Headline
CVE-2023-29586: CWE - CWE-285: Improper Authorization (4.10)
Code Sector TeraCopy 3.9.7 does not perform proper access validation on the source folder during a copy operation. This leads to Arbitrary File Read by allowing any user to copy any directory in the system to a directory they control.
Weakness ID: 285
Abstraction: Class
Structure: Simple
Description
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Extended Description
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user’s privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
When access control checks are not applied consistently - or not at all - users are able to access data or perform actions that they should not be allowed to perform. This can lead to a wide range of problems, including information exposures, denial of service, and arbitrary code execution.
Alternate Terms
AuthZ:
“AuthZ” is typically used as an abbreviation of “authorization” within the web application security community. It is distinct from “AuthN” (or, sometimes, “AuthC”) which is an abbreviation of “authentication.” The use of “Auth” as an abbreviation is discouraged, since it could be used for either authentication or authorization.
Relationships
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view “Research Concepts” (CWE-1000)
Nature
Type
ID
Name
ChildOf
Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
284
Improper Access Control
ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
552
Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
ParentOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
732
Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
ParentOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
862
Missing Authorization
ParentOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
863
Incorrect Authorization
ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
926
Improper Export of Android Application Components
ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
927
Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication
ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1230
Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Metadata
ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1256
Improper Restriction of Software Interfaces to Hardware Features
ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1297
Unprotected Confidential Information on Device is Accessible by OSAT Vendors
ParentOf
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
1328
Security Version Number Mutable to Older Versions
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view “Architectural Concepts” (CWE-1008)
Nature
Type
ID
Name
MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
1011
Authorize Actors
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.
Relevant to the view “CISQ Data Protection Measures” (CWE-1340)
Nature
Type
ID
Name
ChildOf
Pillar - a weakness that is the most abstract type of weakness and represents a theme for all class/base/variant weaknesses related to it. A Pillar is different from a Category as a Pillar is still technically a type of weakness that describes a mistake, while a Category represents a common characteristic used to group related things.
284
Improper Access Control
Background Details
An access control list (ACL) represents who/what has permissions to a given object. Different operating systems implement (ACLs) in different ways. In UNIX, there are three types of permissions: read, write, and execute. Users are divided into three classes for file access: owner, group owner, and all other users where each class has a separate set of rights. In Windows NT, there are four basic types of permissions for files: "No access", "Read access", "Change access", and "Full control". Windows NT extends the concept of three types of users in UNIX to include a list of users and groups along with their associated permissions. A user can create an object (file) and assign specified permissions to that object.
Modes Of Introduction
The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.
Phase
Note
Implementation
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Architecture and Design
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
Operation
Applicable Platforms
This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.
Languages
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Technologies
Web Server (Often Prevalent)
Database Server (Often Prevalent)
Common Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
Scope
Impact
Likelihood
Confidentiality
Technical Impact: Read Application Data; Read Files or Directories
An attacker could read sensitive data, either by reading the data directly from a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to read the data.
Integrity
Technical Impact: Modify Application Data; Modify Files or Directories
An attacker could modify sensitive data, either by writing the data directly to a data store that is not properly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to write the data.
Access Control
Technical Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
An attacker could gain privileges by modifying or reading critical data directly, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality.
Likelihood Of Exploit
Demonstrative Examples
Example 1
This function runs an arbitrary SQL query on a given database, returning the result of the query.
(bad code)
Example Language: PHP
function runEmployeeQuery($dbName, $name){
mysql_select_db($dbName,$globalDbHandle) or die("Could not open Database".$dbName);
//Use a prepared statement to avoid CWE-89
$preparedStatement = $globalDbHandle->prepare(‘SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name’);
$preparedStatement->execute(array(‘:name’ => $name));
return $preparedStatement->fetchAll();
}
/…/
$employeeRecord = runEmployeeQuery('EmployeeDB’,$_GET[‘EmployeeName’]);
While this code is careful to avoid SQL Injection, the function does not confirm the user sending the query is authorized to do so. An attacker may be able to obtain sensitive employee information from the database.
Example 2
The following program could be part of a bulletin board system that allows users to send private messages to each other. This program intends to authenticate the user before deciding whether a private message should be displayed. Assume that LookupMessageObject() ensures that the $id argument is numeric, constructs a filename based on that id, and reads the message details from that file. Also assume that the program stores all private messages for all users in the same directory.
(bad code)
Example Language: Perl
sub DisplayPrivateMessage {
my($id) = @_;
my $Message = LookupMessageObject($id);
print "From: " . encodeHTML($Message->{from}) . "<br>\n";
print "Subject: " . encodeHTML($Message->{subject}) . "\n";
print "<hr>\n";
print "Body: " . encodeHTML($Message->{body}) . "\n";
}
my $q = new CGI;
# For purposes of this example, assume that CWE-309 and
# CWE-523 do not apply.
if (! AuthenticateUser($q->param(‘username’), $q->param(‘password’))) {
ExitError(“invalid username or password”);
}
my $id = $q->param(‘id’);
DisplayPrivateMessage($id);
While the program properly exits if authentication fails, it does not ensure that the message is addressed to the user. As a result, an authenticated attacker could provide any arbitrary identifier and read private messages that were intended for other users.
