SQLi vulnerability in LMS Lite component for Joomla.

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CVE-2023-40629: LMS Lite - Joomla! Extension Directory

SQLi vulnerability in S5 Register module for Joomla.

CVE-2023-49707: S5 Register - Joomla! Extension Directory

SQLi vulnerability in Starshop component for Joomla.

CVE-2023-49708: Starshop - Joomla! Extension Directory

SQL injection vulnerability in Buy Addons bavideotab before version 1.0.6, allows attackers to escalate privileges and obtain sensitive information via the component BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontController::run().

In the module “Product Video, Youtube, Vimeo Tab” (bavideotab) up to version 1.0.5 from Buy Addons for PrestaShop, a guest can perform SQL injection in affected versions.

Methods BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontController::run() and BaVideoTabConfirmDeleteModuleFrontController::run() has sensitive SQL calls that can be executed with a trivial http call and exploited to forge a SQL injection.

**WARNING** : This exploit is actively used to deploy a webskimmer to massively steal credit cards.

This exploit uses a PrestaShop front controller and most attackers can conceal the module controller’s path during the exploit, so you will never know within your conventional frontend logs that it exploits this vulnerability. **You will only see “POST /” inside your conventional frontend logs.** Activating the AuditEngine of mod\_security (or similar) is the only way to get data to confirm this exploit.

    --- 1.0.5/modules/bavideotab/controllers/front/confirmdelete.php
    +++ 1.0.6/modules/bavideotab/controllers/front/confirmdelete.php
    @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ class BaVideoTabConfirmDeleteModuleFront
         public function run()
         {
             $db = Db::getInstance(_PS_USE_SQL_SLAVE_);
    -        $id_product=Tools::getValue('id');
    -        $id_lang = Tools::getValue('id_lang');
    +        $id_product = (int) Tools::getValue('id');
    +        $id_lang = (int) Tools::getValue('id_lang');
             $id_shop=($this->context->shop->id);
             $sql="SELECT text_url FROM "._DB_PREFIX_."url_video WHERE id_product='".$id_product."'";
             $sql .= "AND id_lang='".$id_lang."' AND id_store='".$id_shop."' AND type = 1 ";
    
    

    --- 1.0.5/modules/bavideotab/controllers/front/savevideo.php
    +++ 1.0.6/modules/bavideotab/controllers/front/savevideo.php
    @@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
             $id_lang_default = Configuration::get('PS_LANG_DEFAULT');
             $ob_lang_default = new Language($id_lang_default);
             $name_lang_default = $ob_lang_default->name;
    -        $id_shop = Tools::getValue('id_shop');
    +        $id_shop = (int) Tools::getValue('id_shop');
             $name_shop = Tools::getValue('name_shop');
             $db = Db::getInstance(_PS_USE_SQL_SLAVE_);
             $url = $_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME'];
             $url = rtrim($url, 'index.php');
             $languages = Language::getLanguages();
    -        $type_video = Tools::getValue('type_video');
    -        $id_product = Tools::getValue('id_product');
    +        $type_video = (int) Tools::getValue('type_video');
    +        $id_product = (int) Tools::getValue('id_product');
             $sql = 'SELECT * FROM '._DB_PREFIX_.'product_lang WHERE id_product="'.$id_product.'"';
             $show = $db->ExecuteS($sql);
    
