In a move to embarrass the city, hacking group known as SiegedSec accessed thousands of files with administrator logins, but it's making no ransom demands.

In a security breach first discovered on June 23, Fort Worth, a north Texas city that has more than 935,000 residents, announced that hacktivist threat actors gained unauthorized access to its data.

The group claiming responsibility for the cyberattack, SiegedSec, said it was carried out for political reasons. Specifically, what it deemed to be recent anti-transgender legislation in the state of Texas, stating, "Texas happens to be one of the largest states banning gender affirming care, and for that, we have made Texas our target."

The hacking group publicly claimed in a post that it had accessed around a half-million files containing materials such as police reports, employee/contractor emails, internal documents, work orders, employee lists, and a great deal more. SiegedSec allegedly did so by stealing administrator credentials in order to access city data, the stolen amount of which totals around 180GB.

With a list of links, the post went on to say, "We have uploaded this leak in 10 different links, each containing 20GB of government files (except the last one). If any links go down, we assure we'll have it up again very soon\[.\]"

In a press conference on the same day of the hack, city CTO Kevin Gunn confirmed the attack.

"The City of Fort Worth has confirmed that the posted information did originate from our computer systems," he said. "However, that data came from a website that our workers use to manage their maintenance activities and not from the city's public-facing intranet website. It appears the hackers downloaded file attachments to work orders within the system and those attachments include things like photographs, spreadsheets, invoices for work performed, emails between staff, PDF documents and other related materials for work orders."

Though it is unknown how the group managed to steal login information, Gunn claims that there was no indication that sensitive information was released and there was no ransom demand made, but rather that the group's intent was to make a political statement.

Trans-Rights Hacktivists Steal City of Ft. Worth's Data

The attack exposed personal information from pilot applicants, prompting both airlines to ditch their third-party provider and move services internally.

Hackers breached a database maintained by Pilot Credentials, a recruiting company based in Austin, Texas, resulting in the theft of personal information from more than 8,000 pilot applicants for American Airlines and Southwest Airlines.

The compromised data includes names, birth dates, Social Security and passport numbers, as well as driver- and pilot-license numbers of pilot and cadet job applicants.

According to the breach notifications filed by both airlines, 5,745 American Airlines applicants were affected, while the breach exposed information from 3,009 Southwest applicants. 

The airlines became aware of the breach on May 3, after it occurred on April 30. 

American Airlines reported no evidence of fraudulent activity or identity theft but is offering affected applicants two years of identity theft protection.

Both airlines said they have shifted their recruitment processes to internal websites and are cooperating with law enforcement investigations.

"We are no longer utilizing the vendor, and, moving forward, pilot applicants are being directed to an internal portal managed by Southwest," Southwest Airlines said.

Erfan Shadabi, cybersecurity expert with comforte AG, says this type of data is a goldmine for cybercriminals, who can exploit it for various malicious purposes, including identity theft, financial fraud, and targeted phishing attacks.

"The recent data breach involving American Airlines and Southwest Airlines highlights the profound damage that such incidents can inflict on organizations," Shadabi says. 

Erich Kron, security awareness advocate at KnowBe4, agrees that this kind of breach illustrates the dangers of relying on third parties to manage sensitive information.

"Unfortunately, supply chains have been increasingly targeted, causing users of their services a considerable amount of grief," he adds. "In many cases it is more economically feasible to enlist vendors to handle services such as managing resumes, job requests, and many other functions." 

The problem there, Kron explains, is that when things go wrong, it often reflects more poorly on the customer organization than on the service provider. 

**Airlines Must Improve Third-Party Security**

Nick Tausek, lead security automation architect at Swimlane, says to significantly reduce the risk of data breaches, airlines must collaborate closely with third-party vendors to prioritize the implementation of robust security measures.

This includes practices such as multifactor authentication and regular password updates, and evaluating whether their current security strategy is leaving room for delays in threat detection and incident response.

"The reality is that manual security processes are often time consuming and prone to errors, leaving organizations vulnerable to attacks," he says. "Security automation tools, especially those of the low-code variety, can accelerate security teams' capabilities to keep pace with the evolving threat landscape."

Sally Vincent, senior threat research engineer at LogRhythm, says in addition to the challenges of managing and detecting threats within an enterprise's IT infrastructure, assessing third-party risk is also a critical aspect.

"For airlines, it is essential to have strong communication and notification tools, as well as a deep understanding of how to effectively configure their complex IT environment," she says.

This allows them to gain a comprehensive view of anomalous and malicious activities across all fronts, enabling a prompt and thorough response.

"By implementing a well configured security monitoring solution that provides complete visibility, including for third-party vendors, it would have been more likely to detect indicators of compromise and mitigate the threat in a timely manner," Vincent notes. 

Kron adds when an organization is going to use a third-party service to process or gather information, especially anything of a sensitive nature, special care needs to be taken with respect to security and should be part of the contract with the vendor.

