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© {{ currentDate | date: 'yyyy' }} {{ 'index.copyright' | translate }}

CVE-2023-4892: {{ $title }}

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the dcm_pixel_data_decode functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. A victim would need to open a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**SUMMARY**

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the dcm\_pixel\_data\_decode functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. A victim would need to open a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS**

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Accusoft ImageGear 20.1

**PRODUCT URLS**

ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/

**CVSSv3 SCORE**

9.8 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**CWE**

CWE-191 - Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)

**DETAILS**

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

Trying to load a malformed Dicom, we end up in the following situation:

    eax=00004000 ebx=00000008 ecx=00000000 edx=00000000 esi=ffffcfdf edi=136b1000
    eip=75059a65 esp=0019fa50 ebp=0019fad0 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
    cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000246
    igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x169c5:
    75059a65 897cb58c        mov     dword ptr [ebp+esi*4-74h],edi ss:002b:001939d8=????????
    

The crash happens in LINE16 below in a function identified as dcm_pixel_data_decode:

    LINE1  8b45ec             mov     eax, dword [ebp-0x14 {l_value}]
    LINE2  68db100000         push    0x10db {var_88_3}
    LINE3  0fb700             movzx   eax, word [eax]
    LINE4  68a0c40775         push    data_7507c4a0 {var_8c_3}{"..\..\..\..\Common\Components\ME…"}
    LINE5  57                 push    edi {var_90_3}
    LINE6  be0f000000         mov     esi, 0xf
    LINE7  6a00               push    0x0 {ptr_var34}
    LINE8  2bf0               sub     esi, eax
    LINE9  ff15c0130b75       call    dword [AF_memm_alloc]
    LINE10 8bf8               mov     edi, eax
    LINE11 8b45e4             mov     eax, dword [ebp-0x1c {l_buffer_size_1}]
    LINE12 99                 cdq     
    LINE13 2bc2               sub     eax, edx
    LINE14 d1f8               sar     eax, 0x1
    LINE15 33c9               xor     ecx, ecx  {0x0}
    LINE16 897cb58c           mov     dword [ebp+esi*4-0x74 {obj_str_sz_0x40}], edi
    LINE17 85c0               test    eax, eax
    LINE18 7e0e               jle     0x75059a7b
    

The register esi is a very big value, as result of an integer underflow. We can see at LINE6, it was set to a constant 0xf and subtracted by the register eax LINE8.  
There is no check on the value of register eax, causing the very large number. eax gets its value at LINE1, which is under our control into the malformed file.  
At LINE16 we can influence the stack pointer ebp with esi, as that depends on the content of the file, which means we can choose where in the stack to write edi. The value pointed by the register edi is a result of AF_memm_alloc, which is some kind of wrapper of malloc.

By controlling the eax register an attacker can overwrite anywhere in the stack, possibly leading to code execution.

**Crash Information**

    0:000> !analyze -v
    *******************************************************************************
    *                                                                             *
    *                        Exception Analysis                                   *
    *                                                                             *
    *******************************************************************************
    
    Unable to load image E:\ImageGearFuzzing\bin\igCore20d.dll, Win32 error 0n2
    
    KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
    
        Key  : AV.Fault
        Value: Write
    
        Key  : Analysis.CPU.mSec
        Value: 375
    
        Key  : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
        Value: 2704
    
        Key  : Analysis.IO.Other.Mb
        Value: 0
    
        Key  : Analysis.IO.Read.Mb
        Value: 0
    
        Key  : Analysis.IO.Write.Mb
        Value: 0
    
        Key  : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
        Value: 4061
    
        Key  : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
        Value: 65613
    
        Key  : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
        Value: 179
    
        Key  : Failure.Bucket
        Value: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igMED20d.dll!Unknown
    
        Key  : Failure.Hash
        Value: {7bd32a5f-d13c-5070-0693-11be1df9b256}
    
        Key  : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
        Value: 440574
    
        Key  : WER.Process.Version
        Value: 1.0.1.1
    
    
    NTGLOBALFLAG:  2100000
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS:  0
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
    
    EXCEPTION_RECORD:  (.exr -1)
    ExceptionAddress: 75059a65 (igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x000169c5)
       ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
      ExceptionFlags: 00000000
    NumberParameters: 2
       Parameter[0]: 00000001
       Parameter[1]: 001939d8
    Attempt to write to address 001939d8
    
    FAULTING_THREAD:  00001a78
    
    PROCESS_NAME:  Fuzzme.exe
    
    WRITE_ADDRESS:  001939d8 
    
    ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
    
    EXCEPTION_CODE_STR:  c0000005
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1:  00000001
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2:  001939d8
    
