Headline
GHSA-p8v3-m643-4xqx: Directus allows redacted data extraction on the API through "alias"
Summary
A user with permission to view any collection using redacted hashed fields can get access the raw stored version using the alias
functionality on the API.
Normally, these redacted fields will return **********
however if we change the request to ?alias[workaround]=redacted
we can instead retrieve the plain text value for the field.
Steps to reproduce
- Set up a simple role with read-access to users.
- Create a new user with the role from the previous step
- Assign a password to the user
The easiest way to confirm this vulnerability is by first visiting /users/me
. You should be presented with a redacted JSON-object.
Next, visit /users/me?alias[hash]=password
. This time, the returned JSON object will included the raw password hash instead of the redacted value.
Workaround
This can be avoided by removing permission to view the sensitive fields entirely from users or roles that should not be able to see them.
Summary
A user with permission to view any collection using redacted hashed fields can get access the raw stored version using the alias functionality on the API.
Normally, these redacted fields will return ********** however if we change the request to ?alias[workaround]=redacted we can instead retrieve the plain text value for the field.
Steps to reproduce
- Set up a simple role with read-access to users.
- Create a new user with the role from the previous step
- Assign a password to the user
The easiest way to confirm this vulnerability is by first visiting /users/me. You should be presented with a redacted JSON-object.
Next, visit /users/me?alias[hash]=password. This time, the returned JSON object will included the raw password hash instead of the redacted value.
Workaround
This can be avoided by removing permission to view the sensitive fields entirely from users or roles that should not be able to see them.
References
- GHSA-p8v3-m643-4xqx
- directus/directus@e70a90c