    @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
                             $sql = "INSERT INTO "._DB_PREFIX_."url_video ";
                             $sql .= "(id_video,id_product,id_lang,id_store,text_url,language,shop,name_product,type)";
                             $sql .= " VALUES ('','".$id_product."','".$id_lang_default."','".$id_shop."','";
    -                        $sql .= "".$video_upload_default."','".$name_lang_default."','".$name_shop."','";
    +                        $sql .= "".$video_upload_default."','".$name_lang_default."','".pSQL($name_shop)."','";
                             $sql .= "".$name_product."','".$type_video."')";
                             $db->query($sql);
                             $url_save_video = _PS_ROOT_DIR_.'/media/'.$id_shop."/".$id_product."/";
    @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
                                 $sql = "INSERT INTO "._DB_PREFIX_."url_video ";
                                 $sql .= "(id_video,id_product,id_lang,id_store,text_url,language,shop,name_product,type)";
                                 $sql .= " VALUES ('','".$id_product."','".$value['id_lang']."','".$id_shop."','";
    -                            $sql .= "".$video_upload_default."','".$value['name']."','".$name_shop."','";
    +                            $sql .= "".$video_upload_default."','".$value['name']."','".pSQL($name_shop)."','";
                                 $sql .= "".$name_product."','".$type_video."')";
                                 $db->query($sql);
                                 $url_save_video = _PS_ROOT_DIR_.'/media/'.$id_shop."/".$id_product."/";
    @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
                                 $sql = "INSERT INTO "._DB_PREFIX_."url_video ";
                                 $sql .= "(id_video,id_product,id_lang,id_store,text_url,language,shop,name_product,type)";
                                 $sql .= " VALUES ('','".$id_product."','".$value['id_lang']."','".$id_shop."','";
    -                            $sql .= "".$video_url."','".$value['name']."','".$name_shop."','";
    +                            $sql .= "".$video_url."','".$value['name']."','".pSQL($name_shop)."','";
                                 $sql .= "".$name_product."','".$type_video."')";
                                 $db->query($sql);
                                 $url_save_video = _PS_ROOT_DIR_.'/media/'.$id_shop."/".$id_product."/";
    @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
                             $sql = "REPLACE INTO "._DB_PREFIX_."url_video ";
                             $sql .= "(id_video,id_product,id_lang,id_store,text_url,language,shop,name_product,type)";
                             $sql .= " VALUES ('".$id_video."','".$id_product."','".$value['id_lang']."','";
    -                        $sql .= "".$id_shop."','".$video_url."','".$value['name']."','".$name_shop."','";
    +                        $sql .= "".$id_shop."','".$video_url."','".$value['name']."','".pSQL($name_shop)."','";
                             $sql .= "".$name_product."','".$type_video."')";
                             $db->query($sql);
                             $url_save_video = _PS_ROOT_DIR_.'/media/'.$id_shop."/".$id_product."/";
    @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
                             $sql .= "(id_video,id_product,id_store,text_url,language,shop,name_product,type,id_lang)";
                             $sql .= " VALUES ('".$id_video."','".$id_product."','".$id_shop."','";
                             $sql .= "".trim($name_url_array[$value_lang['id_lang']])."','".$value_lang['name']."','";
    -                        $sql .= "".$name_shop."','".$name_product."','".$type_video."','".$value_lang['id_lang']."')";
    +                        $sql .= "".pSQL($name_shop)."','".$name_product."','".$type_video."','".$value_lang['id_lang']."')";
                             $db->query($sql);
                             $ok="3";
                         }
    @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
                             $sql .= "(id_video,id_product,id_store,text_url,language,shop,name_product,type,id_lang)";
                             $sql .= " VALUES ('".$id_video."','".$id_product."','".$id_shop."','";
                             $sql .= "".trim($name_url_array[$value_lang['id_lang']])."','".$value_lang['name']."','";
    -                        $sql .= "".$name_shop."','".$name_product."','".$type_video."','".$value_lang['id_lang']."')";
    +                        $sql .= "".pSQL($name_shop)."','".$name_product."','".$type_video."','".$value_lang['id_lang']."')";
                             $db->query($sql);
                             $ok="3";
                         } else {
    @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ class BaVideoTabSaveVideoModuleFrontCont
                             $sql .= "(id_video,id_product,id_store,text_url,language,shop,name_product,type,id_lang)";
                             $sql .= " VALUES ('".$id_video."','".$id_product."','".$id_shop."','";
                             $sql .= "".trim($name_url_array[$value_lang['id_lang']])."','".$value_lang['name']."','";
    -                        $sql .= "".$name_shop."','".$name_product."','".$type_video."','".$value_lang['id_lang']."')";
    +                        $sql .= "".pSQL($name_shop)."','".$name_product."','".$type_video."','".$value_lang['id_lang']."')";
                             $db->query($sql);
                             $ok="3";
                         }

CVE-2023-48925: [CVE-2023-48925] Improper neutralization of SQL parameter in Buy Addons - Product Video, Youtube, Vimeo Tab module for PrestaShop

SQL njection vulnerability in SunnyToo sturls before version 1.1.13, allows attackers to escalate privileges and obtain sensitive information via StUrls::hookActionDispatcher and StUrls::getInstanceId methods.

