Headline
GHSA-jhh6-6fhp-q2xp: Open Cluster Management vulnerable to Trust Boundary Violation
A flaw was found in Open Cluster Management (OCM) when a user has access to the worker nodes which contain the cluster-manager or klusterlet deployments. The cluster-manager deployment uses a service account with the same name “cluster-manager” which is bound to a ClusterRole also named "cluster-manager", which includes the permission to create Pod resources. If this deployment runs a pod on an attacker-controlled node, the attacker can obtain the cluster-manager’s token and steal any service account token by creating and mounting the target service account to control the whole cluster.
Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.