#git

### Summary This report details a security vulnerability in Argo CD, where an unauthenticated attacker can send a specially crafted large JSON payload to the /api/webhook endpoint, causing excessive memory allocation that leads to service disruption by triggering an Out Of Memory (OOM) kill. The issue poses a high risk to the availability of Argo CD deployments. ### Details The webhook server always listens to requests. By default, the endpoint doesn't require authentication. It's possible to send a large, malicious request with headers (in this case "X-GitHub-Event: push") that will make ArgoCD start allocating memory to parse the incoming request. Since the request can be constructed client-side without allocating large amounts of memory, it can be arbitrarily large. Eventually, the argocd-server component will get OOMKilled as it consumes all its available memory. The fix would be to enforce a limit on the size of the request being parsed. ### PoC Port-forward to the argocd-serve...

An vulnerability in the handling of Latex exists in Ankitects Anki 24.04. When Latex is sanitized to prevent unsafe commands, the verbatim package, which comes installed by default in many Latex distributions, has been overlooked. A specially crafted flashcard can lead to an arbitrary file read. An attacker can share a flashcard to trigger this vulnerability.

An arbitrary script execution vulnerability exists in the MPV functionality of Ankitects Anki 24.04. A specially crafted flashcard can lead to a arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send malicious flashcard to trigger this vulnerability.

A blocklist bypass vulnerability exists in the LaTeX functionality of Ankitects Anki 24.04. A specially crafted malicious flashcard can lead to an arbitrary file creation at a fixed path. An attacker can share a malicious flashcard to trigger this vulnerability.

Data from the Heritage Foundation containing at least half a million passwords and usernames are available online

### Impact Users using the `ValidatingResolver` for DNSSEC validation can run into CPU exhaustion with specially crafted DNSSEC-signed zones. ### Patches Users should upgrade to dnsjava v3.6.0 ### Workarounds Although not recommended, only using a non-validating resolver, will remove the vulnerability. ### References https://www.athene-center.de/en/keytrap

### Summary Records in DNS replies are not checked for their relevance to the query, allowing an attacker to respond with RRs from different zones. ### Details DNS Messages are not authenticated. They do not guarantee that - received RRs are authentic - not received RRs do not exist - all or any received records in a response relate to the request Applications utilizing DNSSEC generally expect these guarantees to be met, however DNSSEC by itself only guarantees the first two. To meet the third guarantee, resolvers generally follow an (undocumented, as far as RFCs go) algorithm such as: (simplified, e.g. lacks DNSSEC validation!) 1. denote by `QNAME` the name you are querying (e.g. fraunhofer.de.), and initialize a list of aliases 2. if the ANSWER section contains a valid PTR RRSet for `QNAME`, return it (and optionally return the list of aliases as well) 3. if the ANSWER section contains a valid CNAME RRSet for `QNAME`, add it to the list of aliases. Set `QNAME` to the CNAME's ta...

The relationship between various TDSs and DNS associated with Vigorish Viper and the final landing experience for the user A Chinese organized crime syndicate with links to money laundering and human trafficking across Southeast Asia has been using an advanced "technology suite" that runs the whole cybercrime supply chain spectrum to spearhead its operations. Infoblox is tracking the proprietor

When editing a user, group or any object in the Syncope Console, HTML tags could be added to any text field and could lead to potential exploits. The same vulnerability was found in the Syncope Enduser, when editing "Personal Information" or "User Requests". Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.0.8, which fixes this issue.

For RocketMQ versions 5.2.0 and below, under certain conditions, there is a risk of exposure of sensitive Information to an unauthorized actor even if RocketMQ is enabled with authentication and authorization functions. An attacker, possessing regular user privileges or listed in the IP whitelist, could potentially acquire the administrator's account and password through specific interfaces. Such an action would grant them full control over RocketMQ, provided they have access to the broker IP address list. To mitigate these security threats, it is strongly advised that users upgrade to version 5.3.0 or newer. Additionally, we recommend users to use RocketMQ ACL 2.0 instead of the original RocketMQ ACL when upgrading to version Apache RocketMQ 5.3.0.