**IMPORTANT NOTICE**: DO NOT REPORT VULNERABILITIES SOLELY TO THE AUTHOR OR MARKETPLACE.

We urge you to report any vulnerabilities directly to us. Our mission is to ensure the safety and security of the PrestaShop ecosystem. Unfortunately, many module developers may not always recognize or acknowledge the vulnerabilities in their code, whether due to lack of awareness, or inability to properly evaluate the associated risk, or other reasons.

Given the rise in professional cybercrime networks actively seeking out these vulnerabilities, it's crucial that any potential threats are promptly addressed and the community is informed. The most effective method to do this is by publishing a CVE, like the one provided below.

Should you discover any vulnerabilities, **please report them to us at: report\[@\]security-presta.org** or visit https://security-presta.org for more information.

Every vulnerability report helps make the community more secure, and we are profoundly grateful for any information shared with us.

In the module “Urls” (sturls) up to version 1.1.13 from SunnyToo for PrestaShop, a guest can perform SQL injection in affected versions.

**Summary**

*   **CVE ID**: CVE-2023-46348
*   **Published at**: 2023-12-07
*   **Platform**: PrestaShop
*   **Product**: sturls
*   **Impacted release**: <= 1.1.11 (1.1.13 fixed the vulnerability - WARNING : see WARNING below)
*   **Product author**: SunnyToo
*   **Weakness**: CWE-89
*   **Severity**: critical (9.8)

**Description**

Methods StUrls::hookActionDispatcher and StUrls::getInstanceId have sensitive SQL calls that can be executed with a trivial http call and exploited to forge a SQL injection.

This exploit uses a hook Dispatcher with forged parameters so you will never know within your conventional frontend logs that it exploits this vulnerability. **You will only see “POST /” inside your conventional frontend logs.** Activating the AuditEngine of mod\_security (or similar) is the only way to get data to confirm this exploit.

WARNING : Since we noticed this vulnerability on a 1.1.13 version but the author confirm us that it only affects 1.1.11, be warned that there is maybe manufactured versions in the wild and you should check all version prior to 1.1.13.

**CVSS base metrics**

*   **Attack vector**: network
*   **Attack complexity**: low
*   **Privilege required**: none
*   **User interaction**: none
*   **Scope**: unchanged
*   **Confidentiality**: high
*   **Integrity**: high
*   **Availability**: high

**Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**Possible malicious usage**

*   Obtain admin access
*   Remove data from the associated PrestaShop
*   Copy/paste data from sensitive tables to FRONT to expose tokens and unlock admins’s ajax scripts
*   Rewrite SMTP settings to hijack emails

