ghsa

### Impact Privilege escalation in IAM import API, all users are impacted since MinIO commit 580d9db85e04f1b63cc2909af50f0ed08afa965f ### Patches ``` commit f246c9053f9603e610d98439799bdd2a6b293427 Author: Aditya Manthramurthy <[email protected]> Date: Wed Dec 11 18:09:40 2024 -0800 fix: Privilege escalation in IAM import API (#20756) This API had missing permissions checking, allowing a user to change their policy mapping by: 1. Craft iam-info.zip file: Update own user permission in user_mappings.json 2. Upload it via `mc admin cluster iam import nobody iam-info.zip` Here `nobody` can be a user with pretty much any kind of permission (but not anonymous) and this ends up working. Some more detailed steps - start from a fresh setup: ``` ./minio server /tmp/d{1...4} & mc alias set myminio http://localhost:9000 minioadmin minioadmin mc admin user add myminio nobody nobody123 mc admin poli...

Mattermost versions 10.1.x <= 10.1.2, 10.0.x <= 10.0.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.4, 9.5.x <= 9.5.12 fail to properly validate the type of callProps which allows a user to cause a client side (webapp and mobile) DoS to users of particular channels, by sending a specially crafted post.

Mattermost versions 10.1.x <= 10.1.2, 10.0.x <= 10.0.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.4, and 9.5.x <= 9.5.12 fail to prevent concurrently checking and updating the failed login attempts. which allows an attacker to bypass of "Max failed attempts" restriction and send a big number of login attempts before being blocked via simultaneously sending multiple login requests

Mattermost versions 10.1.x <= 10.1.2, 10.0.x <= 10.0.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.4, 9.5.x <= 9.5.12 fail to limit the file size for slack import file uploads which allows a user to cause a DoS via zip bomb by importing data in a team they are a team admin.

### Impact Users hosting D-Tale publicly can be vulnerable to remote code execution allowing attackers to run malicious code on the server. ### Patches Users should upgrade to version 3.16.1 where the `update-settings` endpoint blocks the ability for users to update the `enable_custom_filters` flag. You can find out more information on how to turn that flag on [here](https://github.com/man-group/dtale#custom-filter) ### Workarounds The only workaround for versions earlier than 3.16.1 is to only host D-Tale to trusted users. ### References See "Custom Filter" [documentation](https://github.com/man-group/dtale#custom-filter)

### Summary A vulnerability exists in the FAQ Record component where a privileged attacker can trigger a file download on a victim's machine upon page visit by embedding it in an <iframe> element without user interaction or explicit consent. ### Details In http://localhost/admin/index.php?action=editentry&id=20&lang=en, where a FAQ record is either created or edited, an attacker can insert an iframe, as "source code", pointing to a prior "malicious" attachment that the attacker has uploaded via FAQ "new attachment" upload, such that any page visits to this FAQ will trigger an automated download (from the edit screen, download is automated; from the faq page view as a normal user, depending on the browser, a pop up confirmation may be presented before the actual download. Firebox browser, for instance, does not require any interactions).  ### PoC 1. create a new FAQ record and upload a "maliciou...

### Impact XML parsing performed by the UcumEssenceService is vulnerable to XML external entity injections. A processed XML file with a malicious DTD tag could produce XML containing data from the host system. This impacts use cases where ucum is being used to within a host where external clients can submit XML. ### Patches Release 1.0.9 of ucum fixes this vulnerability ### Workarounds Ensure that the source xml for instantiating UcumEssenceService is trusted. ### References * https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html * https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#jaxp-documentbuilderfactory-saxparserfactory-and-dom4j

A vulnerability has been discovered in Laravel Pulse that could allow remote code execution through the public `remember()` method in the `Laravel\Pulse\Livewire\Concerns\RemembersQueries` trait. This method is accessible via Livewire components and can be exploited to call arbitrary callables within the application. ### Impact An authenticated user with access to Laravel Pulse dashboard can execute arbitrary code by calling any function or static method that meets the following criteria: - The callable is a function or static method - The callable has no parameters or no strict parameter types ### Vulnerable Components - The `remember(callable $query, string $key = '')` method in `Laravel\Pulse\Livewire\Concerns\RemembersQueries` - Affects all Pulse card components that use this trait ### Attack Vectors The vulnerability can be exploited through Livewire component interactions, for example: ```php wire:click="remember('\\Illuminate\\Support\\Facades\\Config::all', 'config')" `...

Versions of the package spatie/browsershot before 5.0.1 are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation due to improper URL validation through the setUrl method. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by using leading whitespace (%20) before the file:// protocol, resulting in Local File Inclusion, which allows the attacker to read sensitive files on the server.

Versions of the package djoser before 2.3.0 are vulnerable to Authentication Bypass when the authenticate() function fails. This is because the system falls back to querying the database directly, granting access to users with valid credentials, and eventually bypassing custom authentication checks such as two-factor authentication, LDAP validations, or requirements from configured AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS.