Headline
CVE-2023-45683: Merge pull request from GHSA-267v-3v32-g6q5 · crewjam/saml@b07b16c
github.com/crewjam/saml is a saml library for the go language. In affected versions the package does not validate the ACS Location URI according to the SAML binding being parsed. If abused, this flaw allows attackers to register malicious Service Providers at the IdP and inject Javascript in the ACS endpoint definition, achieving Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) in the IdP context during the redirection at the end of a SAML SSO Flow. Consequently, an attacker may perform any authenticated action as the victim once the victim’s browser loaded the SAML IdP initiated SSO link for the malicious service provider. Note: SP registration is commonly an unrestricted operation in IdPs, hence not requiring particular permissions or publicly accessible to ease the IdP interoperability. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.14. Users unable to upgrade may perform external validation of URLs provided in SAML metadata, or restrict the ability for end-users to upload arbitrary metadata.
Expand Up @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package saml
import ( “encoding/xml” “fmt” “net/url” “time”
“github.com/beevik/etree” Expand All @@ -19,6 +21,9 @@ const HTTPArtifactBinding = “urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Artifact” // SOAPBinding is the official URN for the SOAP binding (transport) const SOAPBinding = “urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:SOAP”
// SOAPBindingV1 is the URN for the SOAP binding in SAML 1.0 const SOAPBindingV1 = “urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:bindings:SOAP-binding”
// EntitiesDescriptor represents the SAML object of the same name. // // See http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf §2.3.1 Expand Down Expand Up @@ -188,6 +193,76 @@ type Endpoint struct { ResponseLocation string `xml:"ResponseLocation,attr,omitempty"` }
func checkEndpointLocation(binding string, location string) (string, error) { // Within the SAML standard, the complex type EndpointType describes a // SAML protocol binding endpoint at which a SAML entity can be sent // protocol messages. In particular, the location of an endpoint type is // defined as follows in the Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion // Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 - 2.2.2 Complex Type EndpointType: // // Location [Required] A required URI attribute that specifies the // location of the endpoint. The allowable syntax of this URI depends // on the protocol binding. switch binding { case HTTPPostBinding, HTTPRedirectBinding, HTTPArtifactBinding, SOAPBinding, SOAPBindingV1: locationURL, err := url.Parse(location) if err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url %q: %w", location, err) } switch locationURL.Scheme { case "http", "https": // ok default: return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url scheme %q for binding %q", locationURL.Scheme, binding) } default: // We don’t know what form location should take, but the protocol // requires that we validate its syntax. // // In practice, lots of metadata contains random bindings, for example // “urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:profiles:AuthnRequest” from our own test suite. // // We can’t fail, but we also can’t allow a location parameter whose syntax we // cannot verify. The least-bad course of action here is to set location to // and empty string, and hope the caller doesn’t care need it. location = “” }
return location, nil }
// UnmarshalXML implements xml.Unmarshaler func (m *Endpoint) UnmarshalXML(d *xml.Decoder, start xml.StartElement) error { type Alias Endpoint aux := &struct { *Alias }{ Alias: (*Alias)(m), } if err := d.DecodeElement(aux, &start); err != nil { return err }
var err error m.Location, err = checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, m.Location) if err != nil { return err } if m.ResponseLocation != “” { m.ResponseLocation, err = checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, m.ResponseLocation) if err != nil { return err } }
return nil }
// IndexedEndpoint represents the SAML IndexedEndpointType object. // // See http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf §2.2.3 Expand All @@ -199,6 +274,38 @@ type IndexedEndpoint struct { IsDefault *bool `xml:"isDefault,attr"` }
// UnmarshalXML implements xml.Unmarshaler func (m *IndexedEndpoint) UnmarshalXML(d *xml.Decoder, start xml.StartElement) error { type Alias IndexedEndpoint aux := &struct { *Alias }{ Alias: (*Alias)(m), } if err := d.DecodeElement(aux, &start); err != nil { return err }
var err error m.Location, err = checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, m.Location) if err != nil { return err } if m.ResponseLocation != nil { responseLocation, err := checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, *m.ResponseLocation) if err != nil { return err } if responseLocation != “” { m.ResponseLocation = &responseLocation } else { m.ResponseLocation = nil } }
return nil }
// SSODescriptor represents the SAML complex type SSODescriptor // // See http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf §2.4.2 Expand Down
Related news
### Impact The package does not validate the ACS Location URI according to the SAML binding being parsed. If abused, this flaw allows attackers to register malicious Service Providers at the IdP and inject Javascript in the ACS endpoint definition, achieving Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) in the IdP context during the redirection at the end of a SAML SSO Flow. Consequently, an attacker may perform any authenticated action as the victim once the victim’s browser loaded the SAML IdP initiated SSO link for the malicious service provider. Note: The severity is considered “High” because the SP registration is commonly an unrestricted operation in IdPs, hence not requiring particular permissions or publicly accessible to ease the IdP interoperability. ### Patches This issue is fixed in 0.4.14 ### Workarounds Users of the package can perform external validation of URLs provided in SAML metadata, or restrict the ability for end-users to upload arbitrary metadata. ### References This iss...