From his perspective, how the data is handled, who has access, how it's secured, and how long it's retained are some of the key concerns that should be handled within the contracts.

"The security of any third parties who are handling your sensitive information should be vetted to ensure that their security standards meet or exceed those of the organization that is hiring them," he says. 

**Airlines, Travel Industry Under Continued Attack**

Last year American Airlines was victim to a successful phishing attack against employees that compromised email accounts containing a raft of customer data. 

In the wake of these attacks and continued targeting of the travel sector by cybercriminals, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced a new set of cybersecurity requirements for airport and aircraft operators.

This obligation follows previous TSA requirements for operators to report significant cyber breaches to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). 

Ransomware attacks have impacted airlines worldwide, including low-cost carrier Indian SpiceJet, where an attack caused flight delays and rendered unavailable online booking systems and customer service portals.

Pilot Applicant Information for American, Southwest Hacked

Organizations are largely deluded about their own security postures, according to an analysis, with the average SIEM failing to detect a whopping 76% of attacker TTPs.

Despite enterprises' best efforts to shore up their security information and event management (SIEM) postures, most platform implementations have massive gaps in coverage, including missing more than three-quarters of the common techniques that threat actors use to use to deploy ransomware, steal sensitive data, and execute other cyberattacks.

Researchers from CardinalOps analyzed data from production SIEM platforms from companies such as Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, IBM QRadar, and Sumo Logic, and found that they have detections for just 24% of all MITRE ATT&CK techniques. That means that adversaries can execute about 150 different techniques that can bypass SIEM detection, while only about 50 techniques are spotted, the researchers said.

This is despite the fact that current SIEM systems actually do take in sufficient data to cover potentially 94% of all these techniques, CardinalOps revealed as part of the company's "Third Annual Report on the State of SIEM Detection Risk," released today.

Moreover, organizations are largely deluded about their own security postures and "are often unaware of the gap between the theoretical security they assume they have and the actual security they have in practice," the researchers wrote in the report. This creates "a false impression of their detection posture."

MITRE ATT&CK is a global knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations that's aimed at helping organizations detect and mitigate cyberattacks. The report's data is the result of analysis of more than 4,000 detection rules, nearly 1 million log sources and hundreds of unique log source types used in SIEM across a range of diverse industry verticals — including banking and financial services, insurance, manufacturing, energy, and media and telecommunications.

**A Lack of SIEM Fine-Tuning to Blame for Detection Fails**

The key issue contributing to the current state of SIEM efficacy (or lack thereof) seems to be that even though resources exist for organizations to use knowledge, automation, and other processes to detect adversaries and potential attacks on their environments, they still largely rely on manual and other "error-prone" processes for developing new detections, the researchers noted. This makes it difficult to reduce their backlogs and act quickly to fill gaps in detection.

Indeed, SIEMs themselves "are not magic" and rely on the organizations deploying them to do so correctly and efficiently, notes Mike Parkin, senior technical engineer at Vulcan Cyber, a security-as-a-service provider of enterprise cyber-risk remediation.

"Like most tools, they require fine-tuning to deliver the best results for the environment they’re deployed in," he says. "These report results imply that many organizations have gotten the basics working but haven’t done the fine-tuning necessary to take their detection, response, and risk management strategies to the next level."

In addition to the need to scale detection-engineering processes to develop more detections faster, one key issue that seems to be tripping up detection in enterprise SIEM deployments is that on average, they have 12% of rules that are broken, which means they will never file an alert when something is amiss, according to the report.

"This commonly occurs due to ongoing changes in the IT infrastructure, vendor log format changes, and logical or accidental errors in writing a rule," the researchers noted in the report. "Adversaries can exploit gaps created by broken detections to successfully breach organizations."

**Why MITRE ATT&CK Matters**

MITRE ATT&CK, created in 2013, has now "become the standard framework for understanding adversary playbooks and behavior," the researchers noted. And as threat intelligence has advanced, so has the wealth of knowledge the framework provides, currently describing more than 500 techniques and sub-techniques used by threat groups such as APT28, the Lazarus Group, FIN7, and Lapsus$.

"The biggest innovation introduced by MITRE ATT&CK is that it extends the traditional intrusion kill chain model to go beyond static indicators of compromise (like IP addresses, which attackers can change constantly) to catalog all known adversary playbooks and behaviors (TTPs)," the CardinalOps researchers wrote.

Organizations clearly see the value in using MITRE ATT&CK to help them in their security efforts, with 89% currently using the knowledge base to reduce risk for security-operations use cases — such as determining priorities for detection engineering, applying threat intelligence to alert triage, and gaining a better understanding of adversary TTPs, the researchers noted, citing Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) research.

However, using the framework to support SIEM efforts and using it well appear to be two very different scenarios, the report found.

**Closing the SIEM Gap**

There are steps that organizations can take to help close the gap between what a SIEM is capable of in terms of cyberattack detection, and how they currently are using it, researchers and security experts said.

