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CVE-2021-3429: write passwords only to serial console, lock down cloud-init-output.l… · canonical/cloud-init@b794d42
When instructing cloud-init to set a random password for a new user account, versions before 21.2 would write that password to the world-readable log file /var/log/cloud-init-output.log. This could allow a local user to log in as another user.
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write passwords only to serial console, lock down cloud-init-output.l…
…og (#847)
Prior to this commit, when a user specified configuration which would generate random passwords for users, cloud-init would cause those passwords to be written to the serial console by emitting them on stderr. In the default configuration, any stdout or stderr emitted by cloud-init is also written to `/var/log/cloud-init-output.log`. This file is world-readable, meaning that those randomly-generated passwords were available to be read by any user with access to the system. This presents an obvious security issue.
This commit responds to this issue in two ways:
* We address the direct issue by moving from writing the passwords to sys.stderr to writing them directly to /dev/console (via util.multi_log); this means that the passwords will never end up in cloud-init-output.log * To avoid future issues like this, we also modify the logging code so that any files created in a log sink subprocess will only be owner/group readable and, if it exists, will be owned by the adm group. This results in `/var/log/cloud-init-output.log` no longer being world-readable, meaning that if there are other parts of the codebase that are emitting sensitive data intended for the serial console, that data is no longer available to all users of the system.
LP: #1918303
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Sensitive data could be exposed in logs of cloud-init before version 23.1.2. An attacker could use this information to find hashed passwords and possibly escalate their privilege.