Headline
GHSA-jhww-fx2j-3rf7: FoodCoopShop Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability
There is a potential SSRF vulnerability in foodcoopshop. Since there is no security policy on your Github, I tried to use the emails to contact you.
The potential issue is in the Network module, where a manufacturer account can use the /api/updateProducts.json endpoint to make the server send a request to arbitrary host. For example, use
data[data][0][remoteProductId]=352&data[data][0][image]=http://localhost:8888/
will make the server send a request to localhost:8888. This means that it can be used as a proxy into the internal network where the server is.
To make matters worse, the checks on valid image is not enough. There is time of check time of use issue there. For example, by using a custom server that returns 200 on HEAD requests, then return a valid image on first GET request and then a 302 redirect to final target on second GET request, the server will copy whatever file at the redirect destination, making this a full SSRF. (An example python server that can do this is at https://pastebin.com/8K5Brwbq This will make the server download whatever at the redirect target)
You can check https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html for more information on SSRF, their impact and how to properly fix it.
Regards
Package
composer foodcoopshop/foodcoopshop (Composer)
Affected versions
< 3.6.1
There is a potential SSRF vulnerability in foodcoopshop. Since there is no security policy on your Github, I tried to use the emails to contact you.
The potential issue is in the Network module, where a manufacturer account can use the /api/updateProducts.json endpoint to make the server send a request to arbitrary host.
For example, use
data[data][0][remoteProductId]=352&data[data][0][image]=http://localhost:8888/
will make the server send a request to localhost:8888. This means that it can be used as a proxy into the internal network where the server is.
To make matters worse, the checks on valid image is not enough. There is time of check time of use issue there.
For example, by using a custom server that returns 200 on HEAD requests, then return a valid image on first GET request and then a 302 redirect to final target on second GET request, the server will copy whatever file
at the redirect destination, making this a full SSRF.
(An example python server that can do this is at https://pastebin.com/8K5Brwbq This will make the server download whatever at the redirect target)
You can check https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html for more information on SSRF, their impact and how to properly fix it.
Regards
References
- GHSA-jhww-fx2j-3rf7
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46725
- foodcoopshop/foodcoopshop#972
- foodcoopshop/foodcoopshop@0d5bec5
- https://pastebin.com/8K5Brwbq
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Nov 2, 2023
Related news
FoodCoopShop is open source software for food coops and local shops. Versions prior to 3.6.1 are vulnerable to server-side request forgery. In the Network module, a manufacturer account can use the `/api/updateProducts.json` endpoint to make the server send a request to an arbitrary host. This means that the server can be used as a proxy into the internal network where the server is. Furthermore, the checks on a valid image are not adequate, leading to a time of check time of use issue. For example, by using a custom server that returns 200 on HEAD requests, then return a valid image on first GET request and then a 302 redirect to final target on second GET request, the server will copy whatever file is at the redirect destination, making this a full SSRF. Version 3.6.1 fixes this vulnerability.