One key strategy would be to scale SIEM detection-engineering processes to develop more detections faster using automation, something that companies already use widely to great effect in "multiple areas of the SOC, such as anomaly detection and incident response," but not so much in detection, they noted in the report.

"The detection-engineering function remains stubbornly manual and typically dependent on 'ninjas' with specialized expertise," the researchers wrote.

Indeed, having a focus on automation is critical to achieving goals with limited human and financial resources, agrees one security expert.

"This includes expanding automated detection to include Internet of things (IoT) and operational technology (OT) attack vectors, as well as having plans already in place for automated threat remediation," says John Gallagher, vice president of Viakoo Labs at Viakoo.

One key challenge that organizations continue to face is that the current attack surface — which now includes large numbers of vulnerable network-connected devices as well as the typical enterprise network — has grown well past what the IT organization is currently capable of supporting or managing, Gallagher says.

"To defend and maintain the integrity of those assets requires IT working closely with other parts of the organization to ensure those assets are visible, operational, and secure," he says.

Indeed, Parkin observes, until organizations can get a clear picture of their threat surfaces, manage their risk, and prioritize events to focus on what matters most, there will be problems.

"We have the tools to make it happen," he says. "But it can be a challenge to get them deployed and configured for best effect."

Most Enterprise SIEMs Blind to MITRE ATT&CK Tactics

The new FDA software bill of materials (SBOM) guidelines for medical devices could have broad impact on the healthcare industry and the broader open source ecosystem.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is not exactly top of mind for the average open source software (OSS) project maintainer nor the developers building applications that leverage OSS. But new rules from the FDA could impact OSS security more than any government rule to date. The big change? The FDA is mandating that all medical devices running software must create and maintain a software bill of materials (SBOM) and will start enforcing that rule on Oct. 1, 2023.

The new policy addresses growing concerns that critical software-powered components of healthcare devices are not properly secured. Medical institutions are frequent targets of ransomware attacks and, in the future, medical devices could be in the crosshairs of hackers. In addition, medical devices often run on outdated or end-of-life (EOL) operating systems. A significant percentage of these systems use Linux or other open source software.

Often, manufacturers have no easy way to update firmware or device software. Further, medical device companies — and the medical professionals who install and use the devices — may not be well versed in cybersecurity and might not build in proper mechanisms for ongoing security measures. Of course, we've had warnings on this topic for years. What's different about this new rule? And how will it impact the broader OSS ecosystem? The real difference is in the details of the SBOM requirement.

**The Cascading Impact of Mandated SBOMs**

To date, SBOMs have been akin to nuclear fusion — promising, but always a few years away from being a meaningful reality. A host of supply chain attacks, such as the SolarWinds hack, kicked off a more aggressive US government policy towards cybersecurity, including an executive order mandating that software used by the US government include an SBOM. Since then, a host of startups have emerged to facilitate supply chain security and SBOM management. The largest version-control service providers, GitHub and GitLab, now offer automated SBOM generation. Adoption and acceptance of SBOMs are on the rise according to multiple surveys. For example, the Linux Foundation found that 78% of organizations planned to produce or consume SBOMs by the end of 2022.

What the FDA brings to the party is real "teeth." Mere consumption or production of SBOMs doesn't necessarily result in more robust security; it's easy to generate a superficial and somewhat useless SBOM. In contrast, the FDA mandates that medical device manufacturers submit "a plan to monitor, identify, and address, as appropriate, in a reasonable time, postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits" and to "design, develop, and maintain processes and procedures to provide a reasonable assurance that the device and related systems are cybersecure." This includes patching "on a reasonably justified regular cycle" and as-soon-as-possible patches for serious vulnerabilities found outside of the normal patch cycle.

If a medical device maker fails to hit this mark, then the FDA will refuse to accept (RTA) a proposed device. This designation means a maker cannot put the device on the market. For devices already in the market, the rules are murkier. That said, those device makers are scrambling to meet the new SBOM standards.

**One Catalyst for a Broader Shift to Trusted, Transparent OSS**

For the broader OSS ecosystem, this new FDA rule offers a glimpse of a future where SBOMs are finally more than a nice-to-have or checkbox activity. OSS is already widely used in medical devices. Linux is one of the more popular choices for medical device systems, growing even more popular as OSS gathers reputation and acceptance. If you are building on Linux, the design likely incorporates other open source components such as middleware, message queues, front-end frameworks for user experience components, and more.

For medical device companies and service providers building software for the industry, the mandate exerts pressure to bias toward OSS components (and supporting projects) that demonstrate strong security behaviors. This includes developing robust SBOMs that are kept up to date and can be programmatically consumed to aggregate into compound SBOMs for a specific medical device and its software stack. By extension, this means we will likely see a winnowing effect as OSS subcomponents that don't abide by the SBOM mandate subsequently fall out of favor with enterprise use cases. This trend will be reinforced by the emergence of trusted package repositories and mandated package provenance.

