Headline
CVE-2023-32653: TALOS-2023-1802 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group
An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the dcm_pixel_data_decode functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. A victim would need to open a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
SUMMARY
An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the dcm_pixel_data_decode functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. A victim would need to open a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS
The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.
Accusoft ImageGear 20.1
PRODUCT URLS
ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/
CVSSv3 SCORE
9.8 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-191 - Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)
DETAILS
The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.
Trying to load a malformed Dicom, we end up in the following situation:
eax=00004000 ebx=00000008 ecx=00000000 edx=00000000 esi=ffffcfdf edi=136b1000
eip=75059a65 esp=0019fa50 ebp=0019fad0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x169c5:
75059a65 897cb58c mov dword ptr [ebp+esi*4-74h],edi ss:002b:001939d8=????????
The crash happens in LINE16 below in a function identified as dcm_pixel_data_decode:
LINE1 8b45ec mov eax, dword [ebp-0x14 {l_value}]
LINE2 68db100000 push 0x10db {var_88_3}
LINE3 0fb700 movzx eax, word [eax]
LINE4 68a0c40775 push data_7507c4a0 {var_8c_3}{"..\..\..\..\Common\Components\ME…"}
LINE5 57 push edi {var_90_3}
LINE6 be0f000000 mov esi, 0xf
LINE7 6a00 push 0x0 {ptr_var34}
LINE8 2bf0 sub esi, eax
LINE9 ff15c0130b75 call dword [AF_memm_alloc]
LINE10 8bf8 mov edi, eax
LINE11 8b45e4 mov eax, dword [ebp-0x1c {l_buffer_size_1}]
LINE12 99 cdq
LINE13 2bc2 sub eax, edx
LINE14 d1f8 sar eax, 0x1
LINE15 33c9 xor ecx, ecx {0x0}
LINE16 897cb58c mov dword [ebp+esi*4-0x74 {obj_str_sz_0x40}], edi
LINE17 85c0 test eax, eax
LINE18 7e0e jle 0x75059a7b
The register esi is a very big value, as result of an integer underflow. We can see at LINE6, it was set to a constant 0xf and subtracted by the register eax LINE8.
There is no check on the value of register eax, causing the very large number. eax gets its value at LINE1, which is under our control into the malformed file.
At LINE16 we can influence the stack pointer ebp with esi, as that depends on the content of the file, which means we can choose where in the stack to write edi. The value pointed by the register edi is a result of AF_memm_alloc, which is some kind of wrapper of malloc.
By controlling the eax register an attacker can overwrite anywhere in the stack, possibly leading to code execution.
Crash Information
0:000> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Exception Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
Unable to load image E:\ImageGearFuzzing\bin\igCore20d.dll, Win32 error 0n2
KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
Key : AV.Fault
Value: Write
Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
Value: 375
Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 2704
Key : Analysis.IO.Other.Mb
Value: 0
Key : Analysis.IO.Read.Mb
Value: 0
Key : Analysis.IO.Write.Mb
Value: 0
Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
Value: 4061
Key : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 65613
Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
Value: 179
Key : Failure.Bucket
Value: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igMED20d.dll!Unknown
Key : Failure.Hash
Value: {7bd32a5f-d13c-5070-0693-11be1df9b256}
Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
Value: 440574
Key : WER.Process.Version
Value: 1.0.1.1
NTGLOBALFLAG: 2100000
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 75059a65 (igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x000169c5)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
Parameter[0]: 00000001
Parameter[1]: 001939d8
Attempt to write to address 001939d8
FAULTING_THREAD: 00001a78
PROCESS_NAME: Fuzzme.exe
WRITE_ADDRESS: 001939d8
ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: c0000005
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 00000001
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 001939d8
STACK_TEXT:
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0019fad0 750592f0 0019fc3c 10694fa0 1000001e igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x169c5
0019fb04 750567e0 0019fc3c 10694fa0 1000001e igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x16250
0019fbb4 755a15b9 0019fc3c 10680fb8 00000001 igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x13740
0019fbec 755e08bc 00000000 10680fb8 0019fc3c igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
0019fe68 755e0239 00000000 05c26fd0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x1479c
0019fe88 75575bc7 00000000 05c26fd0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14119
0019fea8 00402399 05c26fd0 0019febc 75c6fb80 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x47
0019fec0 004026c0 05c26fd0 05c28fe0 05b8cf50 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
0019ff28 00408407 00000005 05b86f78 05b8cf50 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x340
0019ff70 75c700c9 002d4000 75c700b0 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x6087
0019ff80 77cc7b4e 002d4000 65bf4f61 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
0019ffdc 77cc7b1e ffffffff 77ce8c7f 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
0019ffec 00000000 0040848f 002d4000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb
SYMBOL_NAME: igMED20d+169c5
MODULE_NAME: igMED20d
IMAGE_NAME: igMED20d.dll
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igMED20d.dll!Unknown
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x86
OSNAME: Windows 8
IMAGE_VERSION: 20.1.0.117
FAILURE_ID_HASH: {7bd32a5f-d13c-5070-0693-11be1df9b256}
Followup: MachineOwner
---------
VENDOR RESPONSE
Release notes from the vendor can be found here:
https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Windows/DLL/webframe.html#release-notes.html
https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Linux/webframe.html#release-notes.html
TIMELINE
2023-07-18 - Vendor Disclosure
2023-09-20 - Vendor Patch Release
2023-09-25 - Public Release
Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.
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