Headline
GHSA-6758-979h-249x: capsule-proxy service discloses Namespaces of colliding tenants to owners of different tenants with the same ServiceAccount name
Summary
A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by capsule-proxy
gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.
Details
- Tenant
solar
, owned by a ServiceAccount namedtenant-owner
in the Namespacesolar
- Tenant
wind
, owned by a ServiceAccount namedtenant-owner
in the Namespacewind
Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.
The Tenant owner solar
would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant wind
and vice-versa, although this is not correct.
The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:
capsule-proxy
runs with the--disable-caching=false
(default value:false
)- Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces.
The CVE doesn’t allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.
- GitHub Advisory Database
- GitHub Reviewed
- CVE-2023-46254
capsule-proxy service discloses Namespaces of colliding tenants to owners of different tenants with the same ServiceAccount name
Package
gomod github.com/projectcapsule/capsule (Go)
Affected versions
<= 0.4.4
gomod github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy (Go)
Summary
A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by capsule-proxy gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.
Details
- Tenant solar, owned by a ServiceAccount named tenant-owner in the Namespace solar
- Tenant wind, owned by a ServiceAccount named tenant-owner in the Namespace wind
Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.
The Tenant owner solar would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant wind and vice-versa, although this is not correct.
The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:
- capsule-proxy runs with the --disable-caching=false (default value: false)
- Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces.
The CVE doesn’t allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.
References
- GHSA-6758-979h-249x
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46254
- projectcapsule/capsule-proxy@615202f
- https://github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy/releases/tag/v0.4.5
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Nov 7, 2023
Related news
capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn't allow any pri...