One way to avoid this problem would be to ensure that the “to” field in the message object matches the username of the authenticated user.
Observed Examples
Reference
Description
CVE-2022-24730
Go-based continuous deployment product does not check that a user has certain privileges to update or create an app, allowing adversaries to read sensitive repository information
CVE-2009-3168
Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to reset administrative passwords.
CVE-2009-2960
Web application does not restrict access to admin scripts, allowing authenticated users to modify passwords of other users.
CVE-2009-3597
Web application stores database file under the web root with insufficient access control (CWE-219), allowing direct request.
CVE-2009-2282
Terminal server does not check authorization for guest access.
CVE-2009-3230
Database server does not use appropriate privileges for certain sensitive operations.
CVE-2009-2213
Gateway uses default “Allow” configuration for its authorization settings.
CVE-2009-0034
Chain: product does not properly interpret a configuration option for a system group, allowing users to gain privileges.
CVE-2008-6123
Chain: SNMP product does not properly parse a configuration option for which hosts are allowed to connect, allowing unauthorized IP addresses to connect.
CVE-2008-5027
System monitoring software allows users to bypass authorization by creating custom forms.
CVE-2008-7109
Chain: reliance on client-side security (CWE-602) allows attackers to bypass authorization using a custom client.
CVE-2008-3424
Chain: product does not properly handle wildcards in an authorization policy list, allowing unintended access.
CVE-2009-3781
Content management system does not check access permissions for private files, allowing others to view those files.
CVE-2008-4577
ACL-based protection mechanism treats negative access rights as if they are positive, allowing bypass of intended restrictions.
CVE-2008-6548
Product does not check the ACL of a page accessed using an “include” directive, allowing attackers to read unauthorized files.
CVE-2007-2925
Default ACL list for a DNS server does not set certain ACLs, allowing unauthorized DNS queries.
CVE-2006-6679
Product relies on the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header for authorization, allowing unintended access by spoofing the header.
CVE-2005-3623
OS kernel does not check for a certain privilege before setting ACLs for files.
CVE-2005-2801
Chain: file-system code performs an incorrect comparison (CWE-697), preventing default ACLs from being properly applied.
CVE-2001-1155
Chain: product does not properly check the result of a reverse DNS lookup because of operator precedence (CWE-783), allowing bypass of DNS-based access restrictions.
Potential Mitigations
Phase: Architecture and Design
Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient’s doctor.
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Phase: Architecture and Design
For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Phases: System Configuration; Installation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a “default deny” policy when defining these ACLs.
Detection Methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software’s design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Note: These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Forced Path Execution
Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
- Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
- Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Memberships
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Taxonomy Mappings
Mapped Taxonomy Name
Node ID
Fit
Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
Missing Access Control
OWASP Top Ten 2007
A10
CWE More Specific
Failure to Restrict URL Access
OWASP Top Ten 2004
A2
CWE More Specific
Broken Access Control
Software Fault Patterns
SFP35
Insecure resource access
References
Content History
Submissions
Submission Date
Submitter
Organization
2006-07-19
7 Pernicious Kingdoms
Modifications
Modification Date
Modifier
Organization
2008-07-01
Eric Dalci
Cigital
updated Time_of_Introduction
2008-08-15
Veracode
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-09-08
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-01-12
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2009-03-10
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Description, Related_Attack_Patterns
2009-07-27
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships
2009-10-29
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Type
2009-12-28
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2010-02-16
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2010-04-05
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships
2010-09-27
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Description
2011-03-24
CWE Content Team
MITRE
Changed name and description; clarified difference between “access control” and “authorization.”
2011-03-29
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Relationships
2011-06-01
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Relationships
2012-05-11
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2012-10-30
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Potential_Mitigations
2013-07-17
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships
2014-07-30
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2015-12-07
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships
2017-11-08
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2018-03-27
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2019-01-03
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2019-06-20
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2020-02-24
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated References, Relationships
2020-08-20
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships
2020-12-10
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships
2021-03-15
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Alternate_Terms
2021-07-20
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2021-10-28
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-04-28
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Relationships
2022-10-13
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Observed_Examples
2023-01-31
CWE Content Team
MITRE
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
Previous Entry Names
Change Date
Previous Entry Name
2009-01-12
Missing or Inconsistent Access Control
2011-03-29
Improper Access Control (Authorization)
More information is available — Please select a different filter.
Related news
Code Sector TeraCopy 3.9.7 does not perform proper access validation on the source folder during a copy operation. This leads to Arbitrary File Read by allowing any user to copy any directory in the system to a directory they control.