Headline
GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63: tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)
Summary
The tj-actions/changed-files
workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The changed-files
action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json
input enabled by default, only escapes "
for JSON values.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ;
and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run
block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN
if triggered on other events than pull_request
. For example on push
.
Proof of Concept
- Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example
$(whoami).txt
which is a valid filename. - Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the
List all changed files
step below.
- name: List all changed files
run: |
for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
Example output:
##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
for file in $(whoami).txt; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed
Impact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
A new
safe_output
input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files
env:
ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
run: |
for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
Resources
Summary
The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The changed-files action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.
Proof of Concept
Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example $(whoami).txt which is a valid filename.
Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the List all changed files step below.
- name: List all changed files run: | for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do echo “$file was changed” done
Example output:
##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do for file in $(whoami).txt; do echo “$file was changed” done shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0} ##[endgroup] runner.txt was changed
Impact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
A new safe_output input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.
A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files env: ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }} run: | for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do echo “$file was changed” done
Resources
- Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input
- Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests
References
- GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51664
- tj-actions/changed-files@0102c07
- tj-actions/changed-files@716b1e1
- tj-actions/changed-files@ff2f6e6