For open source, this catalyst from the FDA will prove extremely beneficial. It offers a model of enforceable SBOM requirements for critical infrastructure and components. It provides healthy pressure to make applications built on OSS more transparent and accountable. Most importantly, the FDA mandates could save lives one day. For (one terrifying) example, imagine if an advanced persistent threat were to attempt to hack insulin pumps to extract a ransom. Pressures are also building in other geographies, such as the European Union, which is pursuing policies to mandate medical device hardening.

None of this is to say that OSS has not already been more transparent or accountable than proprietary systems. It has. But even within this context, a higher degree of transparency and accountability — making OSS far more consumable and programmatic — is necessary to secure increasingly convoluted software supply chains and webs of dependencies. The upshot? Your pacemaker or insulin pump will be more secure, and so will everything else in a world increasingly powered by open source.

Why the FDA's SBOM Mandate Changes the Game for OSS Security

The $7.5 million in new funds from the Cybersecurity for Rural Water Systems Act of 2023 is not just a drop in the bucket for crucially important rural water systems.

A recent bill that proposes $7.5 million in annual cybersecurity funding for the next five years for US rural water systems may have a bigger impact for covered entities than the dollar amount alone would suggest. It would be a much-needed infusion of cash for a critical infrastructure sector that plays a big role in public safety despite its smaller customer base.

The funding adds to $25 million available annually as technical assistance for rural water systems and small water utilities under a US Department of Agriculture (USDA) initiative called the Circuit Rider Program. But this bill targets a narrowly focused set of small organizations that currently have little to non-existent cybersecurity capabilities.

Mike Hamilton, former CISO of the City of Seattle and current CISO of Critical Insight, says the investment is vitally important given that these systems make attractive targets for attackers. 

"Disruption of water and wastewater \[systems\] can lead to public health emergencies very quickly," he notes "Given that global geopolitics are incentivizing activists and volunteers to perform disruptive acts, water and waste may be in their sights to drive dissatisfaction with the US government's ability to maintain critical services."

**Rural Water Systems: A Critical Cyberattack Target**

There are more serious concerns as well. By targeting critical operating systems at small water facilities, an attacker could "drain tanks, change levels of chemicals, inject bad telemetry information into well and tank monitoring, and potentially impact waste treatment operations," Hamilton says.

It's also important to remember that softer targets take fewer resources to attack, cautions Chris Warner, senior operational technology security consultant at GuidePoint Security. Such targets are often used to divert attention from more significant and larger targets, he notes. 

Shutting off water is just one potential outcome of an attack on a rural or small water system, Warner adds: "What concerns me is \[attackers\] changing the amount of chemicals used to clean and or balance the water quality. This could cause mass sickness and even possible death."

The good news is, so far, there have been few publicly reported attacks on small and rural water systems of major significance, Hamilton and others say**.** However, that doesn't mean small and rural water entities can't become victims of opportunistic attacks — including ransomware. 

"Key factors include how much exposure their critical systems have to enterprise and Internet facing users that are exploited by threat actors," explains Ron Fabela, CTO of critical infrastructure at Xona Systems. So, "while ... there's no tangible data showing a rise in threat actor interest in rural water systems specifically," Fabela says, the overall increase in awareness, legislation, and industry focus — and this latest investment — are key in making sure the situation stays that way. 

**A Narrow but Significant Cyber Investment in Water Safety**

"While $7.5 million may seem like a drop in the bucket from a funding stance, the USDA Rider program is focused on those water entities \[that\] serve a population of 10,000 or less," says Fabela. "Any financial assistance for these very small water utilities goes a long way."

Reps. Don Davis (D-N.C.) and Zachary Nunn (R-Iowa) along with Reps. Angie Craig (D-Minn.) and Abigail Spanberger (D-Va.) introduced the Cybersecurity for Rural Water Systems Act of 2023 earlier this month. The bill seeks to expand the National Rural Water and Wastewater Circuit Rider program by including $7.5 million annually between 2024 and 2028 for cybersecurity technical assistance for small and rural water utilities.

Under the proposed program, cybersecurity experts — or circuit riders — will travel to rural water facilities and assist them in building plans for securing their systems against cyberattacks. The cybersecurity riders will become part of a broader team of circuit riders that have been providing as-needed, hands-on training and other technical assistance to small and rural water systems for decades.

According to the National Rural Water Association, which collaborated with the USDA in setting up the program, circuit riders have provided technical assistance more than 700,000 times to small and rural water systems since 2009. The assistance has included helping small water utilities to respond rapidly to natural and man-made emergencies; to improve water treatment processes; enhance regulatory compliance; and improve financial sustainability.

