#auth

Authd PAM module up to version 0.3.4 can allow broker-managed users to impersonate any other user managed by the same broker and perform any PAM operation with it, including authenticating as them. This is possible using tools such as `su`, `sudo` or `ssh` (and potentially others) that, so far, do not ensure that the PAM user at the end of the transaction is matching the one who initiated the transaction. Authd 0.3.5 fixes this by not allowing changing the user unless it was never set before in the PAM stack. `su` version that will include https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/pull/3206 will not be affected `ssh` version that will include https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/521 will not be affected `sudo` version that will include https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/pull/412 will not be affected `login` not affected `passwd` not affected <details> <summary>Old report</summary> ### Summary An user can access as another user using its own credentials ### Details ...

`JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` is the authentication measure on the unit hook tool abstract domain socket. It looks like `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID=appname/0-update-status-6073989428498739633`. This value looks fairly unpredictable, but due to the random source used, it is highly predictable. `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` has the following components: - the application name - the unit number - the hook being currently run - a uint63 decimal number On a system the application name and unit number can be deduced by reading the structure of the filesystem. The current hook being run is not easily deduce-able, but is a limited set of possible values, so one could try them all. Finally the random number, this is generated from a non cryptographically secure random source. Specifically the random number generator built into the go standard library, using the current unix time in seconds (at startup) as the seed. There is no rate limiting on the abstract domain socket, the only limiting factor is time (window of time the h...

For years, securing a company’s systems was synonymous with securing its “perimeter.” There was what was safe “inside” and the unsafe outside world. We built sturdy firewalls and deployed sophisticated detection systems, confident that keeping the barbarians outside the walls kept our data and systems safe. The problem is that we no longer operate within the confines of physical on-prem

San Francisco, United States / California, 3rd October 2024, CyberNewsWire

Singapore, Singapore, 3rd October 2024, CyberNewsWire

Businesses that successfully manage the complexities of multicloud management will be best positioned to thrive in an increasingly digital and interconnected world.

Acronis Cyber Infrastructure (ACI) is an IT infrastructure solution that provides storage, compute, and network resources. Businesses and Service Providers are using it for data storage, backup storage, creating and managing virtual machines and software-defined networks, running cloud-native applications in production environments. This Metasploit module exploits a default password vulnerability in ACI which allow an attacker to access the ACI PostgreSQL database and gain administrative access to the ACI Web Portal. This opens the door for the attacker to upload SSH keys that enables root access to the appliance/server. This attack can be remotely executed over the WAN as long as the PostgreSQL and SSH services are exposed to the outside world. ACI versions 5.0 before build 5.0.1-61, 5.1 before build 5.1.1-71, 5.2 before build 5.2.1-69, 5.3 before build 5.3.1-53, and 5.4 before build 5.4.4-132 are vulnerable.

dizqueTV version 1.5.3 suffers from a remote code execution vulnerability.

openSIS version 9.1 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

reNgine version 2.2.0 suffers from an authenticated command injection vulnerability.