI); ok { if err := ethAcct.SetCodeHash(codeHash); err != nil { return err } } k.accountKeeper.SetAccount(ctx, acct) if err := k.SetBalance(ctx, addr, account.Balance); err != nil { return err } k.Logger(ctx).Debug( "account updated", "ethereum-address", addr.Hex(), "nonce", account.Nonce, "codeHash", codeHash.Hex(), "balance", account.Balance, ) return nil } // SetState update contract storage, delete if value is empty. func (k *Keeper) SetState(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address, key common.Hash, value []byte) { store := prefix.NewStore(ctx.KVStore(k.storeKey), types.AddressStoragePrefix(addr)) action := “updated” if len(value) == 0 { store.Delete(key.Bytes()) action = “deleted” } else { store.Set(key.Bytes(), value) } k.Logger(ctx).Debug( fmt.Sprintf("state %s", action), "ethereum-address", addr.Hex(), "key", key.Hex(), ) } // SetCode set contract code, delete if code is empty. func (k *Keeper) SetCode(ctx sdk.Context, codeHash, code []byte) { store := prefix.NewStore(ctx.KVStore(k.storeKey), types.KeyPrefixCode) // store or delete code action := “updated” if len(code) == 0 { store.Delete(codeHash) action = “deleted” } else { store.Set(codeHash, code) } k.Logger(ctx).Debug( fmt.Sprintf("code %s", action), "code-hash", common.BytesToHash(codeHash).Hex(), ) } // DeleteAccount handles contract’s suicide call: // - clear balance // - remove code // - remove states // - remove auth account func (k *Keeper) DeleteAccount(ctx sdk.Context, addr common.Address) error { cosmosAddr := sdk.AccAddress(addr.Bytes()) acct := k.accountKeeper.GetAccount(ctx, cosmosAddr) if acct == nil { return nil } // NOTE: only Ethereum accounts (contracts) can be selfdestructed ethAcct, ok := acct.(ethermint.EthAccountI) if !ok { return sdkerrors.Wrapf(types.ErrInvalidAccount, "type %T, address %s", acct, addr) } // clear balance if err := k.SetBalance(ctx, addr, new(big.Int)); err != nil { return err } // remove code codeHashBz := ethAcct.GetCodeHash().Bytes() if !bytes.Equal(codeHashBz, types.EmptyCodeHash) { k.SetCode(ctx, codeHashBz, nil) } // clear storage k.ForEachStorage(ctx, addr, func(key, _ common.Hash) bool { k.SetState(ctx, addr, key, nil) return true }) // remove auth account k.accountKeeper.RemoveAccount(ctx, acct) k.Logger(ctx).Debug( "account suicided", "ethereum-address", addr.Hex(), "cosmos-address", cosmosAddr.String(), ) return nil }

Related news

GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg: Ethermint vulnerable to DoS through unintended Contract Selfdestruct

# Vulnerability Report ## Impact Smart contract applications that make use of the `selfdestruct` functionality and their end-users. ## Classification The vulnerability has been classified as `high` with a CVSS score of `8.2`. It has the potential to create a denial-of-service to all contracts that can invoke the [`selfdestruct`](https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/315/why-are-selfdestructs-used-in-contract-programming#347) function to destroy a smart contract. ## Users Impacted Due to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. User funds and balances are safe. ## Disclosure In Ethermint running versions before `v0.17.2`, the contract `selfdestruct` invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the [`DeleteAccount`](https://gi...

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