In a statement announcing the bill, Rep. Davis described the proposal as critical to bolstering cyber defense in agricultural communities and rural water systems that are critical to overall national security. "We must ensure our water systems rural communities and farmers rely on have the necessary protections to successfully guard against cyberattacks," he said.

Expanding the circuit rider program to include cybersecurity should begin to help smaller, rural water systems start their security journey, says GuidePoint's Warner. Many of these entities lack the security personnel, expertise, and funding required to operate systems for securing their water and wastewater equipment, he says.

"From several of the water and wastewater organizations I've helped out in the past, this will greatly assist organizations to create security departments that may not exist or that are treated as 'other duties assigned,'" he says. The funding could also help them build out governance and risk management programs, Warner notes.

**Rural Water Cybersecurity Funds Provide Much Needed Relief**

Hamilton, who was previously also vice-chair of the DHS State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, says it's important to consider the size of the target audience when evaluating how effective or not the proposed new funding will be. The $7.5 million in cybersecurity funding that the bill proposes is targeted at small utilities that are typically not in scope for state and local cybersecurity grant programs. "Because of that tight scoping, this amount may be significant," he notes. 

"Private sector water systems that are in rural areas can use the funds to conduct the assessments that are required by the EPA," as part of new drinking water requirements for states and public water systems, he adds. The fund could aid these entities in finding and closing security gaps in their systems.

Data on the exact number of rural water systems in the US is challenging to come by, partly because of how these systems are classified. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 97% of 153,000 public drinking water systems in the US (as of February 2020) serve populations of 10,000 or fewer. Another report, by the American Bar Association following the water crisis in Flint, Mich., pegged the number of community water systems in the US at 60,000, with 93% serving populations fewer than 10,000, and a total of 67% serving fewer than 500 people.

Why Cyber Funding Flows for Rural Water Systems

By investing in a strong future cybersecurity workforce, we can prevent future attacks on US critical infrastructure before they occur.

Our K–12 schools are under cyberattack. From 2016 to 2022, public K–12 schools in the United States fell victim to more than 1,600 cyber incidents, including ransomware, phishing, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Recently, schools in Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Carolina were shuttered as a result. These attacks have caused considerable disruption to students and educators caught in the crosshairs.

We are nearing the end of National Cybersecurity Education Month, an effort led by Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV), to increase awareness of cybersecurity education and its role in improving US national security. Now more than ever, we have a responsibility to stop cyber incidents on schools before they begin. This starts with K–12 cybersecurity education.

Many schools lack funding for sophisticated cyber protections and IT talent to protect infrastructure, making them easy targets. The federal government has taken notice. The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) now provides recommendations on the key steps K–12 schools to effectively reduce cybersecurity risk.

This underscores the importance of preventing cyberattacks on schools from happening in the first place by investing in K–12 cybersecurity education and the next generation of cybersecurity professionals.

The nation continues to face a systemic cyber talent workforce shortage, with more than 750,000 open cybersecurity positions. At the same time, less than half of students nationwide are learning about cybersecurity in the classroom. CISA Director Jen Easterly emphasized that addressing the cybersecurity talent gap begins by engaging students at all levels of education, as well as more women, girls, and minorities in cybersecurity.

There is infrequent and unequal access to K–12 cybersecurity education, as students in small and high-poverty districts are significantly less likely to be exposed to the subject.

Here are three key steps educators and school leaders can take to ensure that all students — regardless of socioeconomic status or ZIP code — have access to cybersecurity education.

**1\. Continue Cybersecurity Education for Teachers**

Teachers are central to empowering students in every subject, but this isn't possible unless we empower teachers with the skills and confidence to teach cybersecurity. Through professional development and readily available resources, educators can learn core cybersecurity concepts and become cyber literate. Armed with the skills and tools to teach cybersecurity, educators can inspire students to succeed in our 21st-century workforce.

**2\. Integrate Cybersecurity Education and Standards Into Existing Curriculum**

Introducing cybersecurity concepts in the classroom can seem daunting, but thanks to existing resources, educators don't need to start from scratch. Educators can use no-cost cybersecurity lessons to integrate cybersecurity into their curriculum, regardless of the subject they teach. Additionally, the national K–12 Cybersecurity Learning Standards provide another road map for educators to ensure students have not only a foundational understanding of cybersecurity, but also the skills and knowledge needed to pursue cybersecurity careers in greater numbers. Designed to be comprehensive, easy to use and easy to find, the standards are available to states, districts, and all educators at no cost.

**3\. Partner on Cybersecurity With Colleges and Universities**

When presenting K–12 students with a potential new career path, it's important to provide examples of what pursuing cybersecurity can lead to. Establishing partnerships and mentorship programs between K–12 schools and higher education institutions that offer cybersecurity degree programs help students envision pursuing cybersecurity in college and as a career.

Building a pipeline of future cyber professionals starts with ensuring that all K–12 students have equitable access to cybersecurity education and the skills to pursue careers in the field. Dedicated educators and school leaders are essential to making this a reality. By investing in a strong future cybersecurity workforce, we can prevent future cyberattacks on US critical infrastructure, like our K–12 schools, before they occur.