**Patch from 1.1.13**

    --- 1.1.13/modules/sturls/sturls.php
    +++ XXXXXX/modules/sturls/sturls.php
    @@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ class StUrls extends Module
                             FROM '._DB_PREFIX_.'category_lang l
                             LEFT JOIN '._DB_PREFIX_.'category a
                             ON (a.id_category=l.id_category)
    -                        WHERE `link_rewrite` = "'.$top_parent_name.'"
    +                        WHERE `link_rewrite` = "'.pSQL($top_parent_name).'"
                             AND a.`active` = 1
                             AND `id_lang` = '.(int)$this->context->language->id
                         );
    @@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ class StUrls extends Module
                         FROM '._DB_PREFIX_.'category_lang l
                         LEFT JOIN '._DB_PREFIX_.'category a
                         ON (a.id_category=l.id_category)
    -                    WHERE `link_rewrite` = "'.$parent_name.'"
    +                    WHERE `link_rewrite` = "'.pSQL($parent_name).'"
                         AND a.`active` = 1'.
                         ($top_parent_name ? ' AND `id_parent` = ' . (int)$top_parent_id : '').'
                         AND `id_lang` = '.(int)$this->context->language->id
    @@ -1344,11 +1344,11 @@ class StUrls extends Module
                     ON (a.id_'.$table.'=l.id_'.$table.')
                     '.($table != 'category' ? 'INNER JOIN '._DB_PREFIX_.$table.'_shop s
                     ON (a.id_'.$table.'=s.id_'.$table.' AND s.id_shop = '.(int)$this->context->shop->id.')' : '').'
    -                WHERE `'.$field.'` = "'.$rewrite.'"
    +                WHERE `'.bqSQL($field).'` = "'.pSQL($rewrite).'"
                     AND `id_lang` = '.(int)$this->context->language->id.'
                     '.($is_id_shop ? 'AND l.id_shop='.(int)$this->context->shop->id : '').'
    -                '.($has_ref ? 'AND reference="'.$reference.'"' : '').'
    -                '.($id_parent ? 'AND id_parent IN ('.implode(',',$id_parent).')' : '').'
    +                '.($has_ref ? 'AND reference="'.pSQL($reference).'"' : '').'
    +                '.($id_parent ? 'AND id_parent IN ('.implode(',', array_map('intval', $id_parent)).')' : '').'
                     ');
                 if ($id) {
                     Configuration::updateValue($this->_prefix_st.'sha1_'.$sig, (int)$id);
    @@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ class StUrls extends Module
                             SELECT bl.id_st_blog FROM '._DB_PREFIX_.'st_blog_lang bl
                             INNER JOIN '._DB_PREFIX_.'st_blog_shop bs
                             ON(bl.`id_st_blog` = bs.`id_st_blog`)
    -                        WHERE link_rewrite = "'.$rewrite.'"
    +                        WHERE link_rewrite = "'.pSQL($rewrite).'"
                             AND id_lang = '.(int)Context::getContext()->language->id.'
                             AND id_shop = '.(int)$this->context->shop->id.'
                             ');
    @@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@ class StUrls extends Module
                             SELECT l.id_st_blog_category FROM '._DB_PREFIX_.'st_blog_category_lang l
                             INNER JOIN '._DB_PREFIX_.'st_blog_category_shop s
                             ON(l.`id_st_blog_category` = s.`id_st_blog_category`)
    -                        WHERE link_rewrite = "'.$rewrite.'"
    +                        WHERE link_rewrite = "'.$pSQL($rewrite).'"
                             AND id_lang = '.(int)Context::getContext()->language->id.'
                             AND id_shop = '.(int)$this->context->shop->id.'
                             ');
    

**Other recommendations**

*   It’s recommended to upgrade to the latest version of the module **sturls**.
*   Upgrade PrestaShop to the latest version to disable multiquery executions (separated by “;”) - be warned that this functionality **WILL NOT** protect your SHOP against injection SQL which uses the UNION clause to steal data.
*   Change the default database prefix ps_ with a new longer, arbitrary prefix. Nevertheless, be warned that this is useless against blackhats with DBA senior skills because of a design vulnerability in DBMS
*   Activate OWASP 942’s rules on your WAF (Web application firewall), be warned that you will probably break your backoffice and you will need to pre-configure some bypasses against this set of rules.