    STACK_TEXT:  
    WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
    0019fad0 750592f0     0019fc3c 10694fa0 1000001e igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x169c5
    0019fb04 750567e0     0019fc3c 10694fa0 1000001e igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x16250
    0019fbb4 755a15b9     0019fc3c 10680fb8 00000001 igMED20d!CPb_MED_init+0x13740
    0019fbec 755e08bc     00000000 10680fb8 0019fc3c igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
    0019fe68 755e0239     00000000 05c26fd0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x1479c
    0019fe88 75575bc7     00000000 05c26fd0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14119
    0019fea8 00402399     05c26fd0 0019febc 75c6fb80 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x47
    0019fec0 004026c0     05c26fd0 05c28fe0 05b8cf50 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
    0019ff28 00408407     00000005 05b86f78 05b8cf50 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x340
    0019ff70 75c700c9     002d4000 75c700b0 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x6087
    0019ff80 77cc7b4e     002d4000 65bf4f61 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
    0019ffdc 77cc7b1e     ffffffff 77ce8c7f 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
    0019ffec 00000000     0040848f 002d4000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
    
    
    STACK_COMMAND:  ~0s ; .cxr ; kb
    
    SYMBOL_NAME:  igMED20d+169c5
    
    MODULE_NAME: igMED20d
    
    IMAGE_NAME:  igMED20d.dll
    
    FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igMED20d.dll!Unknown
    
    OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x86
    
    OSNAME:  Windows 8
    
    IMAGE_VERSION:  20.1.0.117
    
    FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {7bd32a5f-d13c-5070-0693-11be1df9b256}
    
    Followup:     MachineOwner
    ---------
    

**VENDOR RESPONSE**

Release notes from the vendor can be found here:

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Windows/DLL/webframe.html#release-notes.html

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Linux/webframe.html#release-notes.html

**TIMELINE**

2023-07-18 - Vendor Disclosure  
2023-09-20 - Vendor Patch Release  
2023-09-25 - Public Release

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

CVE-2023-32653: TALOS-2023-1802 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the create_png_object functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-32614: TALOS-2023-1749 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the tiff_planar_adobe functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**SUMMARY**

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the tiff\_planar\_adobe functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS**

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Accusoft ImageGear 20.1

**PRODUCT URLS**

ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/

**CVSSv3 SCORE**

8.1 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**CWE**

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

**DETAILS**

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

A specially crafted TIFF file can lead to a heap-based buffer overflow in tiff_planar_adobe, due to a missing bounds check.

Trying to load a malformed TIFF, we end up in the following situation:

    0:000> r
    eax=00000000 ebx=0b086ff0 ecx=00000010 edx=0b087000 esi=0b9d0fb8 edi=00000044
    eip=6e86d4a3 esp=0019da24 ebp=0019da38 iopl=0         nv up ei ng nz ac pe cy
    cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010297
    igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x11383:
    6e86d4a3 8802            mov     byte ptr [edx],al          ds:002b:0b087000=??
    

When we look at the edx memory allocation we can see the buffer allocated is quite small, only 10 bytes:

    0:000> !heap -p -a edx
        address 0b087000 found in
        _DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 4dc1000
        in busy allocation (  DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:         UserAddr         UserSize -         VirtAddr         VirtSize)
                                     b270bfc:          b086ff0               10 -          b086000             2000
        6ebaa8b0 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000240
        773df29e ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000039
        77347170 ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000f0
        77346ecc ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeapInternal+0x0000104c
        77345e6e ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000003e
        6ea11fa6 igCore20d!IG_GUI_page_title_set+0x0003e4d6
        6ea104aa igCore20d!IG_GUI_page_title_set+0x0003c9da
        6e8646ba igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0000859a
        6e826c86 igCore20d!IG_comm_is_comp_exist+0x000048f6
        6e825f75 igCore20d!IG_comm_is_comp_exist+0x00003be5
        6e8604c4 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000043a4
        6e86588e igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0000976e
        6e80c7f2 igCore20d!GPb_image_associate+0x00000092
        6e86d050 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00010f30
        6e84929e igCore20d!IG_cpm_profiles_reset+0x0000dfae
        6e96fc93 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00113b73
        6e969b9b igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0010da7b
        6e8315b9 igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0x00000b29
        6e8708bc igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0001479c
        6e870239 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014119
        6e805bc7 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x00000047
        00402399 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000019
        004026c0 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000340
        00408407 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00006087
        75bf0099 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x00000019
        77367b6e ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000002f
        77367b3e ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000001b
    

The call stack will indicate where this is happening:

    STACK_TEXT:  
    WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
    0019da38 6e84a238 00000001 0b9d0fb8 0b086ff0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x11383
    0019da54 6e96b904 0019fc3c 0b9d0fb8 00000000 igCore20d!IG_cpm_profiles_reset+0xef48
    0019f678 6e96fdb4 0019fc3c 10000021 0019f6d0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10f7e4
    0019f6a0 6e969b9b 0019fc3c 10000021 09046d68 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x113c94
    0019fbb4 6e8315b9 0019fc3c 09046d68 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10da7b
    0019fbec 6e8708bc 00000000 09046d68 0019fc3c igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
    0019fe68 6e870239 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x1479c
    0019fe88 6e805bc7 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14119
    0019fea8 00402399 05281fe0 0019febc 75befb60 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x47
    0019fec0 004026c0 05281fe0 0019fef8 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
    0019ff28 00408407 00000005 051d6f98 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x340
    0019ff70 75bf0099 0023a000 75bf0080 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x6087
    0019ff80 77367b6e 0023a000 6666f0ed 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
    0019ffdc 77367b3e ffffffff 77388ca1 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
    0019ffec 00000000 0040848f 0023a000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
    

The crash is happening in the function tiff_planar_adobe with the following pseudo code at LINE63:

    LINE1   BOOLEAN tiff_planar_adobe(HIGEAR lpHigear,BYTE *raster_buffer,BYTE *at_pixpos,int size_raster_buffer
    LINE2                            ,int loop_sample_per_pixel)
    LINE3   {
    LINE4     undefined4 uVar1;
    LINE5     LPCHAR pCVar2;
    LINE6     AT_INT AVar3;
    LINE7     BOOLEAN BVar4;
    LINE8     int bits_per_channel;
    LINE9     int sample_per_pixel;
    LINE10    int max_loop;
    LINE11    int bit_depth_sums;
    LINE12    undefined4 *_dest_buffer;
    LINE13    undefined2 *puVar5;
    LINE14    int loop_cnt;
    LINE15    BYTE *oobw;
    LINE16    uint uVar6;
    LINE17    HIGEAR hiGear;
    LINE18    
    LINE19    hiGear = *(HIGEAR *)lpHigear->valid_image;
    LINE20    if (lpHigear->lpfnDIBGet != 0) {
    LINE21      uVar1 = getHeight(hiGear);
    LINE22      pCVar2 = (LPCHAR)(*(code *)lpHigear->lpfnDIBGet)(lpHigear->IGDIBRunEnds,at_pixpos,uVar1);
    LINE23      if (pCVar2 == (LPCHAR)0x0) {
    LINE24        AVar3 = getHeight(hiGear);
    LINE25        AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Io\\dfltldcb.c",0x20d,-0x841,0,(AT_INT)at_pixpos,
    LINE26                          AVar3,pCVar2);
    LINE27        BVar4 = AF_error_check();
    LINE28        return BVar4;
    LINE29      }
    LINE30    }
    LINE31    bit_depth_sums = getWidth(hiGear);
    LINE32    bits_per_channel = get_ptr_bits_per_channel_table(hiGear);
    LINE33    sample_per_pixel = get_sample_per_pixel_table(hiGear);
    LINE34    max_loop = size_raster_buffer / ((int)((bits_per_channel >> 0x1f & 7U) + bits_per_channel) >> 3);
    LINE35    if (bit_depth_sums < max_loop) {
    LINE36      max_loop = bit_depth_sums;
    LINE37    }
    LINE38    at_pixpos = GPb_image_row_pointer_get(hiGear,(AT_PIXPOS)at_pixpos);
    LINE39    if (bits_per_channel == 8) {
    [...]
    LINE57      }
    LINE58      else {
    LINE59        oobw = at_pixpos + loop_sample_per_pixel;
    LINE60        loop_cnt = 0;
    LINE61        if (0 < max_loop) {
    LINE62          do {
    LINE63            *oobw = raster_buffer[loop_cnt];
    LINE64            oobw = oobw + sample_per_pixel;
    LINE65            loop_cnt = loop_cnt + 1;
    LINE66          } while (loop_cnt < max_loop);
    LINE67        }
    LINE68      }
    LINE69    }
    [..]
    LINE105 }
    

This is a do-while loop with a bound size controlled by the variable max_loop LINE66. The max_loop is computed at LINE34 and derived from two variables: size_raster_buffer and bits_per_channel. In our case bits_per_channel equals ‘8’, forcing max_loop to be controlled directly by size_raster_buffer

size_raster_buffer passed in argument to tiff_planar_adobe is computed earlier in function DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_get with following pseudo code :

    LINE106 uint DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_get(HIGDIBINFO hdib)
    LINE107 
    LINE108 {
    LINE109   void *local_10;
    LINE110   undefined *puStack_c;
    LINE111   undefined4 local_8;
    LINE112   
    LINE113   puStack_c = &LAB_10261950;
    LINE114   local_10 = ExceptionList;
    LINE115   ExceptionList = &local_10;
    LINE116   local_8 = 0;
    LINE117   if (hdib->nUnits != 1) {
    LINE118     wrapper_thow_exception
    LINE119               ((undefined *)0xfffffe6f,(char *)0x0,(undefined *)0x0,(undefined *)0x0,
    LINE120                (undefined **)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Core\\c_DIB.cpp",(undefined *)0x23b);
    LINE121   }
    LINE122   ExceptionList = local_10;
    LINE123   return hdib->size_X + 0x1f >> 3 & 0xfffffffc;
    LINE124 }
    

At LINE123 we can see size_raster_buffer is derived from hdib->size_X, which corresponds to the value read from the file in TIFF tag ImageWidth.