Preventing Cyberattacks on Schools Starts With K–12 Cybersecurity Education

**MARLTON****, N.J.** **,** **June 23, 2023** **/PRNewswire/ --** Between 2.5 to 2.7 million consumers are being notified that their Social Security numbers and other confidential information were compromised when hackers were able to exploit a vulnerability in software used by a vendor of Genworth Financial, Inc.

The data breach lawyers at Console & Associates, P.C. are investigating claims on behalf of Genworth Financial policyholders and anyone else affected by the breach, hoping to fully inform them of the risks they face in the wake of the breach as well as their legal rights.

The sensitive personal data of at least 2.5 million Genworth Financial policyholders has been compromised. Now, their full names, Social Security numbers and other personal information may be in the hands of criminals who can use the stolen data to carry out various schemes, such as identity theft and other frauds.

On June 22, 2023, Genworth Financial filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission describing a third-party data breach affecting consumers nationwide. Genworth notes that the incident stemmed from a third-party vendor's use of the managed file transfer software, MOVEit.

Evidently, Genworth Financial was notified by its vendor, PBI Research Services, that a vulnerability in the MOVEit file-transfer software, created by Progress Software, allowed hackers to download confidential policyholder data.

According to the notice, the data breach affected an estimated 2.5 million policyholders and other customers.

The list of sensitive information that was exposed includes names, Social Security numbers, and other personal information.

If you receive a data breach notice from Genworth Financial, you could now be at risk of identity theft—and the life-changing financial and legal consequences that follow in its wake.

Genworth Financial may offer those who were affected by the breach with complimentary credit monitoring and identity restoration services. And while victims should enroll in this service immediately, it is not sufficient to protect them from the risks of a data breach.

**What to Do if You Receive a Genworth Financial Data Breach Letter**

Individuals who receive a data breach letter from Genworth Financial should take all necessary steps to protect themselves. (See our Guide for Victims of Data Breach for more details at https://www.myinjuryattorney.com/consumer-privacy-data-breach-lawyers/if-your-information-has-been-compromised-in-a-data-breach/.) Additionally, data breach victims should consider speaking with a data breach attorney as soon as possible. Those consumers who receive a data breach letter from Genworth Financial may be entitled to financial compensation.

If you wish to discuss this data security incident, or if you have any questions regarding your rights following the Genworth Financial data breach, please contact Console & Associates, P.C. at (866) 778-5500. Interested parties and potential plaintiffs can also learn more about this data breach and potential lawsuit at https://www.myinjuryattorney.com/genworth-financial-data-breach-investigation/.

Anyone who has received a Notice of Data Breach letter may contact the firm to learn more about their rights.

Genworth Financial Reports Data Breach Leaking SSNs Belonging to 2.7M Policyholders and Customers

CEO says SEC penalties related to the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attacks are unwarranted and is ready to mount a defense to any legal actions against the company or its employees.

The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued a notice to SolarWinds executives that it intends to bring enforcement actions against them for their role in the 2020 SolarWinds cyber incident. But neither SolarWinds as an organization nor its current or former employees seem prepared to go down without a fight.

In response to a Wells Notice issued by the SEC, SolarWinds CEO Sudhakar Ramakrisha sent an internal email to employees vowing to fight any legal action taken by the regulator.

"Recently, SEC staff notified some of our former and current employees that they are considering bringing legal action against these employees along with the company," Ramakrishna told employees in the email provided to Dark Reading. "We disagree that any such action is warranted against either the company or any employees, and we will continue to explore a potential resolution of this matter before the SEC makes any final decision. And if the SEC does ultimately decide to initiate any legal action, we intend to vigorously defend ourselves."

While Ramakrishna goes on to cast the SEC's actions as a distraction to the organization's goals, a SolarWinds spokesperson tells Dark Reading that the SEC's actions against the company and its executives will ultimately hurt the wider cybersecurity community by discouraging disclosures to avoid facing penalties.

"We are cooperating in a long investigative process that seems to be progressing to charges by the SEC against our company and officers," the spokesperson added in an emailed statement. "Any potential action will make the entire industry less secure by having a chilling effect on cyber incident disclosure."

Although a Wells Notice like the one issued to SolarWinds executives this week isn't legally required, it's a common practice of the SEC to issue one ahead of enforcement, according to Cornell Law School, and it offers the opportunity for the target to submit a written statement to the regulator ahead of any decision being handed down.

Last November, the SEC issued a similar Wells Notice directed at SolarWinds, alleging the organization violated laws related to the breach disclosure as well as controls and procedures related to the infamous cyberattack.

"SunBurst \[SolarWind's preferred name for the incident\] was a highly sophisticated and unforeseeable attack that the United States government has said was carried out by a global superpower using novel techniques in a new type of threat that cybersecurity experts had never seen before," the company spokesperson added. "SolarWinds has acted properly at all times by following long-established best practices for both cyber controls and disclosure."

