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DiCal-RED 4009 Log Disclosure

DiCal-RED version 4009 is vulnerable to unauthorized log access and other files on the device’s file system due to improper authentication checks.

Packet Storm
#vulnerability#web#mac#linux#auth#sap#wifi

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Advisory ID: SYSS-2024-040
Product: DiCal-RED
Manufacturer: Swissphone Wireless AG
Affected Version(s): Unknown
Tested Version(s): 4009
Vulnerability Type: Improper Authentication (CWE-287)
Risk Level: High
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2024-04-16
Solution Date: None
Public Disclosure: 2024-08-20
CVE Reference: CVE-2024-36444
Author of Advisory: Sebastian Hamann, SySS GmbH


Overview:

DiCal-RED is a radio module for communication between emergency vehicles and  
control rooms. It provides Ethernet, Wi-Fi and cellular network connectivity  
and runs a Linux- and BusyBox-based operating system.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"The DiCal-Red radio data module reliably guides you to your destination. This  
is ensured by the linking of navigation (also for the transmission of position  
data) and various radio modules."

Due to improper authentication checks, the device is vulnerable to  
unauthorized access to logs and other files on the device's file system.

Vulnerability Details:

The device allows viewing log files via the administrative web interface.
This function does not require an authenticated session.


Proof of Concept (PoC):

As other parts of the administrative web interface do require authentication,  
a simple proof of concept is to log in to the web interface and navigate to  
the function to view log files.  
Log file contents are returned by a URL similar to  
http:/192.0.2.1/cgi-bin/fdmcgiwebv2.cgi?action=displayfilel&data={%22FilePath%22:%22%22,%22FileAlias%22:%22FdmDebugPath%22,%22LinesMax%22:0}

Using a local proxy to remove the QSESSIONID cookie from this request shows  
that the content is also returned when not sending any session information.

Solution:

The manufacturer recommends not running the device in an untrusted network.


Disclosure Timeline:

2024-02-29: Vulnerability discovered  
2024-04-16: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer  
2024-05-10: Manufacturer states that the vulnerability will not be fixed  
2024-05-14: Vulnerability reported to CERT-Bund  
2024-08-13: CERT-Bund informs us that the vendor declared the product EOL  
2024-08-20: Public disclosure of vulnerability

References:

[1] Product website for DiCal-RED
https://www.swissphone.com/solutions/components/terminals/radio-data-module-dical-red/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2024-040
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-040.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy


Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Sebastian Hamann of SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: [email protected]  
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Sebastian_Hamann.asc  
Key ID: 0x9CE0E440429D8B96  
Key Fingerprint: F643 DF21 62C4 7C53 7DB2 8BA1 9CE0 E440 429D 8B96

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided “as is”
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.


Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0  
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en

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