ghsa

The [proxy endpoint](https://github.com/openhab/openhab-webui/blob/1c03c60f84388b9d7da0231df2d4ebb1e17d3fcf/bundles/org.openhab.ui.cometvisu/src/main/java/org/openhab/ui/cometvisu/internal/backend/rest/ProxyResource.java#L83) of openHAB's CometVisu add-on can be accessed without authentication. This proxy-feature can be exploited as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to induce GET HTTP requests to internal-only servers, in case openHAB is exposed in a non-private network. Furthermore, this proxy-feature can also be exploited as a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, as an attacker is able to re-route a request to their server and return a page with malicious JavaScript code. Since the browser receives this data directly from the openHAB CometVisu UI, this JavaScript code will be executed with the origin of the CometVisu UI. This allows an attacker to exploit call endpoints on an openHAB server even if the openHAB server is located in a private network. (e.g. by sending an openHAB...

### Summary Static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) were vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links. ### Details The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file. ### Impact Servers with static routes that contain compressed variants as symbolic links, pointing outside the root directory, or that permit users to upload or create such links, are impacted. ---- Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8653/files

Concrete CMS versions 9 through 9.3.2 and below 8.5.18 are vulnerable to Stored XSS in getAttributeSetName().  A rogue administrator could inject malicious code.

**Component:** wasmd **Criticality:** Low ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L:Unlikely) **Patched versions:** wasmd 0.52.0 In multiple wasmd message types it was possible to add a large number of addresses which might lead to unexpected resource consumption in ValidateBasic. See [CWA-2024-003](https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-003.md) for more details.

**Component:** wasmvm **Criticality:** Medium ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L:Likely) **Patched versions:** wasmvm 1.5.4, 2.0.3, 2.1.2 Some Wasm operations take significantly more gas than our benchmarks indicated. This can lead to missing the [gas target](https://github.com/CosmWasm/cosmwasm/blob/e50490c4199a234200a497219b27f071c3409f58/docs/GAS.md#cosmwasm-gas-pricing) we defined by a factor of ~10x. This means a malicious contract could take 10 times as much time to execute as expected, which can be used to temporarily DoS a chain. See [CWA-2024-004](https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-004.md) for more details.

### Impact The Shopware application API contains a search functionality which enables users to search through information stored within their Shopware instance. The searches performed by this function can be aggregated using the parameters in the “aggregations” object. The ‘name’ field in this “aggregations” object is vulnerable SQL-injection and can be exploited using SQL parameters. ### Patches Update to Shopware 6.6.5.1 or 6.5.8.13 ### Workarounds For older versions of 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 corresponding security measures are also available via a plugin. For the full range of functions, we recommend updating to the latest Shopware version. ### Credit [LogicalTrust](https://logicaltrust.net)

### Impact The `context` variable is injected into almost any Twig Template and allows to access to current language, currency information. The context object allows also to switch for a short time the scope of the Context as a helper with a callable function. Example call from PHP: ```php $context->scope(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE, static function (Context $context) use ($mediaService, $media, &$fileBlob): void { $fileBlob = $mediaService->loadFile($media->getId(), $context); }); ``` This function can be called also from Twig and as the second parameter allows any callable, it's possible to call from Twig any statically callable PHP function/method. It's not possible as customer to provide any Twig code, the attacker would require access to Administration to exploit it using Mail templates or using App Scripts. ### Patches Update to Shopware 6.6.5.1 or 6.5.8.13 ### Workarounds For older versions of 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 corresponding security measures are also available via a pl...

### Impact Shopware has a new Twig Tag `sw_silent_feature_call` which silences deprecation messages while triggered in this tag. It accepts as parameter a string the feature flag name to silence, but this parameter is not escaped properly and allows execution of code. ### Patches Update to Shopware 6.6.5.1 or 6.5.8.13 ### Workarounds For older versions of 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, corresponding security measures are also available via a plugin. For the full range of functions, we recommend updating to the latest Shopware version.

### Impact The store-API works with regular entities and not expose all fields for the public API; fields need to be marked as ApiAware in the EntityDefinition. So only ApiAware fields of the EntityDefinition will be encoded to the final JSON. The processing of the Criteria did not considered ManyToMany associations and so they were not considered properly and the protections didn't get used. This issue cannot be reproduced with the default entities by Shopware, but can be triggered with extensions. ### Patches Update to Shopware 6.6.5.1 or 6.5.8.13 ### Workarounds For older versions of 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, corresponding security measures are also available via a plugin. For the full range of functions, we recommend updating to the latest Shopware version.

### Summary If a user is granted the `admin:users` scope, they may escalate their own privileges by making themselves a full admin user. ### Details The `admin:users` scope allows a user to edit user records: > admin:users > > Read, write, create and delete users and their authentication state, not including their servers or tokens. > > -- https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/stable/rbac/scopes.html#available-scopes However, this includes making users admins. Admin users are granted scopes beyond `admin:users` making this a mechanism by which granted scopes may be escalated. ### Impact The impact is relatively small in that `admin:users` is already an extremely privileged scope only granted to trusted users. In effect, `admin:users` is equivalent to `admin=True`, which is not intended. Note that the change here only prevents escalation to the built-in JupyterHub admin role that has unrestricted permissions. It does not prevent users with e.g. `groups` permissions from granting ...