SolarWinds Execs Targeted by SEC, CEO Vows to Fight

A recent campaign shows that the politically motivated threat actor has more tricks up its sleeve than previously known, targeting an old RCE flaw and wiping logs to cover their tracks.

_Editor's Note: This article was updated on 7/3/2023 to clarify that_ _CVE-2021-40539_ _was patched in Sept. 2021._

The recently discovered Chinese state-backed advanced persistent threat (APT) "Volt Typhoon," aka "Vanguard Panda," has been spotted using a two-year old critical vulnerability in Zoho's ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus, a single sign-on and password management solution. And it's now sporting plenty of previously undisclosed stealth mechanisms.

Volt Typhoon came to the fore last month, thanks to joint reports from Microsoft and various government agencies. The reports highlighted the group's infection of critical infrastructure in the Pacific region, to be used as a possible future beachhead in the event of conflict with Taiwan.

The reports detailed a number of Volt Typhoon's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including its use of internet-exposed Fortinet FortiGuard devices for initial intrusion, and the hiding of network activity via compromised routers, firewalls, and VPN hardware.

But a recent campaign outlined by CrowdStrike in a recent blog post suggests that Volt Typhoon is flexible, with the ability to customize its tactics based on data gathered through extensive reconnaissance. In this case, the group utilized CVE-2021-40539 in ManageEngine for intrusion, then masked its Web shell as a legitimate process and erased logs as it went along.

These previously unknown tactics enabled "pervasive access to the victim's environment for an extended period," says Tom Etheridge, chief global professional services officer for CrowdStrike, which didn't reveal details on the victim's location or profile. "They were familiar with the infrastructure that the customer had, and they were diligent about cleaning up their tracks."

**Volt Typhoon's Evolving Cyber Tactics**

CrowdStrike researchers' spidey senses tingled when suspicious activity seemed to be emanating from its unidentified client's network.

The then-unrecognized entity appeared to be performing extensive information-gathering — testing network connectivity, listing processes, gathering user information, and much more. It "indicated a familiarity with the target environment, due to the rapid succession of their commands, as well as having specific internal hostnames and IPs to ping, remote shares to mount, and plaintext credentials to use for \[Windows Management Instrumentation\]," the researchers wrote in their blog post.

It turned out, after some investigating, that the attacker — Volt Typhoon — had deployed a webshell to the network a whole six months prior. How did it go unnoticed for so long?

The story began with CVE-2021-40539, a critical (9.8 CVSS score) remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in ADSelfService Plus, discovered and patched back in Sept. 2021. ManageEngine software, and ADSelfService Plus in particular, has been critically exposed on a number of occasions in recent years (CVE-2021-40539 isn't even its most recent critical 9.8 CVSS RCE vulnerability — that title goes to CVE-2022-47966).

With initial access, the attackers were able to drop a Web shell. Here was where the more interesting stealth began, as the researchers observed "the webshell was attempting to masquerade as a legitimate file of ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus by setting its title to ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus and adding links to legitimate enterprise help desk software."

The group proceeded to siphon administrator credentials and move laterally in the network. It took a cruder, manual approach to covering its tracks this time around, going to "extensive lengths to clear out multiple log files and remove excess files from disk," the researchers explained.

The evidence tampering was extensive, nearly eliminating all traces of malicious activity. However, the attackers forgot to erase the Java source code and compiled Class files from their targeted Apache Tomcat Web server.

"If it wasn't for that slight slip up that was reported in the blog, they probably would have gone unnoticed," Etheridge says.

**How to Defend Against Volt Typhoon Cyberattacks**

Thus far, Volt Typhoon has been observed targeting organizations in the communications, manufacturing, utility, transportation, construction, maritime, government, information technology, and education sectors. It's most notable, however, for seeking out critical infrastructure in the United States and Guam — a strategic point of American defense of Taiwan against China.

According to Etheridge, some of the same principles in this case study could be equally applied to a critical infrastructure breach. "Operational technology (OT)-type environments are typically targeted through IT infrastructure first, before the threat actor moves to the infrastructure," he points out. "Certainly the tactics that we see them deploying would be concerning from a critical infrastructure perspective."

To meet the threat of Volt Typhoon, Etheridge says, one major point is identity management.

"Identity is a huge challenge for a lot of organizations. We've seen a huge uptick in advertisements for stolen credentials, and stolen credentials are leveraged quite extensively in the incidents that we respond to each and every day," he says. In this case, being able to leverage stolen credentials was key to Volt Typhoon's remaining under the radar for so many months.

Etheridge also emphasizes the importance of threat hunting and incident response. Nation-state threat actors are notoriously impossible to stop entirely, but organizations will be better prepared to mitigate the worst possible consequences, he says, if they're able "to understand when something is going on in your environment, and being able to take corrective action quickly."

