China's 'Salt Typhoon' Cooks Up Cyberattacks on US ISPs

Source: BSIP SA via Alamy Stock Photo

A freshly discovered advanced persistent threat (APT) dubbed “Salt Typhoon” has reportedly infiltrated Internet service provider (ISP) networks in the US, looking to steal information and potentially set up a launchpad for disruptive attacks.

Citing “people familiar with the matter,” the Wall Street Journal broke the news on Sept. 25 that the Chinese-sponsored state hackers have successfully targeted “a handful” of cable and broadband service providers during the campaign.

Other details are scant, but Salt Typhoon’s efforts highlight China’s priorities when it comes to geopolitical realities, researchers note.

A Sprinkle of Espionage, A Dash of Pre-Positioning

For instance, a position within the service provider network would offer valuable reconnaissance for how to further target high-value marks working for the federal government, law enforcement, manufacturers, military contractors, and Fortune 100 companies.

“Obtaining access to ISPs would make it easier to survey those users of the ISPs for information on their location and what kinds of services are being accessed,” says Sean McNee, vice president of research and data at DomainTools. “Bad actors could get information about the ISP’s users, where they live and billing information, and what kind of access or usage they have, [who they call, and] text messages.”

But the concern doesn’t stop there. Given China’s desire to control Taiwan and other assets in the region, there’s very likely a military component to the campaign as well.

“Based on the recent history of Chinese-sponsored cyber campaigns and warnings from [the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] and FBI, China has escalated from surveillance-only goals toward installing an offensive capability to disrupt critical US civilian and military infrastructure,” warns Sean Deuby, principal technologist at Semperis. “This could potentially range from ‘blinking the lights’ to dissuade US intervention to actively delaying or crippling a US response to Chinese activities.”

There’s precedent for that assessment. Microsoft outed Volt Typhoon in January and its alarming efforts to plant itself inside military bases, critical infrastructure assets, and telecom infrastructure — all with the goal of being able to cause outages, disrupt communications, and sow panic in the event of a kinetic conflict with the US in the South China Sea. Since then, China has denied the allegations, while the APT has been actively expanding its efforts despite its cover being blown.

China’s Recipe: Targeting Telecom, ISPs, Critical Infrastructure

The development is the latest in a string of Chinese-sponsored efforts to subvert critical infrastructure in the US and destabilize Pacific Rim allies, many flagged by Microsoft using hurricane-related names.

For instance, a Chinese threat actor known as Flax Typhoon emerged a year ago, using legitimate tools and utilities built into the Windows operating system to carry out an extremely stealthy and persistent spy operation against entities in Taiwan. Last week, news emerged that the APT had built a 200,000-device Internet of Things (IoT) botnet in order to gain a foothold in government, military, and critical manufacturing targets in the US.

There’s also the APT that Microsoft calls Brass Typhoon (aka APT41, Earth Baxia, and Wicked Panda) that recently attacked Taiwanese government agencies, Filipino and Japanese military, and energy companies in Vietnam, installing backdoors for cyberespionage purposes.

On top of that, other China-linked groups have made a name for themselves in specifically targeting communications service providers, such as Mustang Panda, especially in Taiwan and other countries of interest.

“Chinese-backed threat actors have been conducting attacks against telcos for as long as I can remember,” Semperis’ Deuby says. “Historically, their goals are to create ‘persistence’ in the carrier. By that I mean they will infiltrate a target, gain a foothold, and then move laterally with the goal of maintaining persistence and extracting data from strategic targets as needed.”

He adds that lurking and listening is a specialty: “While Chinese government actors were behind the infamous Operation Soft Cell campaign in 2019, where the threat actor stole call data records, they had infiltrated some of the telcos more than five years before being discovered.”

Communications Service Provider Defenses Need Seasoning

The ongoing targeting of communications infrastructure should put carriers and service providers on notice to harden their defenses.

Aside from phishing and social engineering of employees, Terry Dunlap, chief security strategist at NetRise, notes that firmware and supply chain attacks using core network gear could both be attack avenues against ISPs.

“ISPs’ blind spots are the firmware running their devices. Most firmware contains insecure or sloppy code that can be easily exploited, if discovered,” he notes. “Another attack vector would be the supply chain. For example, if the Ethernet controller in a router or switch is supplied by a Chinese company, there are scenarios where malicious code or backdoors could be integrated into that Ethernet controller, providing an adversary easy access to that important piece of networking equipment.”

In 2020, the World Economic Forum and its global partners developed a set of best practices for ISPs (PDF), including principles such as sharing threat intelligence between peers, working more closely with hardware manufacturers to increase minimum levels of security, and improving routing security, Deuby says.

Still, “as someone that’s talked to many organizations about the well-understood security steps they should be taking versus their actual security posture, I’m sure plenty of gaps remain.”

About the Author

Tara Seals has 20+ years of experience as a journalist, analyst and editor in the cybersecurity, communications and technology space. Prior to Dark Reading, Tara was Editor in Chief at Threatpost, and prior to that, the North American news lead for Infosecurity Magazine. She also spent 13 years working for Informa (formerly Virgo Publishing), as executive editor and editor-in-chief at publications focused on both the service provider and the enterprise arenas. A Texas native, she holds a B.A. from Columbia University, lives in Western Massachusetts with her family and is on a never-ending quest for good Mexican food in the Northeast.