Headline
CVE-2023-29209: XWIKI-20258: Improve escaping in the Legacy ActivityMacro · xwiki/xwiki-platform@9439249
XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the legacy notification activity macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the macro parameters of the legacy notification activity macro. This macro is installed by default in XWiki. The vulnerability can be exploited via every wiki page that is editable including the user’s profile, but also with just view rights using the HTMLConverter that is part of the CKEditor integration which is bundled with XWiki. The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10.
@@ -251,10 +251,19 @@
<property>
<code>{{velocity}}
#set ($wikis = ‘’)
#if ($services.wiki.currentWikiId != $services.wiki.mainWikiId)
#if (“$!xcontext.macro.params.wikis” != ‘’)
#set ($wikis = $xcontext.macro.params.wikis)
#elseif ($services.wiki.currentWikiId != $services.wiki.mainWikiId)
#set ($wikis = $services.wiki.currentWikiId)
#end
{{notifications useUserPreferences="false" displayOwnEvents="true" count="$xcontext.macro.params.entries" #if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.wikis” != ‘’)wikis="$xcontext.macro.params.wikis"#{else}wikis="$wikis"#end #if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.spaces” != ‘’)spaces="$xcontext.macro.params.spaces"#end #if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.authors” != ‘’)users="$xcontext.macro.params.authors"#end #if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.tags” != ‘’)tags="$xcontext.macro.params.tags"#end #if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.minor” != ‘’)displayMinorEvents="$xcontext.macro.params.minor"#end #if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.rss” != ‘’)displayRSSLink="$xcontext.macro.params.rss"#end /}}
{{notifications useUserPreferences="false" displayOwnEvents="true"
count="$services.rendering.escape($xcontext.macro.params.entries, ‘xwiki/2.1’)"
wikis="$services.rendering.escape($wikis, ‘xwiki/2.1’)"
#if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.spaces” != ‘’)spaces="$services.rendering.escape($xcontext.macro.params.spaces, ‘xwiki/2.1’)"#end
#if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.authors” != ‘’)users="$services.rendering.escape($xcontext.macro.params.authors, ‘xwiki/2.1’)"#end
#if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.tags” != ‘’)tags="$services.rendering.escape($xcontext.macro.params.tags, ‘xwiki/2.1’)"#end
#if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.minor” != ‘’)displayMinorEvents="$services.rendering.escape($xcontext.macro.params.minor, ‘xwiki/2.1’)"#end
#if(“$!xcontext.macro.params.rss” != ‘’)displayRSSLink="$services.rendering.escape($xcontext.macro.params.rss, ‘xwiki/2.1’)"#end /}}
{{/velocity}}</code>
</property>
<property>
Related news
### Impact Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the legacy notification activity macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the macro parameters of the [legacy notification activity macro](https://extensions.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Extension/Legacy%20Notification%20Activity%20Macro/). This macro is installed by default in XWiki. A proof of concept exploit is ``` {{activity wikis="~" /~}~} {{async async=~"true~" cached=~"false~" context=~"doc.reference~"~}~}{{groovy~}~}println(~"Hello from Groovy!~"){{/groovy~}~}"/}} ``` If the output of this macro is ``` The [notifications] macro is a standalone macro and it cannot be used inline. Click on this message for details. Hello from Groovy!" displayMinorEvents="false" displayRSSLink="false" /}} ``` or similar, the XWiki installation is vulnerable. The vulnerability can be exploited via ever...