Headline
CVE-2023-20902: Timing attack risk in Harbor
A timing condition in Harbor 2.6.x and below, Harbor 2.7.2 and below, Harbor 2.8.2 and below, and Harbor 1.10.17 and below allows an attacker with network access to create jobs/stop job tasks and retrieve job task information.
In the Harbor jobservice container, the comparison of secrets in the authenticator type is prone to timing attacks. The vulnerability occurs due to the following code:
if expectedSecret != secret {
To avoid this issue, constant time comparison should be used.
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(expectedSecret), []byte(secret)) == 0
Impact
This attack might be possible theoretically, but no workable proof of concept is available, and access complexity is set at High.
The jobservice exposes these APIs
Create a job task --- POST /api/v1/jobs
Get job task information --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}
Stop job task --- POST /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}
Get job log task --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}/log
Get job execution --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}/executions
Get job stats --- GET /api/v1/stats
Get job service configuration --- GET /api/v1/config
It is used to create jobs/stop job tasks and retrieve job task information. If an attacker obtains the secrets, it is possible to retrieve the job information, create a job, or stop a job task.
The following versions of Harbor are involved:
<=Harbor 2.8.2, <=Harbor 2.7.2, <= Harbor 2.6.x, <=Harbor 1.10.17
Patches
Harbor 2.8.3, Harbor 2.7.3, Harbor 1.10.18
Workarounds
Because the jobservice only exposes HTTP service to harbor-core containers, blocking any inbound traffic from the external network to the jobservice container can reduce the risk.
Credits
Thanks to Porcupiney Hairs for reporting this issue.
Related news
In the Harbor jobservice container, the comparison of secrets in the authenticator type is prone to timing attacks. The vulnerability occurs due to the following code: https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/blob/aaea068cceb4063ab89313d9785f2b40f35b0d63/src/jobservice/api/authenticator.go#L69-L69 To avoid this issue, constant time comparison should be used. ``` subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(expectedSecret), []byte(secret)) == 0 ``` ### Impact This attack might be possible theoretically, but no workable proof of concept is available, and access complexity is set at High. The jobservice exposes these APIs ``` Create a job task --- POST /api/v1/jobs Get job task information --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id} Stop job task --- POST /api/v1/jobs/{job_id} Get job log task --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}/log Get job execution --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}/executions Get job stats --- GET /api/v1/stats Get job service configuration --- GET /api/v1/config ``` It is used to create jobs/stop job...