Tag
#ssrf
View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 9.3 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Ruijie Equipment: Reyee OS Vulnerabilities: Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password, Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Premature Release of Resource During Expected Lifetime, Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information, Use of Weak Credentials, Improper Neutralization of Wildcards or Matching Symbols, Improper Handling of Insufficient Permissions or Privileges, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Use of Inherently Dangerous Function, Resource Leak 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of this vulnerabilities could allow attackers to take near full control over the device. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following Ruijie product is affected: Reyee OS: Versions 2.206.x up to but not including 2.320.x 3.2 Vulnerability Overview 3.2.1 Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password CWE-640 Ruijie Reyee OS version...
### Impact A vulnerability is identified in Backstage Scaffolder template functionality where Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) can be exploited to perform Git config injection. The vulnerability allows an attacker to capture privileged git tokens used by the Backstage Scaffolder plugin. With these tokens, unauthorized access to sensitive resources in git can be achieved. The impact is considered medium severity as the Backstage Threat Model recommends restricting access to adding and editing templates in the Backstage Catalog plugin. ### Patches The issue has been resolved in versions `v0.4.12`, `v0.5.1` and `v0.6.1` of the `@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-node` package. Users are encouraged to upgrade to this version to mitigate the vulnerability. ### Workarounds Users can ensure that templates do not change git config. ### References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in the [Backstage repository](https://github.com/backstage/backstage)...
### Summary lobe-chat before 1.19.13 has an unauthorized ssrf vulnerability. An attacker can construct malicious requests to cause SSRF without logging in, attack intranet services, and leak sensitive information. ### Details * visit https://chat-preview.lobehub.com/ * click settings -> llm -> openai * fill the OpenAI API Key you like * fill the proxy address that you want to attack (e.g. a domain that resolved to a local ip addr like 127.0.0.1.xip.io) (the address will concat the path "/chat/completions" which can be bypassed with sharp like "http://172.23.0.1:8000/#") * then lobe will echo the ssrf result The jwt token header X-Lobe-Chat-Auth strored proxy address and OpenAI API Key, you can modify it to scan internal network in your target lobe-web. ![image](https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/assets/55245002/d55e21e0-59d8-4a8e-8c56-4bcda3302dc2) ![image](https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/assets/55245002/86833362-4e9e-4d07-9542-420db541f7a4) ![image](https://github.com/lobe...
A flaw was found in OpenShift Console. A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack can happen if an attacker supplies all or part of a URL to the server to query. The server is considered to be in a privileged network position and can often reach exposed services that aren't readily available to clients due to network filtering. Leveraging such an attack vector, the attacker can have an impact on other services and potentially disclose information or have other nefarious effects on the system. The /api/dev-console/proxy/internet endpoint on the OpenShit Console allows authenticated users to have the console's pod perform arbitrary and fully controlled HTTP(s) requests. The full response to these requests is returned by the endpoint. While the name of this endpoint suggests the requests are only bound to the internet, no such checks are in place. An authenticated user can therefore ask the console to perform arbitrary HTTP requests from outside the cluster to a service inside the cluste...
### Summary A server side request forgery vuln was found within geonode when testing on a bug bounty program. Server side request forgery allows a user to request information on the internal service/services. ### Details The endpoint /proxy/?url= does not properly protect against SSRF. when using the following format you can request internal hosts and display data. /proxy/?url=http://169.254.169.254\@whitelistedIPhere. This will state wether the AWS internal IP is alive. If you get a 404, the host is alive. A non alive host will not display a response. To display metadata, use a hashfrag on the url /proxy/?url=http://169.254.169.254\@#whitelisteddomain.com or try /proxy/?url=http://169.254.169.254\@%23whitelisteddomain.com ### Impact Port scan internal hosts, and request information from internal hosts.
### Impact Flowise allows developers to inject configuration into the Chainflow during execution through the `overrideConfig` option. This is supported in both the frontend web integration and the backend Prediction API. This has a range of fundamental issues that are a **major** security vulnerability. While this feature is intentional, it should have strong protections added and be disabled by default. These issues include: 1. Remote code execution. While inside a sandbox this allows for 1. Sandbox escape 2. DoS by crashing the server 3. SSRF 2. Prompt Injection, both System and User 1. Full control over LLM prompts 2. Server variable and data exfiltration And many many more such as altering the flow of a conversation, prompt exfiltration via LLM proxying etc. These issues are self-targeted and do not persist to other users but do leave the server and business exposed. All issues are shown with the API but also work with the web embed. ### Workarounds - `overrideC...
An improper restriction of external entities (XXE) vulnerability in dompdf/dompdf's SVG parser allows for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and deserialization attacks. This issue affects all versions prior to 2.0.0. The vulnerability can be exploited even if the isRemoteEnabled option is set to false. It allows attackers to perform SSRF, disclose internal image files, and cause PHAR deserialization attacks.
As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v3 9.9 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity/public exploits are available/known public exploitation Vendor: Siemens Equipment: SINEC INS Vulnerabilities: Improper Authentication, Out-of-bounds Write, Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity, Excessive Iteration, Reachable Assertion, Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, Improper Input Validation, Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions, Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Heap-based Buffer Overflow, Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data, Path Traversal, Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthori...
In gradio <=4.42.0, the gr.DownloadButton function has a hidden server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The reason is that within the save_url_to_cache function, there are no restrictions on the URL, which allows access to local target resources. This can lead to the download of local resources and sensitive information.
### Summary The various header-related Refit attributes (Header, HeaderCollection and Authorize) are vulnerable to CRLF injection. ### Details The way HTTP headers are added to a request is via the `HttpHeaders.TryAddWithoutValidation` method: <https://github.com/reactiveui/refit/blob/258a771f44417c6e48e103ac921fe4786f3c2a1e/Refit/RequestBuilderImplementation.cs#L1328> This method does not check for CRLF characters in the header value. This means that any headers added to a refit request are vulnerable to CRLF-injection. In general, CRLF-injection into a HTTP header (when using HTTP/1.1) means that one can inject additional HTTP headers or smuggle whole HTTP requests. ### PoC The below example code creates a console app that takes one command line variable (a bearer token) and then makes a request to some status page with the provided token inserted in the "Authorization" header: ```c# using Refit; internal class Program { private static void Main(string[] args) { ...