#redis

Check Point ZoneAlarm before version 15.8.200.19118 allows a local actor to escalate privileges during the upgrade process. In addition, weak permissions in the ProgramData\CheckPoint\ZoneAlarm\Data\Updates directory allow a local attacker the ability to execute an arbitrary file write, leading to execution of code as local system, in ZoneAlarm versions before v15.8.211.192119

Check Point ZoneAlarm before version 15.8.200.19118 allows a local actor to escalate privileges during the upgrade process.

Hello everyone! This video was recorded for the VMconf 22 Vulnerability Management conference, vmconf.pw. I will be talking about malicious open source and the cost of using someone else’s code. Alternative video link (for Russia): https://vk.com/video-149273431_456239086Video in Russian from CISO Forum 2022: https://youtu.be/LPXg-MEamVA To be honest, at the beginning of the year I did not […]

A remote execution of arbitrary code vulnerability was discovered in ArubaOS-Switch Devices version(s): ArubaOS-Switch 15.xx.xxxx: All versions; ArubaOS-Switch 16.01.xxxx: All versions; ArubaOS-Switch 16.02.xxxx: K.16.02.0033 and below; ArubaOS-Switch 16.03.xxxx: All versions; ArubaOS-Switch 16.04.xxxx: All versions; ArubaOS-Switch 16.05.xxxx: All versions; ArubaOS-Switch 16.06.xxxx: All versions; ArubaOS-Switch 16.07.xxxx: All versions; ArubaOS-Switch 16.08.xxxx: KB/WB/WC/YA/YB/YC.16.08.0024 and below; ArubaOS-Switch 16.09.xxxx: KB/WB/WC/YA/YB/YC.16.09.0019 and below; ArubaOS-Switch 16.10.xxxx: KB/WB/WC/YA/YB/YC.16.10.0019 and below; ArubaOS-Switch 16.11.xxxx: KB/WB/WC/YA/YB/YC.16.11.0003 and below. Aruba has released upgrades for ArubaOS-Switch Devices that address these security vulnerabilities.

FancyBear looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Satana ransomware searches for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Petya ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Cryakl ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

ADMesh through 0.98.4 has a heap-based buffer over-read in stl_update_connects_remove_1 (called from stl_remove_degenerate) in connect.c in libadmesh.a.