**Timeline**

Date

Action

2023-08-31

Issue discovered during a code review by TouchWeb.fr

2023-08-31

Contact Author to confirm versions scope

2023-09-09

Author confirm versions scope

2023-09-16

Author provide a patch

2023-10-17

Request a CVE ID

2023-10-23

Received CVE ID

2023-12-07

Publish this security advisory

**Links**

*   Author product page
*   National Vulnerability Database

**DISCLAIMER:** _The French Association Friends Of Presta (FOP) acts as an intermediary to help hosting this advisory. While we strive to ensure the information and advice provided are accurate, FOP cannot be held liable for any consequences arising from reported vulnerabilities or any subsequent actions taken._

CVE-2023-46348: [CVE-2023-46348] Improper neutralization of SQL parameter in SunnyToo - Urls module for PrestaShop

URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') vulnerability when "form" authentication is used in Apache Shiro.
Mitigation: Update to Apache Shiro 1.13.0+ or 2.0.0-alpha-4+.


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CVE-2023-46750

In affected versions of Octopus Server it is possible for the OpenID client secret to be logged in clear text during the configuration of Octopus Server.



Summary

OpenID client secret logged in plain text during configuration (CVE-2023-1904)

Advisory Number

2023-12

Discovery Date

06 APR 2023

Patch Release Date

21 JUL 2023

Advisory Release Date

12 DEC 2023

Product

Octopus Server

Operating System

Linux and Microsoft Windows

Severity

Medium

CVE ID

CVE-2023-1904

Customers who have downloaded and installed any of the Octopus Server versions listed below ("Details") are affected.

Please upgrade your Octopus Server immediately to fix this vulnerability.

Customers who have upgraded Octopus Server to version 2023.3.5049 or higher are not affected.

**Severity**

Octopus Deploy has given this vulnerability a Medium rating. This rating was given according to the Octopus Deploy severity levels, which ranks vulnerabilities as critical, high, medium, or low severity.

This is our assessment and you should evaluate its applicability to your own environment.

**Details**

In affected versions of Octopus Server it is possible for the OpenID client secret to be logged in clear text during the configuration of Octopus Server.

The versions of Octopus Server affected by this vulnerability are:

*   All 2022.2.x, 2022.3.x, 2022.4.x versions
*   All 2023.1.x versions before 2023.1.11942
*   All 2023.2.x versions before 2023.2.13151
*   All 2023.3.x versions before 2023.3.5049

**Fix**

To address this vulnerability, we have released Octopus Server versions:

*   2023.1.11942
*   2023.2.13151
*   2023.3.5049

The latest versions of Octopus Deploy products can be downloaded from https://octopus.com/downloads and previous versions can be downloaded from https://octopus.com/downloads/previous

**What You Need to Do**

Octopus Deploy recommends that you upgrade to the latest version (2023.4.8116 at the time of writing). You can download the latest version of Octopus Server from https://octopus.com/downloads

We recommend rotating your Octopus Server's OpenID client secret - especially if it appears in your logs. For more information please see our documentation at https://octopus.com/docs/support/log-files, or contact our support team by accessing the link below.

**If you can't upgrade to the latest version (2023.4.8116):**

If you have feature version...

...then upgrade to this version

2022.2.x, 2022.3.x, 2022.4.x

2023.1.11942 or greater

2023.1.x

2023.1.11942 or greater

2023.2.x

2023.2.13151 or greater

2023.3.x

2023.3.5049 or greater

**Mitigation**

There is no known mitigation for CVE-2023-1904, it is important to upgrade to a fixed version as soon as possible.

**Support**

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this advisory, please contact our support team https://octopus.com/support.

**Exploitation and Public Announcements**

The Octopus Deploy security team is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.

**Source**

This vulnerability was found during internal testing by Yun Huang Yong at Octopus Deploy.

CVE-2023-1904: Security Advisory 2023-12




There is a command injection vulnerability in some ZTE mobile internet products. Due to insufficient input validation of multiple network parameters, an authenticated attacker could use the vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands.





CVE-2023-25643: Security Bulletin Details


There is a denial of service vulnerability in some ZTE mobile internet products. Due to insufficient validation of Web interface parameter, an attacker could use the vulnerability to perform a denial of service attack.



CVE-2023-25644: Security Bulletin Details


There is a weak folder permission vulnerability in ZTE's ZXCLOUD iRAI product. Due to weak folder permission, an attacker with ordinary user privileges could construct a fake DLL to execute command to escalate local privileges.

