Source
ghsa
### Impact The Fides web application allows a custom integration to be uploaded as a ZIP file containing configuration and dataset definitions in YAML format. It was discovered that specially crafted YAML dataset and config files allow a malicious user to perform arbitrary requests to internal systems and exfiltrate data outside the environment (also known as a Server-Side Request Forgery). The application does not perform proper validation to block attempts to connect to internal (including localhost) resources. Exploitation is limited to API clients with the `CONNECTOR_TEMPLATE_REGISTER` authorization scope. In the Fides Admin UI this scope is restricted to highly privileged users, specifically root users and users with the owner role. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version `2.22.1`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds.
### Impact The length of URIs and the various parts (eg path segments, query parameters) is usually limited by the webserver processing the incoming request. In the case of Puma the defaults are : - path segment length: 8192 - Max URI length: 1024 * 12 - Max query length: 1024 * 10 See https://github.com/puma/puma/blob/master/docs/compile_options.md If too long Puma raises: > Puma caught this error: HTTP element REQUEST_PATH is longer than the (8192) allowed length (was 12503) (Puma::HttpParserError) However due to the performance of `hashids` extremely long encoded IDs will consume a large amount of CPU and allocate a huge number of intermediate objects. For example: ``` curl -vvv https://localhost.ssl:3000//dos?id=abcd-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...
### Impact Given specially crafted zip or JAR file, `IO.unzip` allows writing of arbitrary file. The follow is an example of a malicious entry: ``` +2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys ``` This would have a potential to overwrite `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. Within sbt's main code, `IO.unzip` is used in `pullRemoteCache` task and `Resolvers.remote`; however many projects use `IO.unzip(...)` directly to implement custom tasks - https://github.com/search?q=IO.unzip+language%3AScala&type=code&l=Scala&p=1 ### Patches The problem has been patched in https://github.com/sbt/io/pull/360 sbt 1.9.7 is available with the fix. ### Workarounds A workaround might be use some other library to unzip. ### References - https://github.com/snyk/zip-slip-vulnerability - https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGCODEHAUSPLEXUS-31680 - https://github.com/sbt/io/issues/358
### Summary `maxBodyLebgth` was not used when receiving Message objects. Attackers could just send a very large Message causing a memory overflow and triggering an OOM Error. ### PoC #### RbbitMQ * Use RabbitMQ 3.11.16 as MQ and specify Message Body size 512M (here it only needs to be larger than the Consumer memory) * Start RabbitMQ #### Producer * Build a String of length 256M and send it to Consumer ``` package org.springframework.amqp.helloworld; import org.springframework.amqp.core.AmqpTemplate; import org.springframework.context.ApplicationContext; import org.springframework.context.annotation.AnnotationConfigApplicationContext; public class Producer { public static void main(String[] args) { ApplicationContext context = new AnnotationConfigApplicationContext(HelloWorldConfiguration.class); AmqpTemplate amqpTemplate = context.getBean(AmqpTemplate.class); String s = "A"; for(int i=0;i<28;++i){ s = s + s; System.o...
### Impact Parse Server crashes when uploading a file without extension. ### Patches A permanent fix has been implemented to prevent the server from crashing. ### Workarounds There are no known workarounds. ### References - GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-792q-q67h-w579 - Patched in Parse Server 6: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/6.3.1 - Patched in Parse Server 5 (LTS): https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/5.5.6
Multiple Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Concrete CMS v.9.2.1 allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted script to the Header and Footer Tracking Codes of the SEO & Statistics.
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Airflow. This issue affects Apache Airflow from 2.4.0 to 2.7.0. Sensitive configuration information has been exposed to authenticated users with the ability to read configuration via Airflow REST API for configuration even when the expose_config option is set to non-sensitive-only. The expose_config option is False by default. It is recommended to upgrade to a version that is not affected if you set expose_config to non-sensitive-only configuration. This is a different error than CVE-2023-45348 which allows authenticated user to retrieve individual configuration values in 2.7.* by specially crafting their request (solved in 2.7.2). Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.7.2, which fixes the issue and additionally fixes CVE-2023-45348.
pkg/suci/suci.go in free5GC udm before 1.2.0, when Go before 1.19 is used, allows an Invalid Curve Attack because it may compute a shared secret via an uncompressed public key that has not been validated. An attacker can send arbitrary SUCIs to the UDM, which tries to decrypt them via both its private key and the attacker's public key.
views/switch.py in django-grappelli (aka Django Grappelli) before 2.15.2 attempts to prevent external redirection with startswith("/") but this does not consider a protocol-relative URL (e.g., //example.com) attack.
views.py in Wagtail CRX CodeRed Extensions (formerly CodeRed CMS or coderedcms) before 0.22.3 allows upward protected/..%2f..%2f path traversal when serving protected media.