Source
ghsa
### Observations The file `packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts` implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (`process.env.ComSpec` on Windows, usually `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe`): https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41 Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by `cmd.exe` expands any environment variable found in command-line above. ### Exploitation This creates a situation where `verifySignature()` can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid. ### Impact This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fet...
In Spring Cloud Function framework, versions 4.1.x prior to 4.1.2, 4.0.x prior to 4.0.8 an application is vulnerable to a DOS attack when attempting to compose functions with non-existing functions. Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true: User is using Spring Cloud Function Web module Affected Spring Products and Versions Spring Cloud Function Framework 4.1.0 to 4.1.2 4.0.0 to 4.0.8 References https://spring.io/security/cve-2022-22979 https://checkmarx.com/blog/spring-function-cloud-dos-cve-2022-22979-and-unintended-function-invocation/ History 2020-01-16: Initial vulnerability report published.
### Impact The phonenumber parsing code may panic due to a reachable `assert!` guard on the phonenumber string. In a typical deployment of rust-phonenumber, this may get triggered by feeding a maliciously crafted phonenumber, e.g. over the network, specifically strings of the form `+dwPAA;phone-context=AA`, where the "number" part potentially parses as a number larger than 2^56. Since f69abee1/0.3.4/#52. 0.2.x series is not affected. ### Patches Upgrade to 0.3.6 or higher. ### Workarounds n/a ### References Whereas https://github.com/whisperfish/rust-phonenumber/issues/69 did not provide an example code path, property testing found a few: `+dwPAA;phone-context=AA`.
### Impact Depending on network and process conditions of a `fetch()` request, `response.arrayBuffer()` might include portion of memory from the Node.js process. ### Patches This has been patched in v6.19.2. ### Workarounds There are no known workaround. ### References https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/3337 https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/3328 https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/3338 https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/f979ec3204ca489abf30e7d20e9fee9ea7711d36
A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the jaraco/zipp library, affecting all versions prior to 3.19.1. The vulnerability is triggered when processing a specially crafted zip file that leads to an infinite loop. This issue also impacts the zipfile module of CPython, as features from the third-party zipp library are later merged into CPython, and the affected code is identical in both projects. The infinite loop can be initiated through the use of functions affecting the `Path` module in both zipp and zipfile, such as `joinpath`, the overloaded division operator, and `iterdir`. Although the infinite loop is not resource exhaustive, it prevents the application from responding. The vulnerability was addressed in version 3.19.1 of jaraco/zipp.
A vulnerability was found in Undertow. This issue requires enabling the learning-push handler in the server's config, which is disabled by default, leaving the maxAge config in the handler unconfigured. The default is -1, which makes the handler vulnerable. If someone overwrites that config, the server is not subject to the attack. The attacker needs to be able to reach the server with a normal HTTP request.
A vulnerability was found in Undertow, where the chunked response hangs after the body was flushed. The response headers and body were sent but the client would continue waiting as Undertow does not send the expected `0\r\n` termination of the chunked response. This results in uncontrolled resource consumption, leaving the server side to a denial of service attack. This happens only with Java 17 TLSv1.3 scenarios.
### Impact When relying on SSO providers in combination with local authentication it can be possible to enumerate existing SSO users in the instance. This is possible because if an email address exists in Directus and belongs to a known SSO provider then it will throw a "helpful" error that the user belongs to another provider. ### Reproduction 1. Create a user using a SSO provider `[email protected]`. 2. Try to log-in using the regular login form (or the API) 3. When using a valid email address | **APP** | **API** | | --- | --- | | ![image](https://github.com/directus/directus/assets/9389634/1da3301d-226f-46a7-bfb8-3f6fb9bc55cd) | ![image](https://github.com/directus/directus/assets/9389634/50cab310-7d1c-4241-a6be-d06542565767) | 4. When using an invalid email address | **APP** | **API** | | --- | --- | | ![image](https://github.com/directus/directus/assets/9389634/7b97659e-b49c-410b-872e-e36786b6e41e) | ![image](https://github.com/directus/directus/assets/9389634/d26ccba7-bb27-43...
### Summary A denial of service (DoS) attack by field duplication in GraphQL is a type of attack where an attacker exploits the flexibility of GraphQL to overwhelm a server by requesting the same field multiple times in a single query. This can cause the server to perform redundant computations and consume excessive resources, leading to a denial of service for legitimate users. ### Details Request to the endpoint /graphql are sent when visualizing graphs generated at a dashboard: ![image](https://github.com/directus/directus/assets/114263468/185eb60f-9092-47d4-81f4-add1a53e99c8) ![DoS5](https://github.com/directus/directus/assets/114263468/f43079f5-b9ab-4704-938f-dcb91453d464) By modifying the data sent and duplicating many times the fields a DoS attack is possible. ### PoC The goal is to create a payload that generates a body like this, where the 'max' field is duplicated many times, each with the 'id' field duplicated many times inside it. `{'query': 'query { query_4f4722ea: t...
The affected versions make unsafe memory accesses under the assumption that `#[repr(packed)]` has a guaranteed field order. The Rust specification does not guarantee this, and https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/125360 (1.80.0-beta) starts reordering fields of `#[repr(packed)]` structs, leading to illegal memory accesses. The patched versions `0.9.7` and `0.10.4` use `#[repr(C, packed)]`, which guarantees field order.