Headline
CVE-2023-39171: Senec Inverters Home V1, V2, V3 Home & Hybrid Publicly Accessible Management Interface “Local GUI”- CVE-2023-39171
SENEC Storage Box V1,V2 and V3 accidentially expose a management UI accessible with publicly known admin credentials.
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From: Phos4Me via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure () seclists org>
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 07:11:03 +0000
Advisory ID: Ph0s-2023-005 Product: EnBw - SENEC legacy storage box: V1-V3 Manufacturer: SENEC - a part of EnBw Affected Version(s): Firmware: all (as of 2023-06-19) Tested Version(s): current Vulnerability Type: CWE-923: Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints
Risk Level: CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L (7.4 High)
Manufacturer Risk Level Rating: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L/E:H/RL:T/RC:C Overall CVSS Score: 7.2
Solution Status: Fixed Manufacturer Notification: 2023-06-05 Public Disclosure: 2023-11-01 CVE Reference: CCVE-2023-39171 Author of Advisory: Ph0s[4], R0ckE7
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Overview: Foreword: This vulnerability was reported to the enbw-cert. we would like to thank enbw-cert for taking care of the vulns and patch the systems. we decided to publish when most of the reported vulns are patched to make sure nobody is harmed when 3rdparys exploit the mentioned vulns.
About Senec: We are SENEC
We have been the EnBW energy independence experts since 2018 – but we have put our heart and soul into guiding customers on the route to independence since SENEC was founded in 2009. Our passion lies in actively promoting the energy transition with innovative ideas and pioneering products. And, because we don’t do things by halves, our unwavering ambition is to create integrated solutions that enable you to enjoy the highest possible degree of independence and sustainability through self-generation of solar electricity.
About SENEC Home:
SENEC.Home: The smart electricity storage device for your home
SENEC.Home is the heart of the your sustainable, affordable supply of solar electricity. The smart battery storage device stores excess electricity generated by your PV system so that you can use it when you need it – such as when your household’s energy consumption rises in the evening, or on rainy days when your PV system generates less power.
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Vulnerability Details:
The management interface of the SENEC.Inverter is publicly accessible via the Internet. This circumstance is recommended by the manufacturer and customers are advised to open the necessary ports to enable remote maintenance. As a result, anyone who manages to detect and successfully exploit security vulnerabilities in SENEC.Inverter, for instance the authors of this report, can access and compromise all devices available on the internet without restrictions. To achieve this,it is possible to use an IoT search engine such as Shodan to automatically obtain an up-to-date list of IP addresses of all devices in just a few seconds.
Besides Shodan, there are other IoT search engines such as Censys or ZoomEye to complement the list even further. Consequently, it is very easy for an attacker to develop an exploit script for the automated compromise of all SENEC.Inverter devices, e.g. to simul- taneously shut down all appliances or to damage them through a targeted overload. For this purpose, only the hard-coded credentials previously identified in findings CVE-2023-39168 and CVE-2023-39169 need to be used in conjunction with SENEC.Inverter’s built-in API.
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Proof of Concept (PoC):
The attack consists of the following steps:
1. use the shodan dork to obtain management-interfaces. (no longer valid, patched by manufacturer)
https://www.shodan.io/search?query=http.html%3A<title>SENEC<%2Ftitle% 3E
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Solution: Patched by Manufacturer (Rolled out until September 11, 2023)
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Disclosure Timeline:
2022-06-01: Vulnerability discovered 2023-06-05: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2023-09-11: Patch rollout by manufacturer to affected devices 2023-11-01: Public disclosure of vulnerability
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Researcher: Ph0s[4], R0ckE7
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Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is” and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible.
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Copyright:
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