ghsa

Failing to properly dissociate system related configuration from user generated configuration, the Form Framework (system extension "form") is vulnerable to SQL injection and Privilege Escalation. Basically instructions can be persisted to a form definition file that were not configured to be modified - this applies to definitions managed using the form editor module as well as direct file upload using the regular file list module. A valid backend user account as well as having system extension form activated are needed in order to exploit this vulnerability.

Phar files (formerly known as "PHP archives") can act als self extracting archives which leads to the fact that source code is executed when Phar files are invoked. The Phar file format is not limited to be stored with a dedicated file extension - "bundle.phar" would be valid as well as "bundle.txt" would be. This way, Phar files can be obfuscated as image or text file which would not be denied from being uploaded and persisted to a TYPO3 installation. Due to a missing sanitization of user input, those Phar files can be invoked by manipulated URLs in TYPO3 backend forms. A valid backend user account is needed to exploit this vulnerability. In theory the attack vector would be possible in the TYPO3 frontend as well, however no functional exploit has been identified so far.

It has been discovered that TYPO3’s Salted Password system extension (which is a mandatory system component) is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass when using hashing methods which are related by PHP class inheritance. In standard TYPO3 core distributions stored passwords using the blowfish hashing algorithm can be overridden when using MD5 as the default hashing algorithm by just knowing a valid username. Per default the Portable PHP hashing algorithm (PHPass) is used which is not vulnerable.

Twig is affected by path traversal vulnerability when used with Twig_Loader_Filesystem for loading Twig templates but only if the application is using non-trusted template names (names provided by a end-user for instance). When affected, it is possible to go up one directory for the paths configured in the application's loader. For instance, if the filesystem loader is configured with /path/to/templates as a path to look for templates, an attacker can force Twig to include a file stored in /path/to by prepending the path with /../ like in {% include "/../somefile_in_path_to" %} Note that using anything else (like ../somefile, /../../somefile, or ../../somefile) won’t work and the application will return a proper exception.

titon/framework package (which is now abandoned and no longer maintained) is vulnerable to remote code execution via Chosen-Ciphertext Attack.

An authentication bypass was identifed in thelia/thelia project for customer and admin. This vulnerability is present from version 2.1.0-beta1 and is fixed in 2.1.3 and 2.2.0-alpha1.

The BackOffice of Thelia (`error.html` template) has a cross-site scripting vulnerability in version 2.1.0 and 2.1.1 but not version 2.0.X. Version 2.1.2 contains a patch for the issue.

The BackOffice of Thelia (`error.html` template) has a cross-site scripting vulnerability in version 2.1.0 and 2.1.1 but not version 2.0.X. Version 2.1.2 contains a patch for the issue.

## Impact The currently selected widget values were not correctly sanitized before passing it to the database, leading to an SQL injection possibility. ## Patches The issue has been patched in tablelookupwizard version 3.3.5 and version 4.0.0. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in https://github.com/terminal42/contao-tablelookupwizard - Email us at [email protected]

Symfony 2.0.11 carried a [similar] XXE security fix, however, on review of ZF2 I also noted a vulnerability to XML Entity Expansion (XEE) attacks whereby all extensions making use of libxml2 have no defense against XEE Quadratic Blowup Attacks. The vulnerability is a function of there being no current method of disabling custom entities in PHP (i.e. defined internal to the XML document without using external entities). In a QBA, a long entity can be defined and then referred to multiple times in document elements, creating a memory sink with which Denial Of Service attacks against a host's RAM can be mounted. The use of the LIBXML_NOENT or equivalent option in a dependent extension amplified the impact (it doesn't actually mean "No Entities"). In addition, libxml2's innate defense against the related Exponential or Billion Laugh's XEE attacks is active only so long as the LIBXML_PARSEHUGE is NOT set (it disables libxml2's hardcoded entity recursion limit). No instances of these two opt...