ghsa

### Impact Any CLI command issued to a Coordinator after the Manifest has been set, is susceptible to be redirected to another MarbleRun Coordinator instance, which runs the same binary, but potentially a different manifest. ### Patches The issue has been patched in [`v1.4.0`](https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.4.0) ### Workarounds Directly using the REST API of the Coordinator and manually verifying and pinning the certificate to a set Manifest avoids the issue.

### Summary HtmlUnit 3.8.0 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via XSTL, when browsing the attacker’s webpage ### Details Vulnerability code location: org.htmlunit.activex.javascript.msxml.XSLProcessor#transform(org.htmlunit.activex.javascript.msxml.XMLDOMNode) The reason for the vulnerability is that it was not enabled FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING for the XSLT processor ### PoC pom.xml: ``` <dependency> <groupId>org.htmlunit</groupId> <artifactId>htmlunit</artifactId> <version>3.8.0</version> </dependency> ``` code: ``` WebClient webClient = new WebClient(BrowserVersion.INTERNET_EXPLORER); HtmlPage page = webClient.getPage("http://127.0.0.1:8080/test.html"); System.out.println(page.asNormalizedText()); ``` test.html: ``` <script> var xslt = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XSLTemplate.6.0"); var xslDoc = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.FreeThreadedDOMDocument.6.0"); var xslProc; xslDoc.async = false; xslDoc.loadXML(`<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="htt...

An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the component /admin/api.upload/file of ThinkAdmin v6.1.53 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Zip file.

Ssolon <= 2.6.0 and <=2.5.12 is vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data.

Microcks up to 1.17.1 was discovered to contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the component /jobs and /artifact/download. This vulnerability allows attackers to access network resources and sensitive information via a crafted GET request.

A potential logging of the firestore key via logging within nodejs-firestore exists - Developers who were logging objects through this._settings would be logging the firestore key as well potentially exposing it to anyone with logs read access. We recommend upgrading to version 6.1.0 to avoid this issue

A serialization vulnerability in logback receiver component part of logback version 1.4.13, 1.3.13 and 1.2.12 allows an attacker to mount a Denial-Of-Service attack by sending poisoned data.

A deserialization vulnerability in Jupiter v1.3.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via sending a crafted RPC request.

### Impact Environment variables can be read from procfs unless a new process is started. ### PoC ``` use birdcage::{Birdcage, Sandbox}; use std::{env, fs}; fn main() { Birdcage::new().lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(env::var_os("SECRET"), None); let environ = fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/environ").unwrap(); assert!(!environ.contains("SECRET"), "ENVIRON CONTAINS SECRET:\n{environ}"); } ``` ``` $ SECRET=test cargo run thread 'main' panicked at src/main.rs:10:5: ENVIRON CONTAINS SECRET: [truncated] ``` ### Possible Solutions The simplest solution would be relying on the ptrace isolation and **always** spawning a new process by changing birdcage's API to create a new command. With an additional PID namespace the guarantees could be even further reinforced.

### Impact This only impacts apps that have the `embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation` and `onlyLoadAppFromAsar` [fuses](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses) enabled. Apps without these fuses enabled are not impacted. This issue is specific to macOS as these fuses are only currently supported on macOS. Specifically this issue can only be exploited if your app is launched from a filesystem the attacker has write access too. i.e. the ability to edit files inside the `.app` bundle on macOS which these fuses are supposed to protect against. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `27.0.0-alpha.7` * `26.2.1` * `25.8.1` * `24.8.3` * `23.3.14` * `22.3.24` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])