The presence of some other tags like Planar and Compression is a prerequisite to trigger this issue.  
As the loop is arbitrarily controlled and has no bounds checks, the command at LINE63 would write out-of-bounds on the stack, leading to memory corruption.

**Crash Information**

    0:000> !analyze -v
    *******************************************************************************
    *                                                                             *
    *                        Exception Analysis                                   *
    *                                                                             *
    *******************************************************************************
    
    
    KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
    
        Key  : AV.Fault
        Value: Write
    
        Key  : Analysis.CPU.Sec
        Value: 2
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugAnalysisProvider.CPP
        Value: Create: 8007007e on DESKTOP-I6GKV78
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugData
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugModel
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Analysis.Elapsed.Sec
        Value: 16
    
        Key  : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
        Value: 93
    
        Key  : Analysis.System
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
        Value: 1946223
    
        Key  : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
        Value: 765
    
    
    NTGLOBALFLAG:  2100000
    
    PROCESS_BAM_CURRENT_THROTTLED: 0
    
    PROCESS_BAM_PREVIOUS_THROTTLED: 0
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS:  0
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
    
    EXCEPTION_RECORD:  (.exr -1)
    ExceptionAddress: 6e86d4a3 (igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00011383)
       ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
      ExceptionFlags: 00000000
    NumberParameters: 2
       Parameter[0]: 00000001
       Parameter[1]: 0b087000
    Attempt to write to address 0b087000
    
    FAULTING_THREAD:  00001a58
    
    PROCESS_NAME:  Fuzzme.exe
    
    WRITE_ADDRESS:  0b087000 
    
    ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
    
    EXCEPTION_CODE_STR:  c0000005
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1:  00000001
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2:  0b087000
    
    STACK_TEXT:  
    WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
    0019da38 6e84a238 00000001 0b9d0fb8 0b086ff0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x11383
    0019da54 6e96b904 0019fc3c 0b9d0fb8 00000000 igCore20d!IG_cpm_profiles_reset+0xef48
    0019f678 6e96fdb4 0019fc3c 10000021 0019f6d0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10f7e4
    0019f6a0 6e969b9b 0019fc3c 10000021 09046d68 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x113c94
    0019fbb4 6e8315b9 0019fc3c 09046d68 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10da7b
    0019fbec 6e8708bc 00000000 09046d68 0019fc3c igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
    0019fe68 6e870239 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x1479c
    0019fe88 6e805bc7 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14119
    0019fea8 00402399 05281fe0 0019febc 75befb60 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x47
    0019fec0 004026c0 05281fe0 0019fef8 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
    0019ff28 00408407 00000005 051d6f98 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x340
    0019ff70 75bf0099 0023a000 75bf0080 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x6087
    0019ff80 77367b6e 0023a000 6666f0ed 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
    0019ffdc 77367b3e ffffffff 77388ca1 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
    0019ffec 00000000 0040848f 0023a000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
    
    
    STACK_COMMAND:  ~0s ; .cxr ; kb
    
    SYMBOL_NAME:  igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+11383
    
    MODULE_NAME: igCore20d
    
    IMAGE_NAME:  igCore20d.dll
    
    FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igCore20d.dll!IG_mpi_page_set
    
    OS_VERSION:  10.0.19041.1
    
    BUILDLAB_STR:  vb_release
    
    OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x86
    
    OSNAME:  Windows 10
    
    FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {fe8f80f8-683f-d41f-7c33-712a409d5fb5}
    
    Followup:     MachineOwner
    ---------
    

**VENDOR RESPONSE**

Release notes from the vendor can be found here:

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Windows/DLL/webframe.html#release-notes.html

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Linux/webframe.html#release-notes.html

**TIMELINE**

2023-05-24 - Vendor Disclosure  
2023-09-20 - Vendor Patch Release  
2023-09-25 - Public Release

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

CVE-2023-32284: TALOS-2023-1750 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A use-after-free vulnerability exists in the tif_parse_sub_IFD functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can deliver file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-39453: TALOS-2023-1830 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the CreateDIBfromPict functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted file can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-23567: TALOS-2023-1729 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the pictwread functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

Source

CVE