#js

Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in nbubna store v.2.14.2 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the store.deep.js component

### Impact Directus allows an authenticated attacker to save cross site scripting code to the database. This is possible because the application injects an attacker-controlled parameter that will be stored in the server and used by the client into an unsanitized DOM element. When chained with [CVE-2024-6534](https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-3fff-gqw3-vj86), it could result in account takeover. ### PoC To exploit this vulnerability, we need to do the following steps using a non-administrative, default role attacker account. 1. Upload the following JavaScript file. Using the upload functionality at `POST /files`. This PoC will show an alert message. ```js export TARGET_HOST="http://localhost:8055" export ATTACKER_EMAIL="[email protected]" export ATTACKER_PASSWORD="123456" root_dir=$(dirname $0) mkdir "${root_dir}/static" curl -s -k -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X 'POST' "${TARGET_HOST}/auth/login" \ -c "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_se...

### Impact A user with access to a Kubernetes cluster where Envoy Gateway is installed can use a path traversal attack to execute Envoy Admin interface commands on proxies managed by Envoy Gateway. The admin interface can be used to terminate the Envoy process and extract the Envoy configuration (possibly containing confidential data). For example, the following command, if run from within the Kubernetes cluster, can be used to get the configuration dump of the proxy: ``` curl --path-as-is http://<Proxy-Service-ClusterIP>:19001/stats/prometheus/../../config_dump ``` ### Patches 1.2.6 ### Workarounds The `EnvoyProxy` API can be used to apply a bootstrap config patch that restricts access strictly to the prometheus stats endpoint. Find below an example of such a bootstrap patch. ``` apiVersion: gateway.envoyproxy.io/v1alpha1 kind: EnvoyProxy metadata: name: custom-proxy-config namespace: default spec: bootstrap: type: JSONPatch jsonPatches: - op: "add" path: ...

Such routers typically lack endpoint detection and response protection, are in front of a firewall, and don't run monitoring software like Sysmon, making the attacks harder to detect.

### Summary Despite normal text rendering as LaTeX expressions, preventing XSS, the library also provides users with commands which may modify HTML, such as the `\htmlData` command, and the lack of escaping leads to XSS. ### Details Overall in the code, other than in the `test` folder, no functions escaping HTML can be seen. ### PoC 1. Go to https://cortexjs.io/mathlive/demo/ 2. Paste either `\htmlData{><img/onerror=alert(1)"src=}{}` or `\htmlData{x=" ><img/onerror=alert(1) src>}{}` in the LaTeX textarea. ### Impact MathLive users who render untrusted mathematical expressions could encounter malicious input using \htmlData that runs arbitrary JavaScript, or generate invalid HTML.

### Impact [Undici `fetch()` uses Math.random()](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/8b06b8250907d92fead664b3368f1d2aa27c1f35/lib/web/fetch/body.js#L113) to choose the boundary for a multipart/form-data request. It is known that the output of Math.random() can be predicted if several of its generated values are known. If there is a mechanism in an app that sends multipart requests to an attacker-controlled website, they can use this to leak the necessary values. Therefore, An attacker can tamper with the requests going to the backend APIs if certain conditions are met. ### Patches This is fixed in 5.28.5; 6.21.1; 7.2.3. ### Workarounds Do not issue multipart requests to attacker controlled servers. ### References * https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 * https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f

### Summary This vulnerability allows a user to maneuver the Webfinger mechanism to perform a GET request to any internal resource on any Host, Port, URL combination regardless of present security mechanisms, and forcing the victim’s server into an infinite loop causing Denial of Service. Moreover, this issue can also be maneuvered into performing a Blind SSRF attack. ### Details The Webfinger endpoint takes a remote domain for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per the ActivityPub spec (https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-considerations), on the security considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while running in production. The **lookupWebFinger** function, responsible for returning an actor handler for received actor objects from a remote server, can be abused to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) and Blind SSRF attacks while attempting to resolve a malicious actor’s object. On Fedify, two client-facing functions implement the *...

### Summary Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections. ### Upgrade Path Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration. - Using the backend integration feature - Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite - Accessing the development server via a domain other than `localhost` or `*.localhost` - Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser #### Using the backend integration feature If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting [`server.origin`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options.html#server-origin), you need to add the origin of the backend server to the [`server.cors.origin`](https://github.com/expressjs/cors#configuration-options) opti...

Introduction Microsoft engineering teams use the Security Development Lifecycle to ensure our products are built in alignment with Microsoft’s Secure Future Initiative security principles: Secure by Design, Secure by Default, and Secure Operations. A key component of the Security Development Lifecycle is security testing, which aims to discover and mitigate security vulnerabilities before adversaries can exploit them.

### Impact Users who use IAM OIDC custom resource provider package will download CA Thumbprints as part of the custom resource workflow, https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk/blob/d16482fc8a4a3e1f62751f481b770c09034df7d2/packages/%40aws-cdk/custom-resource-handlers/lib/aws-iam/oidc-handler/external.ts#L34. However, the current `tls.connect` method will always set `rejectUnauthorized: false` which is a potential security concern. CDK should follow the best practice and set `rejectUnauthorized: true`. However, this could be a breaking change for existing CDK applications and we should fix this with a feature flag. Note that this is marked as low severity Security advisory because the issuer url is provided by CDK users who define the CDK application. If they insist on connecting to a unauthorized OIDC provider, CDK should not disallow this. Additionally, the code block is run in a Lambda environment which mitigate the MITM attack. As a best practice, CDK should still fix this issue under a...