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Non-human identities authenticate machine-to-machine communication. The big challenge now is to secure their elements and processes — before attackers can intercept.
Androxgh0st, a botnet targeting web servers since January 2024, is also deploying IoT-focused Mozi payloads, reveals CloudSEK’s latest research.
As the adoption of LCNC grows, so will the complexity of the threats organizations face.
### Impact On instances where `Extension Repository Application` is installed, any user can execute any code requiring `programming` rights on the server. In order to reproduce on an instance, as a normal user without `script` nor `programming` rights, go to your profile and add an object of type `ExtensionCode.ExtensionClass`. Set the description to `{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Description"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}` and press `Save and View`. If the description displays as `Hello from Description` without any error, then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0. ### Workarounds Since `Extension Repository Application` is not mandatory, it can be safely disabled on instances that do not use it. It is also possible to manually apply [this patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/8659f17d500522bf33595e402391592a35a162e8#diff-9b6f9e853f23d76611967737f8c4072ffceaba4c006ca5a5e65b66d988dc084a) to the page `Ex...
### Impact In `getdocument.vm` ; the ordering of the returned documents is defined from an unsanitized request parameter (request.sort) and can allow any user to inject HQL. Depending on the used database backend, the attacker may be able to not only obtain confidential information such as password hashes from the database, but also execute UPDATE/INSERT/DELETE queries. It's possible to employ database backend dependent techniques of breaking out of HQL query context, described, for example, here: https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/exploiting-hibernate-injections. ### Patches This has been patched in 13.10.5 and 14.3-rc-1. ### Workarounds There is no known workaround, other than upgrading XWiki. ### References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-17568 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) * Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)
### Impact Any user with an account on the main wiki could run scheduling operations on subwikis. To reproduce, as a user on the main wiki without any special right, view the document `Scheduler.WebHome` in a subwiki. Then, click on any operation (*e.g.,* Trigger) on any job. If the operation is successful, then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0. ### Workarounds If you have subwikis where the Job Scheduler is enabled, you can edit the objects on `Scheduler.WebPreferences` to match https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331#diff-8e274bd0065e319a34090339de6dfe56193144d15fd71c52c1be7272254728b4. ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21663 * https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) *...
### Impact Any user with an account can perform arbitrary remote code execution by adding instances of `XWiki.WikiMacroClass` to any page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce on a instance, as a connected user without script nor programming rights, go to your user profile and add an object of type `XWiki.WikiMacroClass`. Set "Macro Id", "Macro Name" and "Macro Code" to any value, "Macro Visibility" to `Current User` and "Macro Description" to `{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from User macro!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}`. Save the page, then go to `<host>/xwiki/bin/view/XWiki/XWikiSyntaxMacrosList`. If the description of your new macro reads "Hello from User macro!", then your instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.11, 16.4.1 and 16.5.0. ### Workarounds It is possible to manually apply [this patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/40e1afe001d61eafdf13f36...
### Impact Any user with script rights can perform arbitrary remote code execution by adding instances of `XWiki.ConfigurableClass` to any page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce on a instance, as a user with script rights, edit your user profile and add an object of type `XWiki.ConfigurableClass` ("Custom configurable sections"). Set "Display in section" and "Display in category" to `other`, "Scope" to `Wiki and all spaces` and "Heading" to: ``` #set($codeToExecute = 'Test') #set($codeToExecuteResult = '{{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack from Heading succeeded!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}') ``` Save the page and view it, then add `?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet&viewer=content§ion=other` to the URL. If the logs contain "attacker - Attack from Heading succeeded!", then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0. ### Workarounds We're...
A critical security flaw in Dell Power Manager has been discovered that could allow attackers to compromise your systems and execute arbitrary code.
An elusive, sophisticated cybercriminal group has used known and zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise more than 20,000 SOHO routers and other IoT devices so far, and then puts them up for sale on a residential proxy marketplace for state-sponsored cyber-espionage actors and others to use.