China's 'Volt Typhoon' APT Turns to Zoho ManageEngine for Fresh Cyberattacks

Identity threat detection and response adds user entity behavioral analytics to fraud detection, creating a powerful tool for real-time protection.

The advantages of using proactive approaches to identify threats before the attackers can cause too much damage are clear to enterprise security teams. One such approach, identity threat detection and response (ITDR), focuses on finding and mitigating threats by monitoring user behavior and detecting anomalies.

ITDR involves continuous monitoring of user identities, activities, and access patterns within an organization's network. Security teams use ITDR tools to detect and respond to potential threats and unauthorized access attempts in real time.

ITDR typically involves the following key components:

*   **Data collection:** Gathering user activity data from various sources, such as log files, network traffic, and application usage.
*   **User profiling:** Creating a baseline of normal user behavior patterns, including access habits, data usage, and time spent on specific tasks.
*   **Anomaly detection:** Comparing current user activities with the established baseline to identify deviations that may indicate potential threats or unauthorized access attempts.
*   **Alerting and response:** Notifying IT security teams of suspicious activities and providing them with the necessary information to investigate and remediate threats.
*   **Continuous improvement:** Updating user behavior baselines and refining detection algorithms as users and threats evolve.

ITDR is not an entirely new concept, as it builds upon established methodologies such as fraud detection and user entity behavioral analysis (UEBA).

Fraud detection refers to the process of identifying and preventing fraudulent activities, such as unauthorized transactions or account takeovers, in industries like banking and finance. Fraud detection systems analyze vast amounts of data, including user behavior, transaction patterns, and historical trends, to identify anomalies that may signal fraud. By detecting potential fraud early, organizations can mitigate financial losses and protect their customers' trust.

Similarly, UEBA is a security approach that focuses on detecting and preventing insider threats by monitoring user activities within an organization's network. UEBA solutions analyze user behavior patterns — such as login times, data access, and system usage — to identify deviations that may indicate malicious intent or compromised accounts. By detecting potential insider threats early, organizations can prevent data breaches and minimize damage to their reputation.

**How ITDR, Fraud Detection, and UEBA Are Similar**

At their core, ITDR, fraud detection, and UEBA share the common goal of identifying and mitigating potential threats by monitoring user behavior and detecting anomalies. While their specific applications may differ, they all leverage advanced analytics, machine learning algorithms, and continuous monitoring to achieve this goal. Here are some key similarities between these approaches:

*   **Centered on data:** All three methodologies rely on the collection and analysis of large volumes of data to detect potential threats. This includes user activities, access patterns, and historical trends, which are used to create a baseline of normal behavior and identify deviations.
*   **Real-time monitoring and detection:** ITDR, fraud detection, and UEBA solutions continuously monitor user activities and analyze data in real time to detect potential threats as they occur. This enables organizations to respond quickly to incidents and minimize damage.
*   **Anomaly detection and alerting:** These methodologies employ advanced analytics and machine learning algorithms to identify anomalies that may signal potential threats. Upon detection, IT security teams are alerted, enabling them to investigate and remediate incidents.
*   **Emphasis on adapting and evolving:** ITDR, fraud detection, and UEBA solutions are designed to adapt and evolve as user behavior and threat landscapes change. By continuously updating behavior baselines and refining detection algorithms, these systems remain effective in detecting new and emerging threats.
*   **Focus on prevention:** These approaches emphasize proactive threat detection and response, aiming to identify potential incidents before they can cause significant harm. By focusing on prevention, organizations can reduce the impact of security breaches and protect their valuable assets.

**Risks and Rewards of Moving to ITDR**

As the cybersecurity landscape continues to evolve, the need for innovative and proactive security solutions becomes increasingly apparent. Heidi Shey, principal analyst at Forrester Research, predicted two serious risks CISOs will encounter in implementing ITDR. First, a C-level executive to be fired for their firm's use of employee monitoring, which can violate data protection laws like GDPR. Second, a Global 500 firm will be exposed for burning out its cybersecurity employees, who are expected to be available 24/7 through major incidents, stay on top of every risk, and deliver results in limited timeframes.

Finally, Shey also predicted that at least three cyber insurance providers will acquire a managed detection and response (MDR) provider in 2023, continuing the trend that Acrisure started in 2022. These MDR acquisitions will give insurers high-value data about attacker activity to refine underwriting guidelines, unparalleled visibility into policyholder environments, and the ability to verify attestations. Such moves will change cyber insurance market dynamics and the requirements for coverage and pricing, which should help push security measures like ITDR into common use.

ITDR is not a radical departure from established cybersecurity methodologies, but rather an extension and refinement of existing practices. By recognizing the common threads between ITDR, fraud detection, and UEBA, organizations can build on their existing security investments and expertise to create a more comprehensive and robust security posture.

Source

DARKReading