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CVE-2019-9948: [2.7] bpo-35907: Avoid file reading as disallowing the unnecessary URL scheme in urllib (GH-11842) by push0ebp · Pull Request #11842 · python/cpython
urllib in Python 2.x through 2.7.16 supports the local_file: scheme, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass protection mechanisms that blacklist file: URIs, as demonstrated by triggering a urllib.urlopen(‘local_file:///etc/passwd’) call.
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push0ebp changed the title bpo-35907: Avoid file reading as disallowing the unnecessary URL scheme in urllib [2.7] bpo-35907: Avoid file reading as disallowing the unnecessary URL scheme in urllib (GH-11842)
Feb 13, 2019
Is this patch the accepted resolution for CVE-2019-9948? If so, when is it expected to be merged?
# bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
if not hasattr(self, name) or \
(self == _urlopener and name == ‘open_local_file’):
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Please simplify the fix. There is no need to check for _urlopener here. Just block all access to local_file:// schema. We don’t need special cases for subclasses or special instances.
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If it does not check the instance type of self, all of overridden open_local_file method will be blocked.
will be okay?
like this
self.assertRaises(IOError, DummyURLopener().open
'local_file://example')
self.assertRaises(IOError, DummyURLopener().open
'local-file://example')
I think that it needs to check open_local_file is overridden.
What do you think?
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I think it has to expect this test result.
def test_local_file_open(self):
class DummyURLopener(urllib.URLopener):
def open_local_file(self, url):
return url
class DummyURLopener2(urllib.URLopener):
def open_test(self, url):
return url
opener = DummyURLopener()
opener2 = DummyURLopener2()
for url in ('local-file://example', 'local_file://example'):
self.assertEqual(opener.open(url), '//example')
self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen, url)
self.assertRaises(IOError, opener2.open, url)
self.assertEqual(opener2.open('test://example'), '//example')
but Considering the overriding method and instance type check was complex.
If you have a better idea. let me know.
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…sies in DummyURLopener test, and simplify mitigation
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** push0ebp left a comment**
I have made the requested changes; please review again.
# bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
if not hasattr(self, name) or \
(self == _urlopener and name == ‘open_local_file’):
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
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If it does not check the instance type of self, all of overridden open_local_file method will be blocked.
will be okay?
like this
self.assertRaises(IOError, DummyURLopener().open
'local_file://example')
self.assertRaises(IOError, DummyURLopener().open
'local-file://example')
I think that it needs to check open_local_file is overridden.
What do you think?
# bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
if not hasattr(self, name) or \
(self == _urlopener and name == ‘open_local_file’):
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I think it has to expect this test result.
def test_local_file_open(self):
class DummyURLopener(urllib.URLopener):
def open_local_file(self, url):
return url
class DummyURLopener2(urllib.URLopener):
def open_test(self, url):
return url
opener = DummyURLopener()
opener2 = DummyURLopener2()
for url in ('local-file://example', 'local_file://example'):
self.assertEqual(opener.open(url), '//example')
self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen, url)
self.assertRaises(IOError, opener2.open, url)
self.assertEqual(opener2.open('test://example'), '//example')
but Considering the overriding method and instance type check was complex.
If you have a better idea. let me know.
# bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
if not hasattr(self, name) or \
getattr(self, name) == self.open_local_file:
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Another fix is to rename the open_local_file() as _open_local_file(). But… In Python 2.7, there is a risk that the method is called directly in 3rd party code for whatever reason :-(
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Why do you compare function objects instead of simply name == "open_local_file"?
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@tiran
If someone rename open_local_file() method and also forgets to modify name == "open_local_file", it may be bypassed.
So I made the mitigation compare the object to raise syntax error.
Should I do change back?
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I concur with Christian, please test directly the name, remove getattr().
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@vstinner
I agree with you. I also considered renaming the open_local_file(). I think that this fix can guarantees availability to the developers who want to override this method. But I chose another fix to minimize side effects for third party codes.
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Please remove getattr().
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Yes. I will do it. I want suggest you other fix.
if not hasattr(self, name):
if proxy:
return self.open_unknown_proxy(proxy, fullurl, data)
else:
return self.open_unknown(fullurl, data)
if name == 'open_local_file':
raise IOError, ('url error', 'invalid url type', urltype)
try:
I think that it is better to raise exception with explicit error message for developers to overriding open_local_file().
they can easily recognize local_file is invalid type.
What do you think about it?
or should I use open_unknown()?
if not hasattr(self, name) or \
name == 'open_local_file':
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# bpo-35907: disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
if not hasattr(self, name) or name == 'open_local_file': ...
LGTM.
if name == 'open_local_file':
raise IOError, ('url error', 'invalid url type', urltype)
That’s wrong exception type, don’t do that.
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I have changed it. Please review.
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I have made the requested changes; please review again.
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** vstinner left a comment**
Modify the object to string in check method name.
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** vstinner left a comment**
LGTM. Just curious about the # which looks like a typo.
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ def open(self, fullurl, data=None):
name = ‘open_’ + urltype
self.type = urltype
name = name.replace('-', ‘_’)
if not hasattr(self, name):
# bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
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I don’t understand the # in "# bpo-35907: # disallow …". Is it a typo?
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Oh Sorry, my mistake. I will correct it.
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I have fixed the typo.
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** push0ebp commented May 22, 2019**
Thank you for your accept.
related to #13474
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